Duquesne University

Duquesne Scholarship Collection
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Spring 2015

A Constructive Account of Children's Moral Agency Drawing on
Thomas Aquinas's Theory of Emotions
Ann Vinski

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Vinski, A. (2015). A Constructive Account of Children's Moral Agency Drawing on Thomas Aquinas's
Theory of Emotions (Master's thesis, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1314

This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne
Scholarship Collection.

A CONSTRUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF CHILDREN’S MORAL AGENCY
DRAWING ON THOMAS AQUINAS’S THEORY OF EMOTIONS

A Dissertation
Submitted to the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Ann Crawford Vinski

May 2015

Copyright by
Ann Crawford Vinski

2015

A CONSTRUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF CHILDREN’S MORAL AGENCY
DRAWING ON THOMAS AQUINAS’S THEORY OF EMOTIONS

By
Ann Crawford Vinski
Approved February 23, 2015

________________________________
Elizabeth Agnew Cochran, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Theology
Dissertation Director

________________________________
James Bailey, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Theology
Committee Member

________________________________
Darlene Fozard Weaver, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Theology
Committee Member

________________________________
Maureen R. O’Brien, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Theology
Chair, Department of Theology

________________________________
James Swindal, Ph.D.
Dean, McAnulty College and
Graduate School of Liberal Arts

iii

ABSTRACT

A CONSTRUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF CHILDREN’S MORAL AGENCY DRAWING
ON THOMAS AQUINAS’S THEORY OF EMOTIONS

By
Ann Crawford Vinski
May 2015

Dissertation supervised by Elizabeth Agnew Cochran, Ph.D.
This dissertation makes the case that children are moral agents engaged with the
morality of their communities without being morally accountable as adults.
Contemporary Christian theological anthropology holds that children are fully human and
in the image of God, and that they are already encountering good and evil in the world.
Childhood is viewed as an essential part of human life and as something that perdures
throughout a person’s existence. Through their emotions, children are able to engage
with, make meaning of, and respond to their surroundings, and these early emotional
experiences help to shape each person for the whole of that person’s life.
Philosophical and theological theories of emotion that include a cognitive
component help make the case for emotions’ part in moral development and moral

iv

agency. After examining some of these theories, the dissertation turns to Thomas
Aquinas’s theory of emotions for a robust description that integrates—while maintaining
the distinction between—thought and passion in the complex, multilayered experience
that we call emotion. Aquinas views reason and emotion as mutually informative and as
having a cumulative effect on one another. Early passional experiences are the building
blocks of what will become virtuous emotions, and emotion is necessary for an action to
be truly virtuous, according to Aquinas. Aquinas’s model allows us to attribute moral
agency to children because children have emotions through which they engage the world
and that partially motivate their actions. At the same time, because their rational powers
are inchoate, their accountability is limited.
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INTRODUCTION

Although theological interest in children has seen a resurgence in the last few
decades,1 children’s moral agency has remained largely on the margins in moral
theology.2 Much contemporary theological anthropology affirms the full humanity and

Marcia Bunge, “The Child, Religion, and the Academy: Developing Robust Theological
and Religious Understandings of Children and Childhood,” Journal of Religion 86, no. 4
(2006): 555-559. DeVries claims the resurgence is more recent, beginning with Theology
Today 56 no. 4 (2000) and Marcia Bunge’s (ed.) The Child in Christian Thought (Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001) (Dawn DeVries, “Toward
a Theology of Childhood,” Interpretation 55, no. 2 [2001]: 162 n. 5). Thatcher argues
that children are still neglected in all areas of theology (Adrian Thatcher, “Theology and
Children: Towards a Theology of Childhood,” Transformation 23, no. 4 [2006]: 194).
Whitmore argues that the Catholic Church lacks an official teaching regarding children,
and his article is an attempt to “redress the lacuna in official church documents” by
offering “an alternative account of children based on themes drawn from Catholic social
teaching” (Todd Whitmore [with Tobias L. Winright], “Children: An Undeveloped
Theme in Catholic Teaching,” in The Challenge of Global Stewardship: Roman Catholic
Responses, ed. Maura Anne Ryan and Todd Whitmore [Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1997], 161-163). Wall divides theological scholarship on children into
two “waves.” The first wave made the case for the full humanity and agency of children
in contrast to the then-common view of children as “adults-in-the-making.” The second
wave, which began in the late 1990s, sought “to include children as research and societal
participants” (John Wall, “Imagining Childism: How Childhood Should Transform
Religious Ethics,” in Children, Adults, and Shared Responsibilities: Jewish, Christian,
and Muslim Perspectives, ed. Marcia J. Bunge [New York: Cambridge University Press,
2012], 137-138). Herzog contends that children have been absent from work in
systematic theology, church history, and biblical theology (Kristin Herzog, Children and
Our Global Future: Theological and Social Challenges [Cleveland, OH: The Pilgrim
Press, 2005], 1).
2
See Wall, “Imagining Childism,” 135; and Kate M. Ott, “Searching for an Ethic:
Sexuality, Children, and Moral Agency,” in New Feminist Christianity: Many Voices,
Many Views, ed. Mary E. Hunt and Diann L. Neu (Woodstock, VT: Skylight Paths
Publishing, 2010), 160. When considering children as a group separately from adults, it is
1

xi

moral agency of children, but in moral theology, children are often seen as the objects of
moral action rather than as fully human moral actors. One reason for this is that moral
accountability is frequently closely associated with moral agency, and so children, who
are not held accountable as adults, are also not considered to be moral agents. Moral
accountability rests in part upon a level of rationality that allows a person to understand
and control her actions. Children’s inchoate rational powers preclude their being able to
take the same level of responsibility for their actions that adults must. While I agree that
children should not be held accountable as adults, I distinguish agency from
accountability, and I critique the contemporary focus on rationality as central to moral
agency.
In this dissertation, I define moral agency as a person’s ability to engage as a
moral actor within her environment, which includes her relationships with other people,
the good and evil she encounters in the world, as well as the moral codes that are part of
her context. This will often involve acting intentionally and having a level of ownership
of those actions. I take both the moral engagement and the actions to be morally
formative of that person. This agency is distinct from accountability for one’s actions.
Thus, while I argue that children have moral agency, I do not contend that they should be
accountable to the same degree that adults are.
I suggest that turning to the emotional dimension of moral motivation and virtue
can serve as a corrective that allows us to acknowledge children’s agency even while
their reason is developing and their experiences are still forming them. To do this, I draw
important to bear in mind that doing so risks “mask[ing] some communalities in how
specific groups of children and their parents are marginalized” (Michel Vandenbroeck
and Maria Bouverne-de Bie, “Children’s Agency and Educational Norms: A Tensed
Negotiation,” Childhood 13 [2006]: 140).
xii

on Thomas Aquinas’s theory of emotions, which differentiates between reason and
emotion, but at the same time maintains the cognitive penetrability of emotion. I argue
that while reason and emotion are both involved in accountability and agency,
accountability requires a level of reason and experience that children have not yet
acquired, but at the same time, their emotions allow them to participate in the moral
community as agents.

Problematic Historical Views of Children
Historically, there has been a tendency among some theologians to view children
as either innately depraved or innately innocent.3 Neither characterization adequately
accounts for the moral development of children as agents who are fully human, engaged
with the good and the evil that they encounter in relationships and in their environments.
When children are viewed as inherently depraved, the implication is that there is
something fundamentally wrong with them when they enter the world. Children, on this
view, have nothing to offer and require external discipline to overcome their evil
tendencies. Some of those who have regarded children as innately sinful have made the
theological move of attributing to them a need for grace due to this sinfulness.4 There is
an ambiguity in understanding children both as created to be recipients of grace and
created as innately sinful.5 To claim that children are fundamentally sinful implies that

John Wall characterizes these as the “top-down story” (children are innately depraved)
and the “bottom-up story” (children are inherently innocent) (John Wall, Ethics in Light
of Childhood [Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010], 15-18, 20-23).
4
Jensen names Proverbs, Augustine, Chrysostom, and Luther, noting that all of them see
children as somehow sinful or touched by sin and requiring grace (David Hadley Jensen,
Graced Vulnerability: A Theology of Childhood [Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim, 2005], 6).
5
Jensen identifies this ambiguity (Jensen, Graced Vulnerability, 4-6).
3
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they are created such that they are essentially inclined away from God. At the same time,
to claim that children require grace implies that they are open and receptive to God’s
presence and activity, which inherent sinfulness would seem to make difficult if not
preclude.
In addition, when innate depravity is ascribed to children, they are seen as
needing to become obedient both to their earthly parents and to God in order to overcome
their proclivity to evil. Learning to obey their earthly parents is supposed to help them
learn to obey God. I see a severely restricted understanding of agency being granted to
children when their goal as children is to learn obedience.6 If they are only agents of
another person’s will for them through obedience, they do not learn to develop the ability
to make moral decisions, or to develop their own understanding of their moral context
and take responsibility for their own actions.7 Obedience can be one aspect of children’s

6

Alasdair MacIntyre develops a similar position in his critique of the Stoic view that
virtue consists in following universal laws. He argues that for the Stoics, adherence to the
cosmic law becomes the good, and there is no telos beyond it. The cosmic law is singular
and universal, and everyone must follow it. This disallows taking individual political
situations, circumstances, and interests into account in making moral decisions (Alasdair
MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1984], 169-170). MacIntyre’s view is that, “knowing how to act virtuously
always involves more than rule-following” (93).
7
Bunge explores the theme of children’s agency through the lens of what she calls the
vocation or calling of children. Children are to love and fear God (Marcia Bunge,
“Beyond Children as Agents or Victims: Reexamining Children's Paradoxical Strengths
and Vulnerabilities with Resources from Christian Theologies of Childhood and Child
Theologies,” in The Given Child: The Religions’ Contribution to Children’s Citizenship,
ed. Trygve Wyller and Usha S. Nayar [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007], 4445), to whom they owe ultimate loyalty (42-43). Bunge cites biblical sources that call
children to honor and obey their parents, and she holds that children’s vocation includes
obedience to their parents (40-42), except when their parents are leading them into sin
(42). They should disobey in these cases because their ultimate loyalty belongs to God.
How the child knows when she is being led into sin is left unaddressed. At the same time,
Bunge thinks children have the agency to “name and reject injustices” and to disobey
anyone, including their parents, who asks them to “cause or perpetuate injustices.” Their
xiv

moral formation, but I will argue that effective moral development leads to virtue, a
moral excellence that shapes an agent’s character in a manner that is necessary to her
flourishing. This means that children must learn to identify for themselves the morality of
situations and then desire to act in accord with the good as they understand it.
Another major historical view that deprives children of moral agency presents
them as innocent and inherently good. John Locke thought children were completely
impressionable and moldable,8 and Jean-Jacques Rousseau contended that children were
inherently innocent and required protection from external corruption.9 The rise of the
middle-class family in the West around the middle of the nineteenth century was the
historical framework in which Christian writers began to describe children as inherently
good.10 As children’s economic value to society diminished, their emotional value to the

agency also includes serving others (47). Children’s vocation means that they should
prepare for their futures through their education (45) and be in the present in their play
(46-47). Bunge sees this vocation of children as recognizing that their moral agency is
already present, but that parents and other adults have a responsibility for teaching the
children in their care (47, 48). Her position seems to presume a level of knowledge of
what constitutes sin and injustice that is not always present in children’s lives, and it
offers a vision of children’s agency that is based on obedience. Even if the child disobeys
her parents in cases where she would be led into sin, Bunge suggests that her reason for
doing so should be obedience to God. Bunge’s account is beneficial in that it highlights
the tensions that exist in children’s agency—between obedience and judgment, and
between being (children who play) and becoming (preparing for adulthood)—but it is
unclear how the child moves from obedience to independent decision-making and
eventual accountability.
8
Bonnie Miller-McLemore, Let the Children Come: Re-Imagining Childhood from a
Christian Perspective (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003), 13.
9
Jensen, Graced Vulnerability, 6; and Miller-McLemore, Let the Children Come, 14.
10
This model arose in a climate wherein men were considered suited to working in the
world and women were to focus their attention on being excellent domestics (Cristina L.
H. Traina, “Learning from the Tradition: The Religious Lives of Children,” New
Theology Review [August 2001]: 19).
xv

family increased.11 This corresponded to a shift in child-rearing from an approach that
focused on teaching morality through obedience to an emphasis on nurturing children.12
At the same time, the Western middle-class view of children within the family places the
responsibility for their moral formation completely on their parents and denies that
children have an active role in their own development.13 Thus, concurrently with children
coming to be seen as romanticized and innocent, both morally and spiritually, adult
concern for children’s moral development decreased.14 On this view, society is the
corrupting force in children’s lives,15 and, in order to maintain their original innocence,
children require protection from outside forces that might pervert them. But, if children
are over-protected, what happens when they do encounter the mystery of evil in the world
and in relationships? The same problem posed by ascribing innate sinfulness to children
also results from this idealized view of children that excessively shelters them. Namely,
they do not develop the abilities needed to engage moral situations and to determine what
in their own desires is guiding them towards good and what towards evil.

11

Miller-McLemore, Let the Children Come, 6. Van der Ven presents a description of
“the relationships between economic processes and discipline” of children (Johannes A.
Van der Ven, Formation of the Moral Self [Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1998], 44-47).
12
Traina, “Learning from the Tradition,” 19.
13
Miller-McLemore, Let the Children Come, 14. Traina notes that, according to some
thinkers of the time, “children are delivered good but incompletely formed; their eventual
character is completely dependent on the quality of nurture they receive from their
parents, mainly their mothers” (Traina, “Learning from the Tradition,” 19). Further, as
Vandenbroeck and Bouverne-de Bie state, “the construction of the Fragile Child (the
child at risk) was closely interconnected with the construction of the Responsible Mother
with a dual responsibility: towards her child, as well as towards society” (Vandenbroeck,
“Children’s Agency and Educational Norms,” 131).
14
Miller-McLemore, Let the Children Come, 6, 13.
15
Jensen, Graced Vulnerability, 6.
xvi

A third problematic perspective of children presents them as adults-in-themaking.16 Thomas Aquinas held this view and thought that children grew into full
personhood as their reason developed.17 Because Aquinas’s thought serves as a
constructive resource in this project, it is important to acknowledge that his legacy
contains elements that pose difficulties when considered in light of contemporary
theological anthropology that addresses children.18 In the remainder of this section, I will
outline some of his troublesome ideas, and in the next section, I will discuss his thoughts
that serve as building blocks for a constructive account of children’s moral agency.
Three of Aquinas’s positions on children are particularly problematic: the
dismissal of young children as uneducable; the view of children as incomplete; and the
notion that children cannot be in relationship with God. All of these stem from the
centrality of reason in Aquinas’s thought. According to Aquinas, being able to use reason
is what allows people to worship God (ST II-II.10.12) and to be accountable for their

16

Jensen, Graced Vulnerability, 8. Ellen Linder argues that although Christianity and
Judaism affirm the dignity of the child, some of these religious communities treat
children as not-yet fully human, as “potential subjects or agents.” “In religious
communities in which this notion of ‘not yet’ is linked with an ethic of love and concern
for the child, this belief is so strong that early religious training of children is referred to
as ‘formation.’ These communities believe that only through a process of formation can
the raw material of humanity, a child, be transformed into the culmination of human
striving, a mature believer” (Ellen W. Linder, “Children as Theologians,” in Rethinking
Childhood, ed. Peter B. Pufall and Richard P. Unsworth, [New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 2004], 57-58).
17
Wall, Ethics, 26. Aquinas did not provide a systematic treatment of the subject of
children in his writings. Cristina Traina’s essay, “A Person in the Making: Thomas
Aquinas on Children and Childhood,” mines the work of Aquinas for his thoughts and
beliefs about children and childhood. She notes that Aquinas’s references to children are
scattered throughout his work and tend to appear when the subject at hand makes the
mention of children logical (Cristina L. H. Traina, “A Person in the Making: Thomas
Aquinas on Children and Childhood,” in The Child in Christian Thought, ed. Marcia J.
Bunge [Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001], 132).
18
I will discuss this theological anthropology in some detail in chapter one.
xvii

sins.19 Aquinas asserts that children under seven years of age are devoid of reason,
rendering them unfit to enter any kind of contract, or even to be educated, because young
children are unable “to learn from another.”20 Children’s lack of rational powers
diminishes their status as full persons in Aquinas’s eyes to the extent that he states: “so
long as man has not the use of reason, he differs not from an irrational animal; so that
even as an ox or a horse belongs to someone who, according to civil law, can use them
when he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the natural law, a son, before
coming to the use of reason, is under his father’s care” (ST II-II.10.12).21 From this
passage, the education and formation of young children appears to be futile.
Contemporary research contradicts this assertion, and current thinking affirms the
importance of early childhood in a person’s formation.

19

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican
Province (London: Burns, Oates, & Washburne, Ltd., 1920, online edition 2008 by Kevin
Knight), accessed October 27, 2014, http://www.newadvent.org/summa/, I-II.89.6,
hereafter ST and cited parenthetically in the text. See also Jensen, Graced Vulnerability,
9.
20
Aquinas breaks down children’s maturation into three stages, each lasting seven years
and determined by their ability to reason: “The age of seven years is fixed reasonably
enough by law for the contracting of betrothals, for since a betrothal is a promise of the
future…it follows that they are within the competency of those who can make a promise
in some way, and this is only for those who can have some foresight of the future, and
this requires the use of reason, of which three degrees are to be observed, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. I, 4). The first is when a person neither understands by himself nor is
able to learn from another; the second stage is when a man can learn from another but is
incapable by himself of consideration and understanding; the third degree is when a man
is both able to learn from another and to consider by himself.” The first stage is from
birth to age 7; the second stage is from age 7 to age 14; and the third is from age 14 to
age 21 (ST Suppl. 43.2).
21
See also John Wall, “Animals and Innocents: Theological Reflections on the Meaning
and Purpose of Child-Rearing,” Theology Today 59, no. 4 (2003): 562; and Traina, “A
Person in the Making,” 126.
xviii

On this view, children are imperfect and incomplete as human beings because
they are awaiting the development of their reason.22 Aquinas compares childhood to the
imperfect knowledge of the law: “the state of the Old Law, because of the imperfection of
knowledge, is as a child, compared to the state of grace and truth which came through
Christ. In like manner, the state of the present life, in which we see through a mirror in a
dark manner, is as a child, compared to the state of the future life, in which there is
perfect knowledge of God.”23 Later in the same commentary, he writes that Paul calls the
Galatians “little children, to indicate the imperfection whereby they had become small.”24
Aquinas says that the imperfection of childhood is separable from the human person, so
as the person matures, the imperfect (child) becomes the perfect (“man”) (ST II-II.4.4).
John Wall maintains that the development Aquinas advances is “from an animal state of
irrationality and disorder toward ever greater capacities to order one’s own existence
using ever more specifically human reason.”25 Within this framework, the purpose of
childrearing is “taking the raw potential of human nature and cultivating it into realized
human, social, and theological goods.”26 Thus, the human being begins as something
almost less than human, in terms of the child’s lack of reason, and gradually develops the

22

See also Jensen, Graced Vulnerability, 9. Art from some historical periods reflected
this image of the child as immature or incomplete adult when it depicted children with
incorrect proportions (Norma Cook Everist, “Who is the Child? Whose is the Child? A
Theology of Children,” in The Ministry of Children’s Education: Foundations, Contexts,
and Practices, ed. Barbara S. Wilson, Mark Gardner and James Satter [Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 2004], 69).
23
Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians, trans. F.R.
Larcher, Aquinas Scripture Series, vol. 1 (Albany, NY: Magi Books, Inc., 1966), 109.
24
Aquinas, Commentary on Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians, 132.
25
Wall, “Animals and Innocents,” 563, emphasis in original.
26
Wall, “Animals and Innocents,” 562.
xix

human capacity of reason, which perfects what is lacking in the original state of
irrationality.
Cristina Traina observes that this view of human development as moving from
imperfection to perfection implies that maturity is valued more highly than the potential
of youth in Aquinas’s anthropology, and that childhood is left behind as a person
matures.27 Aquinas counts childhood as a necessary stage on the journey towards
perfection,28 but he values childhood to the extent that it leads to a more advanced stage,
and the goal is the most advanced stage.29 While Aquinas does allow that children can be
spiritually mature even before they are physically mature (ST III.72.8), their immaturity
and incompleteness make them inappropriate role models for adults.30 He argues that just
as a Christian would not revert to living under the Old Law, which is imperfect and
comparable to a child,31 neither should adults use children as role models. Human life is
irreversible, and Aquinas maintains that one “cannot return to infancy from old age.”32
As I will show in chapter one, contemporary theology diverges from these positions and
holds that children are already fully human, and that even very young children are able to
learn from and engage with their surroundings on a moral level.
A third problematic thread from Aquinas’s legacy is that he requires parental
mediation for children’s relationships with God. Aquinas believes that a child before the
Traina, “A Person in the Making,” 128.
Traina, “A Person in the Making,” 130.
29
This is what DeVries calls an instrumental view of childhood, meaning that childhood
is valued only insofar as it leads to the more advanced stage of adulthood (DeVries,
“Toward a Theology of Childhood,” 162-164).
30
Traina, “A Person in the Making,” 128.
31
Aquinas, Commentary on Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians, 109.
32
Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of St. John, trans. James A. Weisheipl and Fabian
R. Larcher, Aquinas Scripture Series, vol. 4 (Albany, NY: Magi Books, Inc., 1980), 186.
See also ST III.66.9.
27
28
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age of reason, “in the natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents’ reason,
under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of the child in all matters
relating to God” (ST II-II.10.12 ad 4),33 even those concerning eternal life (ST II-II.10.12
ad 2; ST III.68.10 ad 1). Children before the age of reason are under parental authority to
the degree that Aquinas argues that it is unjust to baptize Jewish children against their
parents’ wishes, even though baptism was considered necessary for their salvation. One
of Aquinas’s reasons is that children who are baptized but not raised in Christian homes
will be more likely to abandon the faith (ST II-II.10.12; ST III.68.10). The other, more
striking, justification of this position is that acting contrary to the parental wishes for a
child is against nature because the child is part of the parents and is under parental
authority before she is able to use reason (ST II-II.10.12). While maintaining parental
responsibility for the spiritual nourishment of children is necessary, Aquinas’s position
dismisses the possibility that children are able to be in relationship with God or have
spiritual awareness. It could also be interpreted as removing from parents any obligation
to spiritually instruct or guide their children before the children reach the age of seven.
In addition, Traina critiques Aquinas for not treating children more thoroughly
and in more detail in his writing.34 She also observes that his developmentalism carries
the grave risk that young children, who are wholly subject to parental authority, will
suffer exploitation at the hands of their families if those families do not act in the best
interest of the children.35 Wall critiques Aquinas’s view for neglecting the social aspect

33

See also ST III.68.10 ad 3.
Traina, “A Person in the Making,” 132.
35
Traina, “A Person in the Making,” 132-133. For a contemporary example of biblicallybased justifications of parental violence against children, see Michael and Debi Pearl, To
Train Up a Child (No Greater Joy Ministries, Inc., 1994).
34

xxi

of children and child rearing. Aquinas seems to delegate the task of raising children to
parents without saying much about what role society should play in their upbringing, in
part because Aquinas does not think children are part of the social community before they
have the use of reason.36 Child rearing, while not something Aquinas tends to think the
community needs to support, does in his estimation contribute to the common good.37
This is certainly a problematic legacy for contemporary theological thought on children.
It denies children’s full personhood and their relationship with God, not to mention their
capacity to function with a level of moral agency, all of which are affirmed by
contemporary theology.

Aquinas’s Thoughts on Children as Constructive Resources
Despite these concerns, some of Aquinas’s ideas can serve as constructive
resources for contemporary considerations of theology of children. Specifically, he
advocates limited accountability for children; he takes seriously parental obligations; and
he maintains a place for children legitimately to disobey their parents, thus alleviating
some of the problems that obedience-based accounts of moral formation risk. He
encourages more lenience with children than would be accorded adults,38 and this is
based in part on his conviction that children’s limited rational powers preclude them from
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sinning (ST Suppl. 69.6).39 Limited accountability is an important component of
children’s morality, including, I will argue below, of their developing moral agency.
One result of Aquinas’s position that children are exempt from sin because of
their lack of reason is that he does not share the view that children are inherently sinful.
Traina argues that Aquinas’s view is that human beings naturally seek God and the good,
but that problems arise when people elevate one good over other goods in an
inappropriate way. Thus, when children go astray, it is because this natural tendency to
seek the good is distorted by “desiring and pursuing some goods more intensely than
[they] should, neglecting others that need [their] attention and ought to have curbed
[their] behavior.”40 As children mature, they develop the ability to recognize the good,
which aids in their pursuit of it. Thus, Traina thinks that contemporary views of
childrearing can benefit from Aquinas’s thought by keeping in mind an understanding of
nurturing that is at the same time “affirming, feeding, and encouraging children’s
dawning recognition of goods and of God,” and fostering a development of habits of
virtue in children to curb the tendency to elevate one good “too high above others.”41
Aquinas’s insistence that parents have serious obligations to their children is
another aspect of his thought that is beneficial for contemporary considerations of
children. While this dissertation is not focused on parenting, Aquinas’s ideas on parental
responsibility are instructive in terms of their implication of the value he ascribes to
children. He holds that parents owe their children care, sustenance, education, and so on,
39
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in what Traina describes as an unending debt on the part of parents to their children.42
Aquinas says that parents love their children more than children love parents43 because
parents are to children as principles,44 which means that parents love their children
because children’s existence depends in part on the parents. For this reason, parents owe
their children care (ST II-II.26.9), support (II-II.101.2), and education (ST II-II.189.6).45
Indeed, education is one of the primary obligations of parents to children,46 and Aquinas
exhorts fathers in particular to provide it with the good of their children in mind and not
“by excessively restricting or subjecting them.”47 Children take a long time to raise, in
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part because their reason and experience take years to develop, and until they are
developed, parents must instruct and guide their children.48 Further, men have an
obligation to provide for the upbringing of the offspring they produce.49 Because Aquinas
thinks that men by nature have more strength for punishing and more reason for
instructing than women do, it is an obligation on the part of fathers to remain with their
children to raise them.50 In order to feel motivated to invest the time and energy needed
to raise their children, men desire paternal certainty,51 for which reason Aquinas
advocates indissoluble marriage and monogamy.52
In these sections of Aquinas’s thought, his beliefs about marriage are shaped by
responsibility to children. Although considerations of the theology of marriage today
focus on the spousal relationship more fully, and we have moved beyond his restrictive
definitions of gender roles, Aquinas’s dictates give evidence to his valuation of children.
Children might be incomplete and irrational in his view, but that does not excuse slovenly
exercise of parental responsibility. At the same time, his contention that children under
the age of seven cannot be educated does leave open the possibility that he thinks young
children do not need much in the way of parenting, which could lead to neglect of young
children. He does not give parental advice per se,53 which leaves his thought open to
interpretations that support abuse of children, but his exhortations to parents to fulfill
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their obligations does point to a degree of valuation of children, at least in terms of what
they will become, and to the importance of their formation.
Finally, Aquinas places limits around children’s commitment to obey their
parents. Aquinas says that children should obey their parents’ instructions as a sick
person has a duty to obey a doctor,54 indicating that in his view, children are lacking and
require “healing” or a remedy from those who have more knowledge than they. However,
Aquinas limits children’s obligation to obey their parents. He contends that children who
have reached the age of puberty can disobey their parents when deciding whether and
whom to marry and whether to enter monastic life, including which monastery (ST IIII.104.5).55 A further limitation on children’s obligations to their parents is that children
are to honor parents, except when parents are leading them into sin (ST II-II.101.4).56
Despite these limits, a tension remains between filial obedience and the legitimate use of
one’s conscience in opposition to parental wishes,57 a tension that Traina notes is still
present today, particularly as it relates to family responsibility for children.58
Traina credits Aquinas’s theological anthropology of childhood with providing
the tools for later thinkers to resolve the controversy between the view of children as
essentially innocent and the view of children as essentially depraved.59 Further, Aquinas
endorses a developmental theory of childrearing that Traina suggests can serve as a
foundation for correcting justifications of violence toward children that are evident in the
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Christian tradition.60 His limitation of children’s accountability is a crucial component of
a description of children’s moral agency, and his emphasis on parental obligations in
childrearing underscores the importance of adult responsibility in forming and educating
children.
In addition to these positive elements of his thought with respect to children,
Aquinas’s theory of emotions is structured such that it lends itself to considering
children’s emotions within a moral context. For Aquinas, the emotions are intimately
connected with virtue, and virtue involves the person’s whole self being inclined toward
the good, through her desires as well as her actions, her emotions as well as her reason.
The Western moral tradition, including Aquinas, has tended to view rationality as central
to morality, and so children have continued to be largely unrepresented in moral
discourse on virtue.61 At the same time, one dimension of Aquinas’s thought that offers a
potential avenue for constructive reflection on children as moral agents is his theory that
a virtuous action, in order to be virtuous, must be based in both reason and emotion. A
good or right action undertaken solely on the basis of reason is incomplete as a virtuous
action. I build on this perspective with respect to emotion and its importance in moral
motivation as I make a case for children’s moral agency.
My argument unfolds as follows. In chapter one, I articulate a contemporary
theological anthropology of children that takes seriously the place of childhood in the
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whole of a human life. I do this by exploring Christian theology that addresses the issues
of children and childhood, focusing on theological literature from the past 40 years. This
is an attempt to establish a theological understanding of children and childhood based on
contemporary theological work. I find that the contemporary Christian theological
understanding of children that is the most convincing is that which maintains the full
humanity of children, and which understands childhood to be something that perdures
throughout a human life. Following this investigation, I explore the ways in which
children can be said to have moral agency, and I make the case that children are moral
agents, but that it is inappropriate to hold them to the same level of accountability for
their actions as that to which we hold adults. I conclude with an argument that children
need to be brought into the moral conversation as agents with limited accountability.
In chapter two, I turn to theological and philosophical accounts of emotions in
moral motivation and the moral development of children. Cognitive emotional theories
hold the primary place in my treatment because they tend to advocate that emotions
should be considered moral. My focus in this chapter is on moral formation and moral
education in a general sense rather than on moral education in a classroom setting.
Important as it is to study the formal educational models of moral formation, they will
take me too far afield from my purpose of arguing for the agency of children based on
their emotions and emotional development. I find that the contemporary theories of
emotion tend toward a level of cognitivism that precludes the inclusion of children in
their definitions of emotions, and so from the moral agency that emotions make possible.
As a corrective to the cognitive emphasis of current emotional theories, I turn in
chapter three to Aquinas, whose theory maintains the intimate relationship between
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reason and emotion, but also establishes the distinction between the two such that the
emotions are more than thoughts or judgments. On Aquinas’s view, emotions and reason
are mutually informative and have a cumulative effect on one another such that a
person’s experiences and thinking continually influence her emotions. At the same time,
early passional experiences are the building blocks of what will become virtuous
emotions.
I argue that children, because they desire goods and act on those desires, are
already agents. The role of emotions in the moral life and in virtue is the subject of
chapter four, in which I use Aquinas’s view that the emotions are necessary for a
complete virtuous action to make the case that children are already acting morally, and I
use his distinction between emotion and reason to maintain children’s lesser moral
accountability. At the same time, the early experiences children undergo are formative.
Because contemporary theology affirms the importance of childhood and childhood
experiences, the ways in which children experience the world emotionally, which
includes the ways they are taught by their caregivers, will have life-long implications for
their moral development. Emotions indicate the value a person places on the objects of
the emotions, and they motivate action with respect to those objects. They are also one of
the primary means through which the person engages the world. For these reasons, I
argue that because children have emotions, they are able to engage the moral world as
agents with limited accountability.
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CHAPTER ONE:
THEOLOGY OF CHILDREN AND CHILDREN’S MORAL AGENCY

Contemporary theological scholarship on children offers a corrective to
problematic dimensions of historical Christian reflection on the nature of children and the
purpose of childhood by including childhood as a perduring part of a human life and
regarding children as moral beings who are engaged with their surroundings. Numerous
voices in contemporary Christian theology view children as fully human and made in the
image of God. Because children are made in the image of God and are loved by God,
they have human dignity, and they are created for and are already in relationship with
God. In addition, there are those who view childhood as an integral element of a whole
human life, an unrepeatable and necessary time of life that is not left behind as one grows
to adulthood but that is brought with the person as she matures and is a permanent part of
who she is as a human being. Further, even from a young age, children encounter and
engage with good and evil in the world, and I will argue that the way they interact with
and respond to this is moral.
In this chapter, I strive to show that current theological considerations of children
suggest that Christian moral theology takes children seriously not only as the objects of
other people’s (usually adults’) moral actions, but also as moral actors in their own right.
This theological anthropology addresses children’s creation by and dependence on God,
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as well as children’s relationships with their environments and with other people. A
person’s interacting with her surroundings necessarily involves encounters with good and
evil. Children are born into a world that is already conditioned by grace and sin, and they
contribute to that world through their presence and their actions. I agree with scholars
who claim that children’s ability to interact with their surroundings is part of what
constitutes their moral agency, and that this agency is an ontological quality that is
characteristic of human beings and is distinct from moral accountability. Children learn
the morality of actions from the example of others and from rules, but these lessons must
become an integral part of the children’s own motivation in order for children to want to
choose (and so be likely to choose) to act in a good way themselves. Moral agency and
virtue are deeply connected to moral motivation, which depends considerably on
emotions.
The first section of this chapter explores recent theological scholarship that
focuses on children in relationship to God. Children are made in the image of God and
are created for relationship with God. They are already fully human and have human
dignity.1 But children, as do all people, live in the world and are formed by that world.
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The second section engages theological anthropology of children that highlights the
relationships children have with other people and with their own surroundings. In the
third section, I move to consider a particular dimension of what it is to be human—moral
agency. As with the more general theological anthropology, I first examine children’s
moral agency with respect to God and then turn to moral agency in relation to other
people. I conclude the section on moral agency by studying several sources that give
insight into moral motivation, particularly the place of emotion in moral motivation,
which paves the way for the next chapter in which emotion is treated more fully.

The Child in Relationship with God
Christian theology maintains that all people are created by God, in the image of
God, for relationship with God. Because human beings are created this way, we have
value. A person’s worth is not something acquired; it is the dignity that is constitutive of
each person by virtue of God’s calling her into being. Valuing children as fully human
and with full human dignity cannot mean that they are valued only for what they will
become. Their value and their full personhood are already present, even as we recognize
that they, as do all people, will continue to grow and develop and live out their potential.
Thus, childhood has value in and of itself as well as value that perdures into adulthood.
The focus of this section is to explore the ways these beliefs are explicated in recent
theological scholarship and to show how some theologians think of children’s
relationship with God. This will set the stage for the next two sections of the chapter in
which I consider children in relationship with other people, and the plausibility that
children are moral agents.
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Twentieth century Catholic theologian Karl Rahner played a central role in
reconceptualizing a theological account of childhood. In his 1971 essay “Ideas for a
Theology of Childhood,”2 he addresses the questions: “In the intention of the Creator and
Redeemer of children what meaning does childhood have, and what task does it lay upon
us for the perfecting and saving of humanity?” (33). He argues that because children are
already fully human, and human life is a whole rather than fragmented stages, childhood
is deeply valuable in several important ways. First, “childhood is valuable in itself” (37).
Childhood, as with every other stage of life, is valuable because it allows for a “direct
relationship with God” (33). The child is already a human being (37) whom God calls by
name (38); God creates the child as a fully human person for relationship with Godself.
Moreover, childhood is an unrepeatable stage of growth. In it happen things that cannot
happen at any other time of a person’s life, and so the second way it is valuable is as a
stage of development (36). The child thus is valuable both for who she is and for who she
will grow to be. She is both being and becoming: “The child is a man right at the very
outset. Christianity is aware of the mystery of that beginning which already contains all
present within itself, and yet still has to become all…. What is already present in the child
has still to be realized, to become actual in experience” (38-39). Finally, childhood’s
value perdures, and, along with every other part of a person’s life, is taken up into the
eschaton (36). Rahner affirms that children are fully human, and their lives as children
have eternal value.
This idea of the totality of a life being taken up into the eschaton points to the
unity of each person’s earthly life as well. Rahner contends that viewing a person’s
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history as exhibiting a unified and essential wholeness contrasts with the common idea
(which Aquinas seems to have held3) that life is a series of progressive stages. When life
is seen as a linear progression, each earlier stage preparing the person for the next stage,
then the earlier stages disappear once the later stage is reached. Childhood, on this
understanding, is absorbed into adulthood, and “childhood itself disappears” (34). In this
linear view of life, all that the person “possesses” is the present. Rahner opposes the
linear view and suggests that a theological understanding of human life is one in which
the person is a “subject” who is able at each stage of life to see herself in her totality—
past, present, and future (34-35). Each person’s “future is the making present of his own
past as freely lived” (35). The future is not somehow separable from the past or from
childhood. Rahner writes, “childhood endures as that which is given and abiding, the time
that has been accepted and lived through freely. Childhood does not constitute past time,
time that has eroded away, but rather that which remains, that which is coming to meet us
as an intrinsic element in the single and enduring completeness of the time of our
existence considered as a unity, that which we call the eternity of man as saved and
redeemed” (35-36). Because the past remains with the person as she lives her life,
childhood is never left behind but is part of the person in her totality at each moment of
her life, including at the end of her life.
Rahner’s conception that eternal life takes up all of a person’s life indicates how
he thinks we should view our biological childhood. Whereas we saw above that Aquinas
would have eschewed childhood as a spiritual model for adults, Rahner contends that
childhood “is a basic condition which is always appropriate to a life that is lived aright”
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(47). The main quality of childhood that Rahner thinks needs to perdure in a human life is
openness (48), which includes other childlike qualities, such as receptivity (47) and an
orientation towards God (48). If we are like children, we will live in trusting dependence
on God, recognizing and submitting to God’s designs. We will be open and able to
commit to that which is beyond our comprehension. We will be able to play and to hope.
In short, we will “preserve this state of being delivered over to the mystery” that
childhood is and in this way preserve our “original childhood…forever” (42). Rahner
suggests that when we are able to embrace the openness of childhood in our adult
relationship with God, we understand what our biological childhood was and meant (47).
The childhood we experience in relationship to God is always contained in our human
childhood and “finds expression in it” (49). Rahner is drawing a parallel between
childhood with respect to adulthood, and earthly life with respect to eternal life. When we
see that all of our life is taken up into eternal life, we understand that our earthly lives are
not simply a stage through which we pass on the way to eternal life. Rather, we take up
and bring with us the whole of our earthly life—including our childhood—into the next
stage of our existence, eternal life. The same is true in earthly life. Previous stages of a
human life are not passed through and forgotten; they remain with us as part of the
unified whole of who we are as human subjects. Thus, the child’s relationship with God
has perduring and eternal value for her and for God.
Rahner holds that each child is a beginning in two senses. The child is an absolute
beginning in terms of being a uniquely created individual who has not existed before. As
such, the child’s situation is always pre-conditioned by grace—by God’s offer of selfcommunication. But at the same time, she begins her life in a “pre-existing context, a
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history already wrought out by man before this particular individual arrived on the scene”
(39). This pre-existing context is defined by original sin as well as grace. In his article
“Original Sin,” Rahner explains that the human condition includes death and
concupiscence, which constitute the state of original sin.4 Original sin is one aspect of the
situation in which human beings find themselves and in which they must make decisions
that affect how they work out their salvation; original sin affects human freedom.5 At the
same time, God’s self-communication changes the situation in which humans exist;
human freedom and decision-making are also conditioned by God’s universal and
permanent offer of Godself, which includes God’s will for human salvation.6 Thus, every
moral and free decision a person makes is decided within the framework of both original
sin and grace. According to Rahner, this is the context and history in which a child begins
her life and over which she has no control.7 Children encounter and must engage with the
goodness and the evil of the world. People’s interactions with the world also influence
how they respond to God’s offer of self-communication. The level of security a person
feels in childhood often indicates what her comfort level will be in opening herself to a
loving and trusting relationship with God in her adulthood, which is another indication of
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childhood’s abiding quality.8 I will return to the issue of the child’s interaction with her
surroundings in the next section.
Mary Ann Hinsdale provides additional insight into Rahner’s contribution to
Catholic theology of childhood. Her assessment of his work highlights several main
themes. Of particular significance is his conception of children as embodying “infinite
openness to the infinite” and “the beginning of human transcendentality.” For Rahner,
childhood is both the condition that allows a person to “love and be responsible” and “the
state of spiritual maturity that characterizes our participation in the interior life of God
and makes possible the experience of genuine human community.”9 The implication for
adults is that we are not only responsible to care for children, but also to remain children
in the sense of allowing “our childhood trust, openness, expectation, and willingness to
be dependent on others to be released” (445). Rahner held that childhood is intrinsically
valuable (443), and not just at the beginning of life, but at every stage of life.10 The
intrinsic value of childhood and children points toward and is the result of the child’s
being created by God for relationship with God. The child’s imaging God is not
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something that can be fully grasped. It is a mystery, just as the child is a mystery who
cannot be fully understood or resolved.
The full implication of what it means to be made in the image of God, for
relationship with God is indeed mysterious. Keeping this mystery and the human dignity
that it reflects in mind when thinking about infants and children can foster a sense of
wonder in us, according to Martin Marty. Marty’s work builds on Rahner’s,11 and Marty
acknowledges a particular indebtedness to Rahner with respect to the conception of
wonder. Crediting Rahner with inspiring the theme of his book The Mystery of the Child,
Marty writes that all of Rahner’s proposals about childhood “support our focus on the
mystery of the child and the response of wonder” (107).12 Marty places the child’s being
imago dei as central to seeing the child as mystery (61). Mysteries are “fathomless” and
cannot be fully grasped or solved (16).
Because the child is in the image of God, Marty identifies the child as both a
person who wonders (66), usually at the marvels of the world around her, at mystery
(152), and someone about whom it is appropriate to experience a sense of wonder (66).
Wonder does not worry about how things are in the world, but marvels that they are
(102). We wonder over mysteries—over what is unfathomable, not over what is unknown
(103). Thus, to wonder over the child is to recognize her as mystery, as imago dei. We
can assist the child (and the adult) in continuing to wonder when we allow and encourage
imagination and play in an open way that allows the child’s creativity to flow, without
our trying to re-direct it toward what we think is the “right” way to see the world (118).
11
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Children’s receptivity is a principal condition for their being able to engage the world in
wonder. Marty contends that, according to the gospels, this quality is the one adults must
regain in order to be properly childlike, to become like children (86). For Marty, this is
not a passive receptivity, but an openness and expectation, an acceptance of the lack of
predictability in the world (195). This way of seeing the child presents openness and
receptivity to mystery and wonder as manifestations of the child’s being in the image of
God. The way we relate to children and the way we understand childhood are based in
the mystery of the child as created in God’s image.
Marty’s aim in The Mystery of the Child is to illustrate the difference seeing
children as mysteries rather than as problems makes for those who are responsible for
providing their care (1). Whether we view children as mysteries or as problems has
significance for how we as adults approach moral formation in children. Problems, as he
defines them, are finite, able to be seen in their completion, and have solutions that can
be enacted (16). Adults who take this approach are often over-controlling of children
(60).13 As I will show below, Aquinas’s notion of virtue formation concurs with Marty’s
distinction, and it implies not attempting to control children’s development by force, but
teaching children to want to make good moral choices for the right reasons.
The Christian understanding of the mystery of the human person as created by
God includes the person’s being made for relationship with God. Both Rahner and Marty
contend that the child’s being created as open and receptive to God allows her to be in
relationship with both God and the world. Karen Yust’s 2004 book Real Kids, Real
Faith: Practices for Nurturing Children’s Spiritual Lives advances the argument of
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openness to make the case that children are able to be in relationship with God and to
have faith. Yust, a Protestant pastor and professor of Christian education, defines faith as
“a gift from God. It is not a set of beliefs; nor is it a well-developed cognitive
understanding of all things spiritual. It is an act of grace, in which God chooses to be in
relationship with humanity.”14 Being faithful is responding to this gift. It is important for
Yust to define faith in terms of grace rather than as a stage of human development, which
is how it has sometimes been defined traditionally (3), because when faith is an act of
grace, it is possible for children to be active faith participants, even before they have the
cognitive ability or level of rationality to assent to a set of beliefs or theological
principles. A child is someone with whom God wants a relationship and who can, even
pre-rationally, respond to that grace. For Yust, as for Rahner, childhood is already a time
when a person is capable, through grace, of being in an unmediated relationship with
God.15
As Marty does, Yust holds that children have a natural sense of wonder (121), but
she adds that they must be encouraged and taught to reflect on the things that cause them
to wonder. If the child is not taught to do this, it is entirely possible that she will not learn
spiritual awareness (122). Being created for relationship with God is not the same as
having a mature faith, and while children are already able to be in relationship with God,
this relationship must be nurtured to develop into more mature spiritual awareness. I will
show below that some scholars argue that this relationship with God depends on human
emotion, which motivates the person to foster relationship with God. These emotions
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need to be encouraged and cultivated as the person develops her relationship with God
and her faith.
Most Christian theology maintains that the purpose of human life does not subsist
in earthly existence, and that the relationship with God that human beings are graced to
engage in while they are on earth indicates their ultimate end. Rahner’s essay makes this
point when he says that the whole of human existence is taken up into the eschaton.16
This flow from God and back to God—or, exitus-reditus—drives much of what Todd
David Whitmore thinks Catholic social thought has to contribute to a theology of
childhood. In his 1997 essay, “Children: An Undeveloped Theme in Catholic Teaching,”
Whitmore uses the theological virtues—faith, hope, and love—to tease out an
understanding of children from Catholic social thought that emphasizes the gift-status of
children.17 For Whitmore, our hope in children means seeing them as signs of the future
within the exitus-reditus framework. Children are gifts from God, and they are destined
to return to God and to be in union with God (178). Whitmore’s argument is meant to
emphasize that, because children are gifts with respect to God (as being created by and
returning to God), adults should not treat children as commodities to which they have a
right, an attitude that he finds to be reflected in the current use of for-profit reproductive
technologies (177-178). Whitmore’s view, while not denying the connection between
parents and offspring, underscores that creating a child is the work of God, and that being
created by God, for relationship with God, with the purpose of returning to God is what
gives each person—at every stage of her life—her dignity.
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Whitmore argues that children are not a gift of creation only in the moments of
their conception and prenatal growth; children are “ongoing gifts created in the image of
God” (178). Faith allows us to see and claim that the child is a gift of creation. Whitmore
challenges the almost exclusive emphasis on reproduction as the “gift of creation” in
Catholic thought, to the neglect of later moments in life. Church teachings focus on
reproductive technologies, contraception, and abortion, but there is no dedicated theology
of the child (177). As Hinsdale says Rahner’s work implies,18 Whitmore argues that it is
important to recognize the child as gift in later stages of development. He is in agreement
with Rahner that each stage of life is important and significant for its own sake. The
virtue of love with respect to a theology of children means that adults have a
responsibility to be stewards of their children. Children are to be formed in such a way
that they are ready to participate in the “common good as understood in the exitus et
reditus theological framework,”19 which holds God, to whom we are destined to return, at
the center of our hope for the future (178).
Children are already in relationship with God and are created to return to God.
This theological position affirms the belief that God loves each child, and, according to
Jürgen Moltmann, it also indicates how God loves each person—with hope. In his 2000
essay, “Child and Childhood as Metaphors of Hope,”20 Moltmann identifies children as
metaphors of hope both in terms of human hope and, more importantly for this section, in
terms of God’s hope for the world. Considering the child to be a metaphor of God’s hope
can reveal a dimension of how God might view and relate to each child. A child, claims

Hinsdale, “‘Infinite Openness to the Infinite,’” 444.
Whitmore, “Children: An Undeveloped Theme,” 178.
20
Moltmann, “Child and Childhood,” 592-603.
18
19

13

Moltmann, is cause for hope for three reasons.21 First, as Rahner does, Moltmann holds
that every child is a new and unrepeatable beginning, and it is this uniqueness of each
person that allows for new possibilities in the world’s future. Each new child represents
the possibility of something original and different in the world—of an “open future.”
Second, “with every beginning of a new life, the hope for the reign of peace and justice is
given a new chance.” The child represents this hope for peace and redemption. Finally,
children are emblematic not only of our hope for the future, but of God’s hope for
humanity. The focus on God’s hope in the child helps to deepen our understanding of the
child in relation to God. “God is ‘waiting’ for the ‘human person’ in every child, is
‘waiting’ for God’s echo, resonance, and rainbow.” This includes and extends beyond
hope for humanity in general. Saying that “God wants us, expects us, and welcomes us,”
indicates that God’s relationship with each child is one of deep love and wanting, and
God hopes expectantly that the child will respond. Moltmann finishes his analysis of
children and childhood as metaphors of hope by calling on those around children to “hold
open the doors to this future and to walk with these children into their future.”
While Moltmann’s call for hope in the potential that each child represents is
laudable, it is important not to allow that hope to lapse into an idealization of children as
innocent potential.22 Children are created by God, for relationship with God, and
ultimately to return to God, but this does not mean that they are somehow exempt from
grappling with good and evil. There are theologians who affirm the child’s capacity to
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sin, and it is also vital to acknowledge the deleterious effects the experience of evil can
have on a child. In the next section I turn to theological scholarship that explicitly treats
the issue of the child with respect to the world around her, particularly her relationships
with others.

The Child in Relationship with Other People
Children are created by God for relationship with God, but they must also learn to
negotiate the world into which they are born. I turn now to recent theological work that
considers children in relationship with other people. This section builds on the insights
regarding children’s relationships with God that I highlighted in the previous section, and
it serves as a foundation for the following section that takes up the issue of children’s
moral agency. In the current section, two threads of thought regarding the relationships
children have with other people emerge. One is that children have particular gifts to offer
others. The second emphasizes children’s vulnerability in the face of good and evil, an
exposed state that is part of what it means to be in the image of God. To be in the image
of God is to be in relationship, and to be in relationship, as we shall see, is to be
vulnerable to others.
Children have qualities that touch the lives of those around them in positive ways.
Herbert Anderson and Susan Johnson’s book, Regarding Children, is a pastoral theology
text that addresses the years of family life specifically engaged with raising children. 23 In
their book, Anderson and Johnson coin the term “childness” to refer to those “qualities of
being a child that continue in adult life: vulnerability, openness, immediacy, and
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neediness.”24 The qualities of childness bear some similarity to the qualities of children
that Rahner mentions as worthy of emulation, although childness refers primarily to
human relationships, while Rahner’s work is more focused on relationship with God.
Vulnerability and neediness are childlike qualities that Anderson and Johnson discuss in
terms of the dependence infants experience with respect to older humans, but even as
adults, our dependence on others never disappears.25 It is part of being human. Rahner
says that being a child of God includes trusting dependence that God will give us what
we need26 and recognizing that “the powers presiding over existence are greater than our
own design.”27 He emphasizes human dependence on God, and Anderson and Johnson
highlight human dependence on other humans, but the idea that human beings are not
autonomous and isolated beings is common to both. By immediacy Anderson and
Johnson mean the ability to respond to other people and to one’s surroundings honestly
and with some spontaneity.28 This echoes Rahner’s mention of play as a childlike quality
that is worth maintaining as an adult.29
Because immediacy and spontaneity are qualities that should be retained in
adulthood, we must consider the implications of this kind of genuineness in responding to
one’s environment. It seems evident that being spontaneous does not guarantee that the
24
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person will engage in good actions. The possibility that authentic responses might be
morally bad raises the issue of how to attend to children’s moral formation without
squelching their honesty and spontaneity. How do we teach children to control their bad
impulses while affirming their natural tendencies to be fully in the present moment? I
think the answer is implied in Aquinas’s distinction between despotic control and
guidance that results in cooperation, as I mentioned above. As will become clear below,
Aquinas’s system allows for the possibility of cultivating one’s emotions such that one’s
responses are genuine, immediate, and virtuous.
In addition to possessing qualities that need to be sustained throughout a person’s
life, children can also mediate grace to others. That human beings can be mediators of
grace to one another is well established, and Jerome Berryman expands this to include
children in particular.30 Proposing that the church develop a formal doctrine of children,
he turns to the idea of children as grace-filled and suggests that theologians consider
children as sacraments. He argues that to be in the image of God is to be in the image of
Creator, and so to be a creator as well (232). Children, according to Berryman, have
intense creative energy that fuels their own activities and that can stimulate energy and
creativity in the adults who encounter them. Berryman considers the energy of the
creative process to be akin to grace, and for this reason he thinks that children’s ability to
stimulate creativity in adults marks them as means of grace (244). Children in this model
are unintentional means of grace. They do not choose to cooperate with grace; they
mediate grace simply by being children. Other thinkers credit children with being able to
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choose to do good as a means of mediating grace. Berryman’s account, however, allows
for every child, regardless of her age or level of development, to be a source of grace to
those around her.31 At the same time, his account runs the risk of privileging an idealized
vision of children because it does not take into consideration the ways in which
encounters with children are sometimes not moments and means of grace as Berryman
describes them. If children are means of grace because they energize and inspire
creativity in others, what happens when a person becomes tired or bored as a result of her
encounter with a child?
Joyce Mercer’s work provides the crucial contribution of arguing that children are
gifts not to the extent that they are perfect, give us energy, or meet our standards of
behavior. They are gifts even in their “messiness.” She concurs that children are gifts
from God and are equal in status to all other human beings,32 and she insists that the
whole of what a child is—not just the pleasant aspects—constitutes the gift.
To say that children’s messiness is included in their gift-status is simply to
say that the gift that a child is depends not upon the conditions a child
evokes in the lives of those around her or him. The gift that a child is
depends solely on the child’s being made in God’s image and, as Rahner
asserts, sharing in the childhood of God. Such an affirmation means that
even a child whom others may experience in primarily negative
terms…remains fundamentally a gift.33
Mercer argues that an appropriate image of childhood is one of ambiguity, recognizing
that children are neither innocent angels nor depraved devils. They are complex and
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“exist as the same strange mixtures of moral capacities as the rest of humanity”34 and
need to be embraced and welcomed as such. Thus, the mystery of a particular child might
not inspire a sense of wonder or an experience of creative grace in those around her at
any given moment—she might, in fact, evoke a sense of frustration, anger, or
exhaustion—but the child even in that moment is in imago dei and is gift. This is an
important point to bear in mind when thinking theologically about children because it can
serve as a reminder not to idealize children but to accept their inspiring as well as their
difficult qualities. In their very being as children, with all that that entails, they are gifts.
Not only are children bearers of grace and messiness, but they themselves also
must contend with the grace and sin that are present in their surroundings. Their high
level of dependence as well as their lack of experience and power leave them particularly
vulnerable to the good and evil of the world. This second theme—children’s
vulnerability—will occupy the remainder of the section. Vulnerability is definitive of the
experience of childhood, but it also reflects what it means to be a human being created in
the image of God. All people, by virtue of being in relationship with others, are at risk of
being hurt by others. God, too, by choosing to be in relationship with people, makes
Godself vulnerable in those relationships.
David Hadley Jensen’s theology of children makes the claim that children exist as
difference-in-vulnerability, and this shapes his understanding of children’s experience of
sin and grace. He suggests that, as adults, our response to children creates a vulnerability
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in us as we care for them and “stake a claim with their lives”35 that allows us to
understand more fully what it means to be in the image of God. For Jensen, the image of
God is not an invariability that all people share, some sort of stamp of sameness that
makes all human beings in imago dei (14, 32). Rather, he sees the image of God reflected
in the difference and vulnerability that people exhibit. Each person is different from all
other people, and each person is susceptible to being hurt by others. Jensen states, “this
difference implies that vulnerability and openness to others are constitutive of human life
in God’s world, chords that we find echoed throughout scripture. The God of the Bible is
not a monad enclosed upon itself, but a God who becomes vulnerable in relation to
others, who calls us to live in vulnerability with others” (15).36 Far from being a
deficiency, vulnerability is an essential part of being in God’s image (126). 37
Because children are especially vulnerable, they are susceptible to violence, and
this experience of violence is the lens through which Jensen explores the sin children
encounter in the world (66). Jensen presents a number of ways in which children are
35
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victimized by violence, including poverty (67-69) with its concomitant problems of poor
health (69-70) and child labor (including the child sex trade) (70-72), abuse (72-75), war
(75-76), and neglect (76-77). In reflecting on these circumstances of sin, he asks a
question that is not often asked in the tradition—what about the children? That is, sin is
traditionally explored from the perspective of adults who are the sinners. And while he
sees sin more as a state in which we live than as individual acts, he notes that sin’s effects
on children are rarely recognized (88-92).
As a remedy for this, Jensen proposes first “encountering” children before trying
to explain their nature from the perspective of the adult moral agent, which is seen as
normative in the tradition. If we do this, Jensen posits that “a complementary
understanding of sin can be developed: an understanding that begins with the suffering of
children and with a welcome to the children in our midst” (92). His position claims both
that all people are connected to one another in some way and that “each person is at all
times both actor and acted upon—no matter how old or young, we are never reducible to
passive vessels or masters of our own destiny” (95).38 Jensen argues that taking this
perspective allows us to see sin emerging not from the places most often suspected—selfcenteredness and infidelity—but in the experience of being rejected. This follows from
his argument that people are in imago dei as vulnerable and difference-in-relationship.
That is, because we are vulnerable and are in relationships, and no two people have the
same web of relationships in their lives, we are different yet still connected.39 From this
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perspective, sin is the rejection of other people. And from the point of view of the child
who is completely vulnerable, it is the experience of being rejected, of refusal (93).40
Children believe what they are told and taught by this refusal from those in power, and
they internalize the worthlessness that it expresses to them (93). But the experience of
being refused is not part of the nature of the child; it is the state of sin into which the
child is born, and the child experiences the underside of the sin (94).41 This sin is not
reducible to human depravity (96), however. It is reflective of the interconnectedness of
all people, including children (95), and of all people’s “vulnerability to refusal” (96). At
the same time, vulnerability also means openness to relationship, to the grace of the
world, and similar to Rahner, Jensen writes that it is into this grace-filled, sinful world
that human life enters with the creation of each new person (98).
Some children’s circumstances put them at an especially high level of
vulnerability. Pamela Couture addresses this issue by considering the case of a notably
susceptible group—poor children. Couture defines poverty in two ways: material
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deprivation42 and the “poverty of tenuous connections” (29-35).43 She distinguishes
between the two because, although material poverty and social isolation often appear
together, they are separable, and it is sometimes the case that children experience one
form of poverty without the other (23). Being conscious of both kinds of poverty
heightens our awareness of the different ways in which children encounter evil in the
world. All children are made in the image of God and reflect God (50), and all children
need love and commitment from an adult who will protect them and promote their best
interests, including meeting their basic needs of food, shelter, health care, and education
(49).44 Without this support, children live with the poverty of tenuous connections. For
this reason, Couture holds that, although children and adults are of equal worth and value,
a one-on-one adult-child relationship must also include responsibility and care on the part
of the adult for the child (49).45
When children’s needs are not met, they suffer. Couture calls attention to the
suffering and agony of poor children by utilizing the Korean concept of han, which
“refers to the suffering that is accumulated in the victims of sin, burdening them with
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agony” (62).46 Han, as Couture presents it, is similar to Rahner’s conception of original
sin as a pre-existing condition of death and concupiscence into which each person is
born. However, han goes beyond focusing on the conditions to considering the
consequences they mete out on their victims. Han acknowledges that people are born not
only into sinful conditions, but into the suffering that is a result of those sinful conditions
(66). This suffering often leads to the child’s exhibiting problematic behavior (62).
Rather than simply imputing guilt to the child because of this behavior, Couture suggests
addressing it within the context of han. That is, the behavior needs to be corrected while
at the same time the child’s suffering needs to be alleviated (62). In order to move
beyond the inheritance of han, children need empathy, compassion, and agency in their
own lives (67). But when this agency includes the responsibility to care for herself too
early in a child’s life, the child is in danger of at-risk behavior (95). Children need to
play, to be creative, and to imagine, giving them structure and freedom in a balance that
allows them to develop and to have adequate connections with adults. Children also need
hope to encourage them not to engage in destructive and dysfunctional behavior (121),
but to envision a hopeful future. Without their needs being met—or, as Jensen puts it,
when they experience the sin of rejection—children will not be able to envision and
effect a hopeful future for themselves, and they will, quite possibly, not be able to be a
source of hope for the world. Couture’s emphasis is on the children themselves and the
hope they need to feel, whereas Moltmann’s discussion of hope presented the child
herself as the hope for the future. Couture’s call for hope within each child seems to be a
necessary precondition for the child to function as an instrument of future change. The
46
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two visions can thus complement each other—the child as one-who-hopes and the child
as the object of others’ hope.
While it is necessary to remember that children’s lives—and, indeed, all people’s
lives—are sometimes tragically conditioned by their surroundings, the person is not
reducible to those surroundings but remains a distinct individual. Further, all children,
including those who are not poor, are capable of problematic behavior due to their own
proclivity towards sin. These caveats reflect the tension that exists between people’s own
integrity as volitional agents and their condition as situated in and responsive to a world
of good and evil. It is to this tension that I now turn.

The Child as Moral Agent
Some contemporary theology on children’s moral agency makes the case that
children are moral agents even before they are able to comprehend or articulate moral
reasons for their actions, or to be held fully accountable for those actions. For the
purposes of this project, I define moral agency as a person’s ability to engage with the
morality of her environment, which includes the good and evil she encounters in the
world and the moral codes that are part of her context. This will often involve her having
a level of ownership over intentional actions. I take both the moral engagement and the
actions to be somewhat formative for that person. My definition is different from the
literature in Christian moral theology that equates moral agency with responsibility.47 As
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will become clear below, I think that it is plausible to distinguish between moral agency
and moral accountability, and to attribute agency to children without requiring that they
be fully responsible for their actions. This distinction between agency and accountability
is crucial to acknowledging that children engage in moral activities, even though they are
still developing their understanding of the import of those actions and their ability to
control their actions. Because they are very much in the process of being formed, they
should not be answerable or legally responsible for their moral activities in the ways an
adult would be.
All people, including children, live and act within a set of circumstances, but no
one is reducible to those circumstances. Theologically, we can hold the seemingly
contradictory positions that children are in relationship with God and have a degree of
ontological integrity, and that children are conditioned by their environments. The two
views are not mutually exclusive. Quite the contrary, recent scholarship on the moral
agency of children considers ontological integrity and environmental impact to be
mutually influential. Because the person is in relationships with others and lives in a
social and moral context, her actions will be in response to her particular situation; at the
same time, they will be her own actions that will, in turn, have an impact on that
situation. The interaction operates in two directions: the environment informs the child’s
responses, and the child’s responses help to shape the environment.
Responding to one’s surroundings in a moral way involves the person’s having
reasons to do so. These reasons can be called a person’s moral motivation. Making moral
choices and being moved to act on them goes beyond following prescribed rules. One of
Covenant and Hope in the Human Future: New Frontiers in Jewish & Christian Thought
International Conference (Jerusalem, 2011), 23.
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the primary ways children learn moral behavior and reasons for acting is through their
interaction with and observations of adult behavior. People must also integrate what they
learn into their own lives, and there are scholars who argue that this must occur at an
emotional level in order for individuals to understand why they should act in certain ways
and to want to do so.
I begin this section with accounts of moral agency that emphasize the person in
relationship with God. I then move to considering the person in relationship to her
surroundings, which includes the interactive model of moral agency. I conclude the
section by engaging the question of moral motivation. Much of the literature I review
addresses children and their moral agency explicitly; a few of the authors I treat
contribute to the conversation with fruitful discussions of moral agency as it relates to
adults, and I will draw out the implications of their work for considering the moral
agency of children. In this way, I provide the context to which I strive to contribute with
this dissertation. I will build upon the arguments in favor of children’s moral agency by
focusing explicitly on the role emotions play in morality and agency.

Moral Agency of Children with Respect to God
Christian theology holds a place for both human agency and the agency of God.
Although the person is dependent on God, her agency does not compete with God. Partly
in conversation with Aquinas, Jennifer Herdt makes the case for a non-competitive
relationship between human agency and God. Aquinas maintained a non-competitive
view of grace and human agency simultaneously with his emphasis on the necessity of
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grace for human perfection and salvation.48 The issue at stake is the relationship between,
on the one hand, infused virtue and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and on the other, human
activity. Although humans can do nothing to receive the grace of infused virtue or the
gifts of the Holy Spirit, Herdt stresses that people are not rendered passive by their
bestowal.49 Both the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect a person,50 but
the perfecting does not compromise the person’s own agency. True human agency is
operating most fully when it is “being willingly dependent, fully open to God’s gift, thus
perfecting the charity that unites human beings with God” (91),51 and its purpose is the
“transformation of their own characters” such that salvation can be realized for the person
(95). Herdt argues that, when considering human agency and grace, trying to determine
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The tension between what a human being can do on her own towards developing
virtues through good behavior, and the virtue of character that comes through grace alone
is one that Gilbert Meilaender points out is prevalent in Martin Luther’s thinking (Gilbert
Meilaender, “The Examined Life Is Not Worth Living: Learning From Luther,” in The
Theory and Practice of Virtue [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984],
118, 120-121, 122). This tension “leaves unexplained the link between strenuous
education efforts to inculcate virtue [in children] and the claim that these efforts are
entirely unable to bring about the fundamental transformation that is needed…. Seeking
the virtue which only God could work but mindful of its rarity, they [Lutherans in
Germany following the Reformation] committed themselves—but only halfheartedly—to
the external disciplines of moral education” (124). I will discuss Aquinas’s treatment of
this tension in chapter three.
49
Jennifer A. Herdt, Putting on Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2008), 90.
50
“The gifts differ from the virtues in that while the virtues ‘perfect man according as it
is natural for him to be moved by his reason,’ the gifts dispose human beings to be moved
by God” (Herdt, Putting on Virtue, 90, citing ST I-II:68.1).
51
Rebecca DeYoung deals with pusillanimity and magnanimity, specifically comparing
Aristotle’s treatment of them with how Aquinas tweaks them given the Christian belief in
a person’s total dependence on God. Her contribution to my argument stems from her
claim that accurate self-assessment comes from both humility and magnanimity.
Humility allows the Christian to recognize her total dependence on God; magnanimity
grants her the honesty to see her gifts and to use them for good, through the grace of God
(Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, “Aquinas’s Virtues of Acknowledged Dependence: A
New Measure of Greatness,” Faith and Philosophy 21, no. 2 [2004]: 221).
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how grace and agency operate non-competitively is less fruitful than embracing that they
do, that “the moral life…is at once both ordinary and mysterious” (97).
Christians look to Christ as the “perfect human image of God,” and one whom
Herdt maintains it is proper to emulate as they strive for (albeit limited) perfection (8).
Far from truncating human agency, Herdt interprets the “inexhaustibility in Christ’s
exemplarity” (8) to be a fecund source of inspiration and mimesis for Christians. Because
Christ’s human image of God is perfect and human beings are finite, each person is only
able to participate in Christ’s perfection partially, and there are myriad ways of mirroring
him. As a witness to this, Herdt points to the “rainbow cast of saints” that are held up as
moral exemplars. Although there is great variety in the ways the saints lived, all of them
were striving to emulate Christ. For this reason, Christians can engage in mimesis of
Christ in ways that are authentic to who God created them to be (8). There is no cookiecutter version of modeling one’s life after Christ’s. Further, given the rich diversity
among the saints, contemporary Christians can exercise their moral agency in
determining which saints and which actions they themselves are called to reflect (9).
Herdt maintains that humans are dependent on God (343), but within that dependency,
individuals can model their lives on Christ’s in ways that are authentic and original to
them (344). While Herdt speaks of the emulation of Christ primarily in terms of the moral
formation of adults,52 her ethic offers resources for exploring how each child is utterly
reliant on God and simultaneously able to investigate and develop her own unique
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Herdt discusses children briefly when she presents the views of moral development in
Aristotle (Herdt, Putting on Virtue, 25-30), Luther (189-192), and Rousseau (292), but
these sections do not include an account of her own thoughts on children and their moral
formation. Because my focus in this chapter is on contemporary scholarship on children,
these sections fall outside the scope of this project.
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qualities in ways that reflect the perfection of Christ. In practical terms, this means that,
while children should be encouraged to model their behavior on the good behavior of
others, they must also be allowed and taught to discover their own ways of doing what is
good. They must be taught virtue and discernment rather than unquestioningly to follow
rules.
David Cloutier agrees that it is necessary to see human agency and divine grace as
complementing each other rather than competing.53 God moves the person’s will, and the
person freely chooses to do good. Cloutier explains that the difficulty with holding these
two positions simultaneously stems from an incorrect view of God as a creature or thing
(88). Properly understood, God’s creative power working in the person is what makes her
who she is. Because God is the creator and sustainer of the person, “human agency
becomes most fully human when it is most dependent on God” (88). Thus, human agency
in competition with God is less fully human than agency that is dependent on (and
cooperating with) God because God creates and sustains each human being.54
The form of agency that Cloutier advocates is neither individualistic nor based on
following rules or laws (90). Rather, human agency is communal and eschatological (95).
Cloutier finds the roots of the eschatological dimension of agency in scripture, which
emphasizes “the future-coming-into-being-now of the new creation” (100-101). It is
within this eschatological framework that each person finds her agency as part of the

David Cloutier, “How Does the Wind Blow and the Fire Burn? The Holy Spirit and
Moral Agency,” The Josephinum Journal of Theology 12, no. 1 (2005): 87, 88.
54
Darlene Weaver concurs with the argument that human agency is not in competition
with God. She considers it a misrepresentation of the power of God to say that God’s will
being done means that God has taken control of a situation. God’s power is not
dominating; it is creative and sustaining, the ground and sustenance of our very being
(Weaver, “Moral Agency, Sin, and Grace,” 16-17).
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Church community55 moving towards that future (100). Without removing individuality
through absorption into the community (101), Cloutier contends that the person moves
towards her perfection by “being drawn into community, into communion” (100). The
Spirit’s agency is also communal and eschatological (102), and it participates in the
community’s moral life by granting the people of the community knowledge of God’s
future towards which they are moving, and the power to enact that future (103).
Human moral agency is, according to Cloutier, a gift from God that grows and
develops, and it is not something strictly interior to the person. Agency begins to form
with the initial interaction of the person’s desires with her environment. Because agency
grows through her interaction with her surroundings, moral agency requires attention and
formation for it to develop well. Cloutier cites Alasdair MacIntyre’s contention that
imagination is necessary for envisioning a telos56 and that people who live in
communities that do not foster and form this sense of imagination will not be able to
visualize futures for themselves (104). Fostering good imagination is, therefore, one of
the ways that community aids in agency formation, and it also meets the criterion of noncompetition between God and the human agent. Cloutier argues that the Holy Spirit is
both “God’s future” and “God’s imagination for us.” When we receive the Holy Spirit,
we receive “the gift of sight and power” to envision God’s future and to live it (106).

Cloutier acknowledges that defining the community as the Church “opens up questions
of ecclesiology that go beyond the scope of the present text.” His purpose is to show “that
the communalized self must exist on both universal and local (or personal) levels—the
absence of one or the other will lead to distortion” (Cloutier, “How Does the Wind
Blow,” 100).
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See also David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the
Culture of Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 1981).
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Herdt’s and Cloutier’s non-competitive views of moral agency allow for an
understanding of human agency that is consistent with theological anthropology that
holds the full humanity of children, who are in the image of God and in relationship with
God. Humans, including children, are brought into being and sustained by God’s
creativity. They are not manipulated by it, and their actions are not controlled by it. At
the same time, everyone’s actions, including children’s, occur within the framework of
God as the source and sustenance of their being. Further, the communal dimension of
agency formation that Cloutier presents reminds us of the Christian understanding of the
eschatological telos towards which Christian communities and the individual agents
within them are moving.57
Children share the human capacity for relationship with God, and their spirituality
is partially constitutive of their agency. Miller-McLemore uses feminist theology to argue
that children’s spirituality gives them agency because they are not passive recipients of
church teaching but are able to engage actively with their faith.58 Their accountability is
still less than an adult’s, and it increases as children grow. Miller-McLemore argues that
“with increased knowledge, authority, and control comes growing responsibility and
culpability, and—ideally in the Christian story—liberation and grace” (80-81). As
children learn and grow in the ability to control their actions, their accountability for
those actions, both the good and the bad, increases.

The human freedom at stake in Cloutier’s argument is not only helped along by the
community, but it can also be limited by structures of social sin and violence, a theme to
which I will return in the next section.
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Miller-McLemore, Let the Children Come, 148. Recall that Yust puts forth a similar
argument, contending that children respond to God’s offer of relationship and, therefore,
are active in their faith (Yust, Real Kids, Real Faith, 7).
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Because human beings are also capable of sin, and sin affects a person’s
relationship with God, Miller-McLemore holds that it is important to take into account
children’s capacity for sin when considering their moral agency. She argues that sin, as a
social reality and not just an individual action, affects children, who are vulnerable to the
adults who surround them (158). In any account of sin and children, it is important to
remember that “children are more often sinned against than sinners themselves,” but at
the same time, allowing that children sin gives them agency beyond victimhood (80).
Children’s capacity for being actors for good and evil indicates that they are moral
agents.
As children come to understand that their actions have consequences and as they
learn to control them, they grow in their ability to reflect on their actions and to take
responsibility for them. They become conscious of their agency and develop a level of
accountability. One particular experience—the Sacrament of Reconciliation—specifically
addresses children’s capacity for sin and for recognizing and taking a level of
responsibility for their own sins.59 Jennifer Beste examines the reactions of Roman
Catholic second graders to receiving the Sacrament of Reconciliation for the first time.60
She finds that the greater the level of agency the children felt about receiving the
sacrament, the more positive their experience of the sacrament on several levels. By
agency, Beste means “whether they [the children] perceive themselves desiring and
choosing the sacrament for a reason related to the sacrament itself” (340). This is
significant for considering children’s moral agency because her findings indicate that the
In what follows, the focus is on the children’s experience of the sacrament, not an
examination of the sacrament itself.
60
Jennifer Beste, “Children Speak: Catholic Second Graders’ Agency and Experiences in
the Sacrament of Reconciliation,” Sociology of Religion 72, no. 3 (2011): 327-350.
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degree to which children understand themselves to be choosing an activity affects their
experience of the activity.
Beste’s purpose is not to determine why children felt the way they did regarding
their agency in receiving the sacrament, but to investigate the effect that perceived
agency had on their experience of the sacrament. Not only did the children’s emotional
response tend to be more positive if they felt they had chosen to receive the sacrament
(339), but the children who perceived themselves having greater agency were also the
ones who reported that their relationship with God was positively impacted by receiving
the Sacrament of Reconciliation (333, 339). Furthermore, the children who felt that their
agency was engaged in choosing the sacrament reported that receiving the sacrament had
a positive effect on their moral lives (345). Those children who did not feel a sense of
agency tended to report more negative or neutral responses to their reception of the
sacrament. Beste concludes that she has identified “a correlation between children’s
perceived sense of agency (or lack thereof) and (1) their affective response, (2) whether
the sacrament is personally meaningful, and (3) its impact on their relationship with God
and others” (347). The implications of this for children’s moral development need to be
explored further. It does seem plausible, however, that the degree to which a child feels a
connection to the decisions she is making will affect her response to those decisions. This
is worth bearing in mind as we consider the role of emotions in moral development and
virtue below.
Psychologist Patrick Sean Moffett, who works with the Boys’ and Girls’ Towns
of Italy, offers a definition of agency that concurs with Beste’s focus on intentional
choice. Moffett writes of the agency of the children who are citizens of these towns,
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defining their agency as “intended engagement in activities that help to shape who I am
and who I am becoming.”61 He believes such activities very possibly begin in infancy and
become more conscious as the person grows: “From infancy, humans engage in activities
that suggest intentionality. When we begin to speak, we communicate what we want to
do and, in time, we explain why.”62 The agency he sees in the children with whom he
works has its grounding in the intentional, self-defining actions of those children.
From these accounts of children’s moral agency, we can conclude that recent
Christian theological scholarship on the agency of the child in relationship with God
advances the following views: children are created and sustained by God, and their
agency is most free when it is dependent on God; children act in grace-filled ways, but
they are also capable of sin; and children’s participation as agents in their moral choices
is connected to their experience of those choices and of the choices’ consequences. At the
same time, all of these thinkers acknowledge that an individual child’s moral agency does
not occur or develop in a vacuum. It is formed and shaped through the child’s interaction
with her surroundings.

Moral Agency of Children in Response to their Environments
Children are undeniably formed by their environments, for better and for worse,
and this influence shapes their responses to their surroundings. Recent scholarship makes
the case that the interaction operates in both directions, and children also have an impact
on their surroundings and the people in them. In this section, I begin with an explanation

Patrick Sean Moffett, “Promoting Agency Among Children and Adolescents at the
Margins,” The Journal of Pastoral Counseling 30 (1995): 39.
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of interactive agency and then move to the theological considerations for children’s moral
agency within the context of their environments.
The theory of interactive agency originates in the social sciences but has import
for theological considerations of children’s moral agency. In explaining the interactive
theory, I draw on the work of Sam Frankel. Frankel is an independent writer and
consultant who utilizes his own empirical research with children in conversation with
current sociological scholarship on children’s agency to explain how he thinks the social
agency of children translates into moral agency. While Frankel is not a theologian,63 his
thoughts on children’s agency offer a clear explanation of and argument for the
interactive view of children’s agency that is prevalent in some social scientific thought, 64
and which influences the work of some theologians, including John Wall (discussed
below). In the latter half of the twentieth century, social scientists began to “recast the
relationship between structure and agency in favour of a growing recognition of the
individual as social agent.”65 Broadly speaking, the social sciences conceive structure as
the set of regulations and cultural customs that are already present and must be negotiated
by each person.66 The person’s agency is her ability to respond to the cultural or social

63

He is the founder and director of Educational Charity Act 4, UK. I use his explanation
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structure and to affect it through her interaction with it (19).67 This conception of agency
also involves a person’s ability to create meanings of her own from her interactions with
her surroundings, meanings that make sense of what she encounters and that inform her
actions as a result (18, 22, 24). The relationship between structure and agency is
symbiotic, meaning that a child’s agency cannot be considered without taking the social
structure in which she lives into account, and the social structure is shaped by
individuals’ (including the child’s) interaction with it (22). This sociological
understanding led to what Frankel calls a new paradigm of children within society (2022). Some sociologists began to see children as active with respect to their social world,
not just as passive recipients of it. At the same time, the structure does exist, and children
are not defining everything for themselves out of nothing. Therefore, children are active
in “drawing on the social world as they seek to make sense of what is happening around
them and to negotiate a way through it” (22).
Frankel makes the case that the social agency for which the new paradigm argues
translates into moral agency as well. He includes children in the moral discourse through
which people not only become trained in the morality of a particular culture, but also help
to define that morality through their interaction with it. He argues that children learn this
kind of morality from a very early age through an innate emotional awareness of their
surroundings and the dynamics of the social interactions in which they engage (31). He
claims that “it is by recognising children as agents, responding and reacting to the world
around them, as they shape a sense of identity and belonging, that the case for children’s
moral agency and therefore their inclusion in such discourses can be made” (9, see also
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31, 44). The moral agency for which Frankel (and the theologians discussed below)
argues is in contrast to those theories that present children as products of their
surroundings whose inability to reason renders them incapable of moral engagement and
agency (15). Structure and agency impact the child, just as both impact the adult. The key
difference, according to this new paradigm, is that children lack the experience, not the
ability, to interact with their structures.68
Combined with his study of the new paradigm described by the social sciences,
Frankel’s empirical research leads him to conclude that children are indeed moral agents.
In the demographic with which he worked,69 agency involved being able to define oneself
with respect to others and to define others with respect to oneself (94-95). It also involved
negotiating one’s world and one’s power within that world to achieve a sense of
belonging, which all the children sought (136).70 One way children develop their moral
understanding and learn what is and is not acceptable is through their social interactions.

Frankel, Children, Morality and Society, 20-21. Wall concurs when he writes, “The
difference between adults and children does not lie in whether they struggle with their
own (and others’) good and evil, but in the extent to which they have acquired the social
and cultural capabilities and means for doing so” (John Wall, “Childism and the Ethics of
Responsibility,” in Children’s Voices: Children’s Perspectives in Ethics, Theology and
Religious Education, ed. Annemie Dillen and Didier Pollefeyt [Walpole, MA: Peeters,
2010], 255).
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Moffett observes that the children in Boys’ and Girls’ Towns also sought a sense of
belonging as citizens of those Towns. The children did not have a sense of belonging in
other areas of their lives, which was one reason they were not living with their families.
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40). Couture refers to this lack of belonging to significant groups, particularly groups that
include adults who can aid children, as the poverty of tenuous connections (Couture,
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In order to ascertain the moral codes of their community, children require experience as
well as guidance from people with whom they have relationships (137). The children
Frankel interviewed saw their moral development as a learning process, and as they
gained experience and understood the morality of various issues, they became able to
assess the morality of situations for themselves (140-141). Learning to understand and to
navigate their surroundings and their relationships with others is part of children’s
developing moral agency. In addition, children’s existence and actions make an
impression on the very environment that helps to form them.
Recall that numerous theological voices draw attention to the good and evil that
children encounter in the world. While it is true that there are many aspects of a child’s
environment over which she has no control, the child is not completely determined by her
surroundings. Rather, she is created by God as a person with an organic integrity that will
be impacted by her experiences, but that also affects her surroundings, including the
people in them. Her ability to influence and make meaning of her surroundings and
experiences is part of what it means for her to have agency. It seems reasonable that
another aspect of the child’s developing moral agency is her capacity to engage in
intentional actions, which I see as part of the interactive model (she is acting on her
environment) that will foster her budding ability to be accountable for her actions.
John Wall advances an interactive model of children’s agency, and he writes that
a child’s agency is a factor both of the child’s environment’s acting on her and of the
child’s ability to act on, interpret, and to an extent create her environment through her
interaction with it.71 This interaction between the child and her environment occurs both
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passively and actively. Children cannot control certain dimensions of their lives, and
Wall explains that they experience those dimensions passively. In other ways, children
actively participate in their social worlds and do not simply mold themselves to the ways
adults train them (539). This is not to negate the importance of socializing and morally
educating a child. Rather, both the passive and the active aspects must be borne in mind
in order not to “dehumanize” the child by overemphasizing either her agency or her need
for moral and social education (541). Because Wall is articulating a view that sees
people, and so children, as both interpreters of their worlds and as interpreted by their
worlds, and because these worlds include those dimensions that benefit the child and
those that harm her, his work follows on the theological anthropology that holds that
children’s lives are shaped by both good and evil. The child is interpreting and acting
upon the world by which she is influenced and shaped, and this is her agency (540).
When we accept that children are able to be moral agents, we see that teaching
them to use that agency well and to make good moral choices is vital. To that end,
Christine Gudorf endorses an increased level of agency for children within the family. 72
Beginning with Catholic social teaching that advocates for all people to be involved in
decision making in a society, she writes: “Social justice is best created not through
merely attempting to persuade the powerful to take into consideration the needs of the
powerless but through structural change that empowers the weak to recognize their own
legitimate needs and to interact with others in order to meet them” (147). As promising as
this teaching is, Gudorf notes that it has not been extended to children. She argues that
families must operate with justice, meaning that children’s thoughts and needs must be
Christine Gudorf, “Rights of Children,” in The New Dictionary of Catholic Social
Thought, ed. Judith A. Dwyer (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1994), 143-148.
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taken seriously by their parents.73 When children are allowed to participate in family
decisions, they learn how to make decisions by being part of the process that affects their
own lives (147). The implication for their agency is that participation will permit children
to be active in family life rather than passively obedient. Further, learning discernment in
decision making will aid in the development of their agency as well as prepare them to be
adults who are responsibly accountable for their decisions.
Cristina Traina agrees that agency functions interactively, but she articulates the
crucial distinction between acting morally and being accountable for those actions. She
argues that children—even those who are quite young—should be reckoned moral
agents.74 Agency is a quality that develops with time, she claims. “Agency is not a skill
or ability that one does not have today and achieves tomorrow; it is an ontological quality
that deepens and develops in response to, and within the limits of, a social world” (29).
Agency develops in relationship with other people and with one’s environment, and it is
determined by whether one is engaging in “self-consciously moral action, which…is
always contingent and interdependent” (21). At the same time, she argues that moral
agency does not require the ability to give moral reasons for one’s actions, nor does it
demand autonomy, accountability, or legal liability (21).
Traina emphasizes the significance of individuals’ interactions with their
surroundings in the formation of their agency. Even before a person can articulate the
73
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reasons for her responses to her surroundings, her responses are shaped by her
circumstances and the information they convey to her.75 As each person gains experience,
she will gather new information from those experiences that will help to shape her
responses to future situations. Children’s unarticulated reserve of moral experience that
influences their moral actions grows and changes quickly because they are still learning
about their world and cannot yet express their reasons for acting in a particular way (24).
Traina also argues that autonomy is not necessary for agency. Theologically, she
says, requiring autonomy as a necessary condition for “agency, accountability, and
dignity before God” would risk eliminating the personhood of an individual in the face of
the mitigating circumstances and actions of other people that affect her choices (24). All
people must choose among what they determine are available options when making
moral decisions. That those options are limited by and made in response to a particular
set of circumstances does not remove the agency of the actor from the situation.
Therefore, children, even in their dependence76 and vulnerability,77 are agents (24).
Finally, Traina holds that accountability cannot be required for a person to have
agency; a person’s blameworthiness cannot be identified with her ability to engage in
moral acts (29). The reason it is appropriate not to hold children accountable as adults,

Traina makes this statement in the course of discussing Nomy Arpaly’s Unprincipled
Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral Agency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), which
I examine below. I am indebted to Traina’s article for making me aware of Arpaly’s work
and its relevance for this project.
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Traina writes, is that “moral accountability is not a predictable, linear capacity gradually
and permanently acquired but…one that we must continue to develop in response to life’s
imperfect unpredictabilities. Thus, most children have acquired fewer moral languages of
accountability than most adults, and all are ontological moral agents” (30).78 Being a
moral agent is part of what it means to be a human being; accountability is acquired.
When we think about this in terms of children’s formation, the implication is that
children must be afforded the time and opportunity to engage in actions that exercise their
agency within limits that proscribe the level of harm that can result from those actions.
For example, children need to learn that physical violence is not a morally acceptable
way to acquire a toy from a playmate. If one child hits another child, that action can be
described as a moral action, and the child should be corrected for it, but she should not be
held accountable for assault.
As children grow, their experience and understanding of the world increases, and
they learn to exercise their agency in response to the morality they have been taught and
within the limitations of their particular circumstances. As they gain experience, they also
increase their praiseworthiness and blameworthiness in those circumstances. Consider
again the child who hits her playmate. A child who has been repeatedly corrected for
hitting another child will likely be blamed for hitting again, whereas initial
experimentation with hitting to get one’s own way will be less likely to incur blame.
Caregivers might initially see refraining from hitting as something the child needs to
Kate M. Ott echoes this distinction in her discussion of Traina, Beste, and Wall: “As
children and adults, we will experience differing levels of autonomy and rational capacity
throughout our lifetime, but we are all equally moral agents. Our accountability for our
actions is not determined by whether or not we have agency, but by growing knowledge
and experience of moral requirements to self and others” (Ott, “Searching for an Ethic,”
162).
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learn. As children gain moral experience, we expect them to be able to apply that
experience to new situations and to be accountable for their actions in similar situations
in the future. Traina’s assertion that accountability is not permanent or linear reminds us
that children may be faced with situations so new that knowing how to behave in them is
beyond what can be expected, and so they should not be blamed for their actions. The
distinction between agency and accountability is crucial to arguing for children’s moral
agency while protecting them from blame that presumes a level of experience,
discernment, and control that they are still developing.
Agency and accountability function within the conditions of good and evil each
person encounters in the world. Interaction with sin in the world can limit one’s choices
as well as one’s ability to recognize her accountability for the consequences of those
choices, argues Darlene Weaver. She makes the case that “sin preconditions freedom
because we become selves through social processes that are themselves sinful.”79
Focusing on structural violence, by which she means the organized repression of some
people by others within a social context (examples are “racism, sexism, heterosexism,
ageism, and economic oppression” [113]), Weaver makes the case that these structures,
along with grace, are the pre-conditions of human agency (115).80 She draws attention to
the ways structural violence influences the agent-in-formation in two ways. First, the
structural violence negatively impacts its victims. Second, because the violence is
structural, people who act within its structure participate in it, often without knowing that
they are perpetuating systems of violence and injustice, and in this way it “mask[s] the
79

Darlene Fozard Weaver, The Acting Person and the Christian Moral Life (Washington,
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 112.
80
Weaver’s articulation of this is very much in line with Rahner’s understanding of
original sin and grace as conditioning human freedom (see above).
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effects” their actions have on others in the world (113-114).81 When extending this idea
to a consideration of children’s agency, we can see that children participate in structural
violence without knowing that they are or understanding the import of their actions, and
they should not be held accountable for participating in structural violence in the ways
that adults are. While Weaver’s account is not concerned with children explicitly, it is a
useful resource for considering children’s moral agency in the context of sin.
Kristin Herzog offers an explicit consideration of children’s agency within some
of the worst cases of structural violence. Arguing that children are capable of being
agents for good or for bad in the contexts in which they find themselves,82 she explores
both types of agency. Children are capable of being cruel and of committing atrocious
acts, but they are not responsible for having created the circumstances that sometimes
lead to these actions (165-166). Within the problematic circumstances of children’s
agency, her emphasis is on child labor and in particular on child soldiers. While she
contends that there is room for cultural differences in what constitutes acceptable work
for children (74-75), she insists that one area of child labor that should be abolished is
child soldiering (83). When children are forced or recruited to be soldiers, they are in the
complicated position of being both victims and agents.83 Poverty, the adults who recruit
them, and the war-torn, violent situation in which they live circumscribe their available
options and train them to be violent (84, 86). The military leaders use the children for

Weaver maintains that God’s grace is necessary to correct the structural violence in the
world (Weaver, The Acting Moral Person, 115).
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83
The same is true for many other child laborers as well (Herzog, Children and Our
Global Future, 74-81).
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their own purposes, in some truly horrifying ways.84 At the same time, it is the children
who do the killing, the torturing, and the fighting at the command of their military
authorities.
Herzog notes that when the child’s community of origin knows that the child has
committed these evil acts, the relationship between the child and that community is
understandably fractured. There are groups that work to rehabilitate the child soldiers and
to reintegrate them into their communities, when possible. In some areas of Uganda, for
example, people perform a ritual purification of former child soldiers before they are
reaccepted into the community. The members of the community know that these children
have killed. They have performed evil acts and they must be cleansed of the evil (88).
The magnitude of their actions requires that the children be accountable on some level,
but as Herzog points out, the children are also victims of the military leaders who recruit
and use them. Herzog argues that allowing children to have agency bears the same risks
that allowing adults to have agency does—people make bad choices sometimes. The way
we respond to children who have done evil is the key to helping them learn why what
they did was wrong and to learn the necessary skills and qualities to make better choices
in the future (166).
Children are also able to be agents of good and of positive change. Herzog thinks
that children’s “dependence on love and care keeps them open to an ever new and
surprising future, to the vitality and enjoyment of life itself, and to trusting relationships”

“Child soldiers are favored by ruthless leaders because they are cheap and easily
manipulated. They work as spies, guards, carriers, sex slaves, human shields, and
removers of mines. Under the influence of alcohol or drugs they can turn into coldblooded murderers” (Herzog, Children and Our Global Future, 83).
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(165). Children can be taught to be agents of good,85 as when children who have
abundant material possessions can become aware of and choose to act in response to the
crippling poverty of so many of the world’s children (168). They can also be role models
for adults and reminders of what we must become again (171). They can do this by
serving as testimonials to adults of the need to protect and care for the environment (169),
of the reality that human value subsists in being rather than in what a person is able to do
(168), and of the peace that comes with reconciliation (170).
On these accounts, being able to interact with and interpret one’s surroundings in
both good and sinful ways is what makes a person a moral agent. Moral accountability
and moral responsibility develop in a person over time, but the person herself is always
an agent. Agents are active; they are learning and forming (sometimes unarticulated)
ideas about how the world works, and they are acting in that world. Their interaction with
their surroundings shapes their moral inclinations, which, in turn, drive their future
actions. In the next section, I turn to the question of what motivates a person to make
moral choices.

Moral Motivation
Moral actions are rarely the result solely of rational moral reasons that can be
articulated as such. Rather, a person’s individual history, her experiences, and her
emotions also contribute to her motivation to act as she does. In this section, I consider
See also Peter L. Bensen and Eugene C. Roehlkepartain, “When ‘Good Enough’ Isn’t
Really Good Enough: Aiming for the ‘Best’ for All Young People,” in The Best Love of
the Child: Being Loved and Being Taught to Love as the First Human Right, ed. Timothy
P. Jackson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011), 34-35. Bensen
and Roehlkepartain argue that children’s moral formation must include teaching and
expecting them to use their gifts to be agents of good.
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different views of moral motivation. By moral motivation, I mean to include those factors
that influence a person to respond to a situation in a particular way, which is related to
but not reducible to the person’s moral judgment of the situation.86 Moral motivation is
part of moral agency; it is what drives a person to action. A person’s interaction with her
surroundings helps form the meaning she makes of the world and her understanding of
moral situations. Even at a sub-conscious level, this understanding shapes her motivation
to notice and respond to those situations. Emotions are crucial to attaining moral
understanding and to moral motivation.
Robert Coles is a pediatrician and psychiatrist who has studied children in
particularly difficult situations, such as racial integration in the U.S. South in the 1960s
and the poverty of the favelas in Brazil. He is concerned with how and why a person
learns to become what we would call a moral person who makes good choices and
behaves in good ways, but he does not attempt to provide simple answers to the
questions. Coles’s focus is on people’s concrete actions rather than on their ability to
articulate moral principles.87 This distinction is important to him, because he holds that
while we can teach rules and reasons to people, real situations will call for action, and
that action will be based on factors that go beyond reflection and rational rules.88 The
circumstances of a child’s life and the influences of the adults around her will be key to
determining her moral development and her motivation to act in particular ways. At the
Moral motivation is not a resolved issue in philosophy. See Connie S. Rosati, “Moral
Motivation,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2008 Edition, ed. Edward
N. Zalta, accessed December 12, 2013,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/moral-motivation/.
87
Robert Coles, The Moral Life of Children (Boston, MA: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986),
26.
88
Coles, Moral Life, 21; Robert Coles, The Moral Intelligence of Children (New York:
Random House, 1997), 10, 131.
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same time, children are not simply molded by those around them. Some children exhibit
qualities that help them to act in more moral ways than others.
A striking example of the influence of parents on children’s reasons for acting
comes from Coles’s interview with a woman reflecting on her upbringing in pre-CivilRights New Orleans.89 She recalls that her father would spew venomous rhetoric
regarding racial minorities, Catholics, and Jews (226-227). Her mother worked hard not
to hate these groups and to show the children that the father’s hatred was not to be
emulated; she winked at them when he went on a drunken verbal rampage (227). That
kind of counter-force was deeply influential to this woman, whose mother also
encouraged her to use whatever means she could to get out of the poverty in which they
lived. (The woman was a beauty queen and was able to use that to escape her poverty.
She also educated herself through reading and taking courses at Tulane University [227].)
The woman’s brother, on the other hand, was materially rewarded in one poignant
instance for his perpetuation of the hatred their father was teaching them. The father paid
the brother $5 for swearing at an African-American woman (228). While the woman
Coles interviewed was able to leave her impoverished life and marry a rich man, her
brother joined the Ku Klux Klan (228). The children grew up in the same home with
similar influences, but they developed along different paths, even at a very early age. The
reason each was shaped by a different set of influences is not what concerns Coles. The
result, however, points to the agency of the children at work as they made meaning of
their parents’ actions and the racial tensions in their community, and then acted on the
motivation that that cultivated. One child chose to follow the path of actively
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Coles, Moral Life, 226-228.
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perpetuating racism, while the other child acted in ways that allowed her to escape the
poverty of her childhood. Although they were raised in the same household, the
children’s interaction with their environment—which includes their exercise of agency
within that that environment—led them to be morally motivated to act in different ways.
A second example illustrates the influence the community can have on children as
well. Coles tells the story of a young girl named Marty,90 the 13-year-old daughter of a
family of migrant farmers, who was the sole survivor of a car crash that took the lives of
her father and one of her brothers (113). Coles tells of Marty’s spiritual reflectiveness and
empathy for others. Her life was impoverished and in many ways quite harsh, and yet she
yearned to be a source of comfort and care to those around her. As Coles reflects on his
encounters with her, he is impressed by her spirit and moral purpose (118), and he notes
that her family, under the leadership of her mother, stayed close to as much of a
community as they could muster in their lifestyle (124). There was a minister (118), a
nurse who worked with the migrant families (120-121), and a teacher (121-122), all of
whom were supportive of Marty and her family. Coles also credits Marty’s deep religious
faith for giving her a purpose and a direction in her moral life (123-124). These
relationships offered moral examples as well as support and protection to a vulnerable
child.
Somehow, Marty’s supportive relationships translated into her being morally
motivated by a concern for others.91 The ability to see beyond themselves is an important
aspect of children’s moral development. Coles remarks, “Generally speaking, what
characterizes a not-so-good person is a heightened, destructive self-absorption, in all its
90
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Coles, Moral Life, 113-125.
Coles, Moral Life, 119-120.
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melancholy variations.”92 It is difficult for children to learn a level of moral connection
with others when they are feeling vulnerable themselves. Coles argues that feeling
susceptible can undermine moral connectedness in two ways. “This tendency to flee
ourselves, either to take moral cover in the company of others or to place ourselves at a
firm distance from others, is no small aspect of a child’s growing moral life.”93 The
connection is important both in terms of having supportive, nurturing connections with
others, and in terms of seeing oneself as an actor in those relationships.
Coles’s experience with children leads him to conclude that they are moral beings
who are making moral choices, and their choices are influenced to a large extent by their
surroundings. They are learning from those around them about what kinds of behavior are
moral and acceptable, and they are learning either to distance themselves from the other
or to cultivate a sense of empathy for the other, and those distinctions play out in their
actions. This is not to say that the children are reflecting abstractly on their surroundings,
but rather that their moral actions are shaped by their experiences, including what they
witness adults doing, and how they internalize those experiences. 94
Rational reflection was not required for the kind of influences that shaped the
moral motivation Coles noticed in his interactions with children. They were often
influenced by the actions of the adults who surrounded them, and they learned to engage
other people with empathy or to distance themselves from others through their
experiences with particular people and situations. It is also possible to argue
92
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philosophically that conscious reasoning is not necessary for moral motivation. Nomy
Arpaly is a moral philosopher whose book Unprincipled Virtue addresses this issue of
moral motivation that does not stem from conscious rational processes. Her work does
not deal with children specifically, but it encourages a broader understanding of rational
decision making and moral agency that has implications for how we consider the moral
agency of children.
Arpaly focuses on the possibility that people can (although they do not always)
make rational moral decisions based on emotions or reasons that they cannot articulate or
have not yet articulated, and that sometimes the best course of action is that which is
against one’s best judgment. This is relevant for the current study because it means that
articulated, conscious rationality is not necessary for an action to be either moral or
rational. When Arpaly refers to acting rationally, she assumes, “for the purposes of
argument, that one only has a reason to act in a certain way to the extent that the relevant
course of action is likely, given one’s beliefs, to satisfy one’s desires, and that acting
rationally, whatever it turns out to be, involves doing what one has overwhelming reasons
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to do, for these reasons.”95 She includes beliefs made in and based on emotional states as
legitimate responses to the data at hand.96
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between rationality and irrationality in
practice, both when looking at others and at ourselves (60). Arpaly argues that akrasia,
which she defines as, “acting against one’s best judgment” (35), is not always irrational.
Indeed, she thinks that sometimes when people act against their best judgment, they are
following the most rational course of action. A somewhat obvious case of this would be a
person whose best judgment was based on mistaken assumptions or beliefs. Less
obviously, sometimes people’s reasons for doing what they do are deep-seated and are
not conscious to them.97 They act in a way that is against their best articulated judgment,
but their decision is based on what would actually—given all their circumstance, beliefs,
and desires—be in their best interest, although those reasons might be unconscious to
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Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue, 37. I understand Arpaly to mean satisfying ones desires in
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them at the time.98 Arpaly employs a term called “inverse akrasia,” to refer to these
“cases in which an agent does the right thing but does so against her best judgment.”99
This is an explanation for the kind of person who holds official views that are considered
problematic (racist, sexist, etc.) but in practice is kind and caring to those of a different
race or sex. The person’s articulated moral reasons do not match her actions, although her
actions would still be considered rational and moral.
Arpaly does not require deliberation to be a part of rational decisions or actions.100
Because children are less well-equipped for rational deliberation, her position is
significant for bringing them into the moral conversation. Arpaly argues that deliberation
cannot be part of every decision or action that we would call rational. In cases of fast,
almost reflexive action (she uses the examples of a tennis player and fast conversation),
people do not have time to deliberate but must act quickly, and yet their actions would
still be called rational. Further, the case of deliberation itself illustrates the non-necessity
of deliberation regarding a rational decision. If deliberation were required to make a
rational decision, then in order for the deliberation to be rational, one would have to
deliberate whether to deliberate in a particular case, and then deliberate about whether to
deliberate about deliberating, and so on in infinite regression (57). In addition, sometimes

“[O]ne can act for good reasons (where good reasons are thought of in terms of desire
satisfaction given one’s beliefs) without knowing that one is acting for good reasons”
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people have what she calls “dawning” experiences, where, upon extended exposure to
new evidence, they change their minds without deliberating (54). This can be a rational
experience, but it is not necessarily one.
This ability to use prior knowledge in an effective way in decision making seems
to have a connection to emotion. This will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter,
but at this point it is worth noting that emotions feature in a person’s morality because a
morally concerned person will find the thought of doing something immoral “quite
painful.”101 Arpaly cites neuroscientist Antonio Damasio’s study wherein patients whose
brain damage removed their ability to feel emotions were found to be very bad at
practical reasoning.102 These patients made bad decisions precisely because they did not
have “feeling-based access to their own background knowledge in making those
decisions” (59). People who are able to access their feelings have emotional responses to
some possible courses of action based on their past experiences and do not deliberate
over every possibility. For example, Arpaly says that the idea of assigning Martin
Heidegger’s Being and Time in an introductory-level undergraduate philosophy course
causes her to feel amusement and thus is not deliberated upon but simply dismissed. This
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dismissal is a rational, although not deliberated, decision. She concludes that rational
actions can—and sometimes must—spring from something other than deliberation and
that “no action and no belief is purely the result of deliberation” (59). Deliberation is
always, at every stage, informed by prior experience that is not itself deliberative.
Arpaly’s analysis is helpful for considering virtuous moral agency because a
virtuous person is virtuous in her daily life, not just in moments of great moral challenge,
and daily life is lived in a largely non-deliberative way. Her argument that Huckleberry
Finn acts in a morally praiseworthy way and for morally significant reasons when he does
not turn in Jim to the slave catchers103 indicates that her theory has relevance for
considering children and their morality. Huck’s reasons for protecting Jim stem from his
experience of getting to know Jim as a fellow human being. Although Huck’s articulated
stance remains racist, his actual moral reasons for acting have shifted, through the kind of
dawning experience mentioned above, to those of someone who views Jim as a person of
equal value to himself (77). Without the benefit of being able to reason abstractly (75,
77), Huckleberry Finn’s receptivity to new experience provides him with the moral
reasons to act in a praiseworthy way (76). This argument can be extended to a
consideration of all children, whose inchoate rational powers disallow their reasoning
their way to conclusions about what is morally right. If Arpaly is right, and I am inclined
to think she is, then children’s experience, intuition, and emotions can lead to their
having moral reasons that have not yet surfaced in their rational consciousness, and this
must be included when considering their moral agency and motivation.

See also Jonathan Bennett, “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn,” Philosophy 49
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In addition to shaping some of the moral reasons that motivate action, emotions
also play a crucial role in moral concern, which is another important part of moral
motivation. Lisa Damm makes a case for the necessity of emotion for moral motivation
based on her consideration of studies of persons whose psychological conditions have left
them with diminished emotional capacities.104 Distinguishing moral judgment (an agent’s
ability to assess the morality of a situation) from moral motivation (an agent’s reason for
doing something), she finds that persons without affective capacities are unable to be
morally concerned and so moved to act morally. Moral judgments result from moral
reasoning, but moral motivation is distinctly tied to emotion and “is a concern for what is
right or wrong based on considerations involving the welfare of other individuals in their
community” (276). She finds that emotion contributes to moral motivation in three ways.
First, a person must feel concern for others in order to be motivated morally. She needs to
understand and be perceptive of the needs of other people in order to be able to take
moral concepts from the abstract and understand why she should follow them. Second, a
person must be able to grasp that other people also have feelings and concerns, and she
must be able to recognize these in others in order to be motivated to act morally. This is a
kind of emotional perspicuity with respect to others that persons with impaired emotional
capacities (specifically persons with autism) have exhibited difficulty developing.105
Third, and very much in agreement with Arpaly’s assessment above, “emotions represent

Lisa Damm, “Emotions and Moral Agency,” 275-292. Her account ties moral agency
to moral responsibility, which differs from my working definition; however, I find her
distinction between moral judgment and moral motivation and the role of emotion in the
latter to be convincing regardless of whether one holds a person responsible for her
actions or not.
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a source of embodied knowledge that contributes toward helping persons select and act in
accordance with moral decisions in their lives” (288). On this account, emotion is
necessary for moving from abstract concepts to understanding why those concepts are
important and acting on them in one’s life—in other words, for moral motivation. This is
not to remove the importance of moral reasoning for arriving at moral judgments, but it
does point to the necessity of more than reason in moral motivation and moral action.
These are the kinds of emotional qualities that become significant when considering
children’s moral development from the perspective of emotions, as we shall see in the
next chapter.
Children are in relationship with God and with other people because they are
human beings created in God’s image. Their moral agency is based on the individual
child’s ability to interact with and contribute to the good and evil in her environment. The
child’s agency grows and develops in connection and relationship with other people.
Because she is created in God’s image and in relationship with God, her agency is not in
competition with God, but rather is most fully human when it is most dependent on God.
Finally, much of the child’s interacting with and learning to negotiate the world in which
she lives occur at an emotional level. Children might feel an emotional connection or
degree of choice that moves them to have a positive experience of their action, as with
the second graders in Beste’s study. They might also have unexpressed, unconscious
emotional experiences that lead them to make decisions that are contrary to their
articulated stance, as with Huck Finn and his decision not to turn in Jim to the slave
catchers. As the child grows and develops, her moral agency develops as well, and her
emotions will continue to be integral to her agency and moral growth. In the next chapter,
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I explore some contemporary theological and philosophical views of the role of emotions
in morality and moral development.
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CHAPTER 2: THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN CHILDREN’S MORAL
DEVELOPMENT—CONTEMPORARY VIEWS

Emotions are far from value-neutral. Quite the contrary, the idea that emotions are
fundamentally ethical is not new, according to Robert Solomon, who provides a brief
history of Western thought on the emotions. He acknowledges that philosophers have at
times been skeptical of the potential emotions have to contribute positively to a person’s
life. Even those thinkers, such as Aristotle and Hume, whose work is now used to explain
or champion the place of emotion as central to human life, required that emotion or
passion be subservient to reason.1 There were early Christian thinkers who designated
some emotions as sinful, categorizing certain emotions, such as envy and lust, as among
the seven deadly sins.2 At the same time, throughout history, some philosophers and
theologians have viewed emotions as necessary to the moral life. Aristotle held that
emotions are moral, and he incorporated emotion into his theory of virtue—one must feel
the right emotion, in the right way, to the right extent, at the right time. Some early
Christians elevated particular emotions, such as gratitude, to a divine status.3 Aquinas’s

1
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theory of emotions draws on Aristotle’s, and we will see below that he holds that if
emotions are properly formed and cultivated, they can contribute to a person’s virtue.
Emotions are morally significant because they are involved in moral motivation
and because emotions can indicate the value people place on the objects that elicit the
emotions. A person who has developed compassion will experience an emotional
response to the suffering of others. However, if she is overcome with grief at the sight of
a child crying as the child receives a vaccination against a life-threatening disease, we
would likely conclude that her emotions are not virtuous in that instance. She might be
feeling the right emotion (compassion for the child who is frightened or in some pain),
but it is excessive since we know that the vaccination will benefit the child more than it
hurts her. Experiencing the right emotion in the right way at the right time can motivate a
person to act in ways that are appropriate to the situation because her emotions have
allowed her to notice the morally salient aspects of the situation and, if something is
morally amiss, to determine what needs to change to rectify the situation. Many
philosophers and theologians argue that emotions also play a role in moral development,
which has direct bearing on the current study of children’s moral agency.
I begin this chapter with a consideration of philosophical cognitive theories of
emotion, which argue that emotions are fundamentally evaluative judgments or thoughts. 4

John Deigh, “Concepts of Emotions in Modern Philosophy and Psychology,” in The
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, ed. Peter Goldie, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 17. Cognitive theories are distinguished from accounts of
emotions that stem from the work of William James. James identifies emotions with the
bodily feelings that are associated with them (Deigh, “Concepts of Emotions,” 20;
Solomon, True to Our Feelings, 139). On James’s view, a person does not cry because
she is sad. She is sad because she cries. For him, a person’s hearing tragic news results in
neurological and physiological changes that produce crying, and the crying is prior to the
experience of sadness (Deigh, “Concepts of Emotions,” 20). Contemporary neo4
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In my consideration of these theories, I find that their focus centers on what the emotion
is in terms of the person’s internal experience. The cognitive dimension is what allows
emotion to be morally evaluated and educated. Cognitive theories of emotion are useful
in a number of ways for considering children’s emotions, but because they tend to define
emotion as a category of thought conceived in terms of propositions, they limit the
experience of emotion to those people who have developed rational powers, thus
excluding children from the discussion. This is one reason I will look beyond cognitive
theories when constructing an account of children’s moral agency. Another reason is that
I agree with the literature that argues that if children are to develop morally, they must
learn to detach their thinking from their emotions enough to assess whether any given
emotional response is warranted and is leading them toward a good end. If they are to
grow in virtue (as Aquinas defines it), they must then reintegrate their emotions with their
thoughts and wills such that they want to do that which they think and understand to be
good. Such a distinction and reintegration requires that emotions not be defined as
thoughts.
In the second section, I explore theories of emotion that include a cognitive
dimension but are not exclusively cognitive. The emphasis among these thinkers is on
what the emotion means in terms of the person’s moral development in response to and
relation with her surroundings. Within this body of scholarship, some philosophers and

Jamesians, basing their theories on neuroscientific findings, maintain the physiological
foundation of emotions. They claim that non-deliberative actions (crying, recoiling in
fear) are constitutive of the emotion (Deigh, “Concepts of Emotions,” 33). These are not
moral actions, nor are emotions conceived in this way a source of moral motivation to
engage in moral action. Further, this physiological view seems to remove education of
the emotions as a means of fostering moral development in children. For these reasons, I
do not find the neo-Jamesian accounts useful in thinking about moral agency in children.
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theologians address the agency of the individual as an actor for whom emotions are
motivational. A few of the scholars whose work I review discuss children’s emotional
development explicitly, but most do not, and in those cases, I will indicate the
implications of their work for considering children’s moral development. In each section,
I begin by engaging philosophical scholarship and then move to theological scholarship.
Although I am not proposing a definitive theory of emotion,5 my understanding
of emotion for this project has been informed by cognitive thinkers such as Martha
Nussbaum and Robert Solomon, as well as those whose theories move beyond strict
cognitivism, most notably Diana Fritz Cates, and I will discuss their theories more fully
later in this chapter. I argue that emotions have both cognitive and moral dimensions. An
emotion, as I will use the term,6 is a multifaceted response to an object or situation, and
that object or situation can be real (I am afraid of a violent bull who is in an enclosed
field with me), perceived but not real (I am afraid of the violent bull who is in the field,

5

Given the complicated nature of emotions, some scholars have called for a cessation of
attempting to articulate a coherent emotional theory in favor of engaging each emotional
theorist on his or her own terms to understand that particular thinker’s approach to
emotions. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty advances such a plea (Rorty, “Enough Already with
‘Theories of the Emotions,’” in Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on
Emotions, ed. Robert C. Solomon [New York: Oxford University Press, 2004]).
Elsewhere, Rorty argues for the complexity of emotions. “Emotions do not form a natural
class. A set of distinctions that has generally haunted the philosophy of mind stands in the
way of giving good descriptions of the phenomena.” Those distinctions include passivity
and activity, the degree to which psychological states can be explained physically,
rational-irrational versus non-rational, and voluntariness (Rorty, “Explaining Emotions,”
in Explaining Emotions [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1980], 104).
6
I am not distinguishing between emotion and passion in this chapter. Most of the
literature I engage uses the term “emotion,” but a few scholars (notably Solomon and
Harak) use “passions” to refer to the same phenomena that others define as emotion. I
will use the term emotion throughout this chapter except when quoting material from
authors who use the term passion. In chapter three, I will explain the distinction between
emotion and passion as it pertains to Aquinas’s thought.
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but the bull is safely confined even though I cannot tell that he is confined), or imagined
(I am sitting in a room imagining being in a field with the bull, and I am afraid of the
imagined bull). The person experiencing the emotion will usually experience an affective
response and/or have a physiological response associated with the emotion. An emotion
is elicited by something that is of value to the person, and as such, the emotion has moral
implications and can be a factor in her moral motivation. Because emotions include
cognition, they are somewhat controllable and, equally important when considering
children’s emotional development, educable. Further, as people live and gain experience,
they develop emotional patterns that can either foster or inhibit moral development.
These emotional patterns often become habitual such that people’s emotional responses
include a history. That is, emotions from a person’s past will frequently resurface in new
circumstances, and her way of responding emotionally will usually follow a predictable
pattern. This is of paramount importance when considering children’s emotional
development because it means that the patterns people establish in childhood have lifelong repercussions.

What Is an Emotion?
Philosophical Contributions
Current philosophical literature contains a broad range of perspectives regarding
what emotions are and their relationship to the value people place on the objects that
elicit emotion. Philosophers hold different views regarding the duration of emotion.
There is discussion but no consensus on whether a person can change an emotion she is
experiencing, or how a person can alter her predisposition to have particular emotions in
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response to particular objects. (I will return to this issue in chapter four.) Because most of
the theories of emotion are focused on the emotions of adults, children remain largely on
the periphery of the conversation. (Martha Nussbaum is one notable exception to this
tendency, although her treatment of children is susceptible to critiques that cause me to
look beyond it when considering emotion’s place in children’s moral formation and
agency.) However, contemporary theology of children maintains that they are fully
human and bear a measure of moral agency. The emotional dimension of human
experience can assist us in advancing the case for children’s moral agency, and the
cognitive dimension of emotions helps explain the moral import of emotions.
The thinkers I engage in this section ascribe at least a cognitive dimension to
emotion, and some promote a fully cognitive theory. Because cognitive theories of
emotions take evaluative judgments to be constitutive of emotion, these theories hold that
emotions themselves can be evaluated to ascertain whether or not they are warranted,
given the circumstances in which they arise.7 For example, if I am frightened because I
am in a pen with a violent bull, my fear is warranted because the bull poses a real danger
to me. Both my judgment of the danger and the associated emotion (fear) are warranted.
On the other hand, if I am afraid of a bull that I know has been tranquilized and is safely
contained away from me, then my fear is not warranted because the bull at that time
poses no threat or danger. I am judging something to be a danger that is not, in fact, a
danger, and so my judgment and the emotion it constitutes are not warranted. If the
judgment is appropriate and accurate, then the emotion is as well, because the emotion is
essentially the judgment. An incorrect judgment will result in an unwarranted emotion,

7

Deigh, “Concepts of Emotions,” 26.
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and cognitive theories maintain that changing one’s cognitive judgment will change the
associated emotion.8
In addition to evaluating a given emotion, cognitive theories provide tools to aid
us in distinguishing among emotions. The example John Deigh cites is the distinction
between contempt and anger in response to another person’s bad behavior. Contempt is
based on a judgment that the other person is “low or unworthy of your esteem in view of
that behavior.” Anger, on the other hand, results from the judgment that the other
person’s behavior has in some way wronged or insulted you or someone close to you.9
Being able to distinguish among emotions and to determine an emotion’s appropriateness
can be useful in thinking about the moral quality of emotions because it allows us to
reflect on our emotions and the judgments that constitute them.
Martha Nussbaum’s cognitive theory of emotions10 is particularly relevant to this
dissertation both because she views emotions as deeply connected to ethics, and because
she addresses the emotions and emotional development of children with respect to
morality.11 For Nussbaum, emotion is not composed in part of a cognitive element; an
emotion is cognitive judgment. While she understands cognition broadly, the focus
remains thought.12 Nussbaum explains her view of emotions:

8

There can be cases where the memory of an emotional experience results in the emotion
surfacing again, even when the object of the emotion does not warrant it. In such a case,
the memory of a frightening experience with a violent bull might well cause me to be
afraid even of a tranquilized, contained bull.
9
Deigh, “Concepts of Emotions,” 26.
10
Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001).
11
Nussbaum discusses the emotions of infants and children in the fourth chapter of her
text, “Emotions and Infancy” (Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 174-237).
12
Cates summarizes Nussbaum’s inclusive concept of thought: “It includes, for example,
entertaining an initial appearance, assenting to an appearance as ‘the way things are,’
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[E]motions are appraisals or value judgments, which ascribe to things and
persons outside the person’s own control great importance for that
person’s own flourishing. It thus contains three salient ideas: the idea of a
cognitive appraisal or evaluation; the idea of one’s own flourishing or
one’s important goals and projects; and the idea of the salience of external
objects as elements in one’s own scheme of goals.13
Thus, for Nussbaum, emotions are deeply personal because they involve an individual’s
“important goals and projects,” and because they are the evaluative judgments of whether
an external condition will have bearing on those goals and projects that are important to
the person. But it is because emotions involve judgments that Nussbaum argues they
must be included as necessary components in systems of ethical reasoning (1).
Evaluative judgment is crucial to Nussbaum’s conception of an emotion. If a
person judges the value of an object to be inconsequential, she will not experience an
emotional response to the object. Nussbaum is not saying that the emotion might or might
not follow the person’s judgment. The judgment that an object has value in the way
Nussbaum describes is itself the emotion, and this value judgment is all that is necessary
for something to qualify as an emotion (56-57). According to Nussbaum, feelings often
accompany emotion, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for emotion. The kinds
of feelings she is referring to are “without rich intentionality or cognitive content, let us
say feelings of fatigue, of extra energy, of boiling, of trembling, and so forth” (60). Even

pondering one’s goals and projects, and assessing what is happening with a particular
object that bears on one’s goals and projects. ‘Thought’ includes picturing an event in
one’s imagination; it also includes apprehending formal musical structures that embody
‘ideas’ of urgent need. Emotions are thoughts about ‘how things are with respect to the
external (i.e., uncontrolled) items that we view as salient for our well-being.’ They are
‘judgments in which the mind of the judge is projected unstably outward,’ like a
‘geological upheaval,’ into a world full of value” (Diana Fritz Cates, Aquinas on the
Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry [Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press,
2009], 50-51).
13
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 4, emphasis in original.
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those feelings that frequently accompany a particular emotion are not necessary for the
emotion to be occurring (60-61).
Nussbaum does not propose that all feelings are detached from the moral realm.
She argues that some emotions are feelings, but not all emotions involve feelings, and not
all feelings are emotions. Rather, some feelings, namely those with “rich intentionality,”
very frequently are part of an emotion. Nussbaum explains that intentional feelings—
“feelings of the emptiness of one’s life without a certain person, feelings of unhappy love
for that person, and so forth” (60)—are of a different kind than non-intentional feelings,
and are more properly identified as judgments and evaluations (60). Thus, feelings that
can be identified with value judgments can be considered emotions, but non-intentional
feelings cannot. Further, emotions may be nonconscious, but feelings are not (61).
Nonconscious emotions will, therefore, be different from emotions that are intentional
feelings. Nor are emotions necessarily physiological, although she does qualify this
statement by saying that physiological manifestations often accompany emotions and that
it is not clear from the available research which physiological effects are caused by the
emotion and which might be constitutive of it (58).
Nussbaum also draws a distinction between those emotions that arise from an
encounter with a specific object or circumstance, and those that are long-term and
continue through the vicissitudes of life. Situational emotions arise when particular
circumstances elicit them (69). “Background” emotions persist over time and are often
nonconscious. Love for a significant person in one’s life or anger at a continuing injustice
are the kinds of emotions that Nussbaum refers to as background. The reason she argues
that these are emotions is that they are based on evaluative judgments pertaining to the
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flourishing of the individual experiencing them, and they tend to affect the choices and
actions of that person (70-71). The category of background emotions—some of which
begin in childhood—is significant for considering the ways emotions can affect a person
throughout her life, including the contribution they can make to her development of
virtue.
Nussbaum explores children’s emotions because she holds that emotions that
begin in childhood have relevance within the larger context of a human life. She argues
that it is not possible to understand a person’s emotions when she is an adult without
appreciating whence they came—that is, without understanding their history (179, 231232). The history of an emotion includes the object of that emotion and its intentional
content. Intentional content is the active perception that the person who experiences an
emotion has of the object of that emotion. The object is not observed in a detached way
such that the person notices it and then simply moves on; it is something that is perceived
as having meaning for the person. This attributed significance tends to persist with
respect to the particular object, and it can also be transferred to objects that trigger similar
emotional responses. In this way, a person’s emotional responses to situations in her life
reflect the emotional pattern that Nussbaum refers to as background emotions. Because
she identifies emotions with evaluative judgments, it would follow that the history of an
emotion is also the history of habitual experiences of evaluative judgments. Accordingly,
when a person encounters new objects or situations, she brings this history with her and
evaluates and responds to the new objects in ways that draw on and are shaped by the
emotional responses that were directed toward objects in her past (175). Thus, the
emotion a person experiences at a point in her life beyond early childhood will be
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directed toward the current object of the emotion, but it will often also be directed toward
the experience of similar emotions in her past. Nussbaum writes, “new objects of love
and anger and fear bear the traces of earlier objects; one’s emotions toward them are
frequently therefore also, in both intensity and configuration, emotions toward one’s own
past” (175).
This view of emotions that includes their history places weight on children’s
emotions in a particular way because those experiences will shape the emotional
landscape of a given child’s life for the whole of that life. However, the value the person
ascribes to the object of her emotion can be based on a faulty view of that object (27-28),
and so her emotion might be appropriate to her perception and at the same time be
inappropriate to the object as it is in reality.14 This possibility brings into question the
reliability of emotions for decision-making and as the basis for action. It is also
significant when considering the development of children’s emotional patterns. If those
patterns are based on inaccurate perceptions that are not corrected, the person will have
great difficulty changing her emotional habits when she is older because they will have
become habitual evaluative judgments that are also invested with meaning regarding her
“conception of well-being” (233). I would add that in addition to shaping situational
emotions, early patterns of emotion will begin to determine the kinds of experiences that
Nussbaum refers to as background emotions that will persist in a person’s life. For
example, a person will be more likely to develop a background emotion of love toward
her mother if her early experiences of her mother are emotionally positive. The
importance of childhood emotional experiences to a person’s later emotional life is

14

I will address whether anyone can know what “reality” is below.
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reminiscent of Rahner’s claim that childhood is brought with the person as she grows and
that it has ramifications on the rest of her life.15 Nussbaum’s analysis underscores the
dimension of emotional history that will shape the child’s emotional responses for the
rest of her life.16 How, then, does Nussbaum think emotions develop in an infant and
young child?
There are three main issues that Nussbaum addresses as she explores emotions in
infancy. The first two deal with the normal development of emotions and their
relationship to ethics. To wit, she asks whether there are aspects of a normal emotional
development that promote moral formation, and whether there are aspects of a normal
emotional development that are “intrinsically problematic from the ethical viewpoint.”
The third issue involves variations in emotional development, both individually and
socially or culturally, and she inquires to what degree it is possible to optimize
development so that it assists moral dispositions (179).
Nussbaum’s description of the normal course of children’s emerging emotional
patterns involves children’s sense of self and their awareness of their lack of power. Both
recognitions occur very early in an infant’s life and are interrelated. The infant becomes
aware “that some processes of profound importance to one’s being are arriving and
departing in a way that eludes control” (190). I take these processes to refer to the array
of things that are important to an infant’s thriving. There are pleasant arrivals such as the
arrival of food when the infant is hungry and warmth when she is cold; there are also
uncomfortable situations due to illness, pain, and so on. All of these appetitive, bodily

Rahner, “Ideas for a Theology of Childhood,” 35-36.
Nussbaum cites neurological studies that support the idea that established emotional
patterns are resistant to change (Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 115, see also 36, 233).
15
16
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desires are highly significant for the infant experiencing them (her sense of self), and
none of them are within the infant’s control either to bring about or to alleviate. (The
infant’s crying may—and should—elicit a response from the caregiver, but the act of
crying itself does not directly bring about the arrival of a response. Whether or not the
caregiver—if there is a caregiver in the vicinity—is able or willing to respond to the
infant at any given moment is beyond the child’s control.) Infants also have the need for
security and holding, which Nussbaum distinguishes from the appetitive desire.17 It is the
recognition both that these arrivals are significant and that they lie outside one’s control
that Nussbaum says is constitutive of early emotions (190).
The child’s emotions at this point are without a distinct object, but Nussbaum
argues that as the child learns to distinguish between herself and others, the objects of her
emotions become more clear (190-191). Eventually, the infant learns that other people are
complete people who continue to exist independently of her (191). Emotions in infants
are inchoate cognitive appraisals, and they “arise out of the infant’s developing
awareness of the uncertainty of the good and its [the infant’s] own lack of omnipotence”
(200).18 As the infant grows, emotions become her “map of the world” through which she
is aware of good and bad things outside of herself that are, to a large extent, beyond her
control (206-207). She also comes to learn that good and bad exist within herself, and the
17

Aquinas has a broader understanding of appetite, as we will see below.
Nussbaum refers to infants as “it” but changes to the personal pronoun “she” when the
child grows beyond infancy and Nussbaum considers that gender differences need to be
addressed (Upheavals of Thought, 208, n. 83). I will use personal pronouns for infants
throughout this dissertation because I think that is consistent with the theological
anthropology that sees infants as fully human and in God’s image. Nussbaum’s approach
reflects one of the issues that is critiqued regarding cognitive theories of emotion,
namely, that they exclude infants and very young children. Thus, even while she is
considering infants’ emotional development, there is a sense in which they remain
marginalized through the use of the pronoun associated with non-human objects.
18
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emotional awareness of this is the ground on which Nussbaum argues morality is built
(214-216). I think that this is significant for considering moral agency in children,
because it means that emotions are the way the child engages the world and learns to be
moral.
It is at this point that the ethical import of normal emotional development comes
to the fore. Nussbaum contends that seeing and accepting the bad in oneself is necessary
to being a moral person, but it must be tempered with the realization that there are ways
to make reparation for the bad one does. When a child learns that she is capable of doing
bad, she should at the same time be taught that she is capable of performing actions or
speaking words that atone for the infraction and that help to heal the rift that her misdeed
perpetrated. When this kind of normal emotional development occurs, it aids the child’s
moral formation. Returning to the need for holding an infant, Nussbaum compares
morality with the holding a loving parent bestows on a child. Morality, properly
conveyed to the child, accepts the child in her humanness and imperfection, loves her,
and assures her that the internal aggression she feels is not going to “cause the world’s
destruction” (217).
Childhood emotional development is paramount to the child’s moral
development. Nussbaum’s theory is that early lessons of accepting the bad one does and
learning to atone and make reparation for it become the person’s “moral defense.” This is
the origin of morality, and it helps the child feel safe against the forces of her own
badness that she fears will consume her (216). This morality teaches the child to
understand and accept that other people have “legitimate activities” as well as needs and
concerns that are separate from the child (217). A child who never learns that others have
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needs will be tyrannical in her demands for her own desires to be met and will be unable
to be moral (218). In other words, this moral development takes the child out of selfcenteredness and engages her with others who are also moral beings, who do bad, and
with whom she must learn to negotiate. A person who is able to accept, atone for, and
attempt reparation for her own wrongful actions will be more likely to accept that other
people also act badly, to receive their reparation, and not to demand perfection of them.
Perfectionism in this schema is counter-productive to the goal of emotional
maturity and morality. If a person is not able to accept her own imperfections—her
shortcomings and ability to hurt others—and if the possibility of reparation for that
“badness” or imperfection is not present in the child’s upbringing, then the child’s human
relationships and sense of morality will be damaged (217, 219). Parents who demand
perfection of a child do not allow the child to learn the lessons and good ways of relating
that are needed for morality, and this deficit can have life-long consequences.
Perfectionism also proves counter-productive to moral development when a person
demands of herself that her emotions line up perfectly with reason or with some ideal of
what her emotions should be (234). Nussbaum’s basis for this argument lies in her
contention that the earliest sources of emotions in humans stem from our own lack of
omnipotence coupled with our neediness. Recall that the infant notices on some level that
processes that are important to her well-being come and go in her life and are outside her
control. The result of this kind of radical neediness and dependence on others creates
ambivalence in the infant. Nussbaum states, “the roots of anger, hatred, and disgust lie
very deep in the structure of human life, in our ambivalent relation to our lack of control
over objects and the helplessness of our own bodies. It would be naïve to expect that
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projections of these negative emotions onto other people will not take place—although
we may certainly hope to moderate their number and intensity” (234). As we will see
below, Alasdair MacIntyre has a different view of the way dependence should shape
emotions, and he advocates virtues of acknowledged dependence for all people.19 Further,
from a Christian theological standpoint, accepting one’s dependence on other people can
foster the spiritual acknowledgment of dependence on God.20 However, for Nussbaum,
one result of infant dependence is “negative” emotions, which are already present from
the beginning of our emotional development; they are part of what it means to be a
person who responds to her surroundings in an emotional way.
Nussbaum sums up her review of emotional development by stating: “As we see,
then, a view of emotional development reveals some problems that emotions, as
acknowledgments of neediness and incompleteness, contain for morality; they also reveal
rich resources for morality. Indeed, the story strongly indicates that without emotions
morality could not come into being, and that it relies on them continuously for
sustenance” (222). Emotions are not something to be overcome or controlled
tyrannically. Nussbaum argues that they are to be molded and shaped through loving
relationships that lead one to be able to relate to oneself and to others in a fruitful and
loving way. The goal of this process is mature interdependence, which is when a person
can think of others as separate from herself and recognize that she is limited, that others
are limited, but that she needs them, and that they need her (224).21
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MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 8.
See, for instance, de Young, “Aquinas’s Virtues,” 221.
21
Mature interdependence includes “acknowledging the imperfection of the human body,
and its needs for material goods.” This acknowledgment of the need to share the goods
and resources of the world leads to Nussbaum’s contention that the emotional structures
20
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Martha Nussbaum’s theory is a rich and nuanced resource for thinking about
emotions in children’s moral agency. It is limited, however, as are other cognitive
theories of emotion, and Deigh explores some of these limitations when he discusses two
main reservations regarding the cognitive model. The first objection is that the cognitive
model does not explain the emotions people sometimes feel “toward something that one
knows lacks the properties it must have for the emotion to be warranted.”22 Deigh’s
example is the fear of falling from a precipice when one knows that one is not in danger
of falling. This is distinct from the fear of falling based on the memory of falling; it is the
fear of something that does not pose a real danger. The second concern surrounding these
theories is that they do not adequately account for the presence and experience of
emotions in animals and human infants.
According to Deigh, thinkers such as Nussbaum subscribe to the “perceptual”
model, which is a modification of the cognitive model that allows the evaluative
judgments that are constitutive of emotions to be based on perceptions. Perception is a
category that includes more than accepting propositions on a conscious level, and it
accommodates those perceptions and emotions that contradict beliefs or judgments. For
example, Deigh says that if someone standing on the edge of a precipice fears falling off
when she is perfectly safe, her fear of falling is a perceived danger, even though she is

of some cultures are more conducive than others to producing emotional health and
morality for all people (Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 227). Nussbaum discusses this
further in Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice (Cambridge, MA: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013), which emphasizes the need for
fostering love to counter social and cultural tendencies and emotions of disgust, hatred,
stigma, and exclusion (see especially chapter 7, “‘Radical Evil’: Helplessness,
Narcissism, Contamination,” 161-198).
22
Deigh, “Concepts of Emotions,” 27.
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not in any real danger of falling. The perceptual model successfully accounts for the
contradiction between the person’s awareness and the reality of the situation.23
However, the perceptual model does not fare so well on the issue of emotions in
human infants (or animals) because, Deigh argues, it operates on an understanding of
perception that is conceptual and abstract. He contends that “the cognitive content of a
perception of someone, the man with the stick, say, as dangerous is the same as the
cognitive content of a judgment that this man is dangerous. In either case, the concept of
danger is deployed in a cognitive representation of the situation, and to have and deploy a
concept of danger is to be capable of propositional thought,” which human infants and
animals are not.24 That is, in the perceptual model, the person must understand what she
is perceiving on a conceptual level in order to have an evaluative judgment—an
emotion—in response to it. I think this critique holds for cases where the experience is
new and must be associated with other perceptions from our experience. However, there
is a level of habitual emotional response, such as fear, that can develop in animals and
possibly in infants in response to a particular stimulus. A dog whose owner repeatedly
beats it with a stick will recoil when it sees the owner with the stick. Deigh is arguing that
this recoil is not fear as the perceptual model would define it because the recoil does not
involve an evaluative judgment of the danger but a response based on experience. This is
not the kind of emotional response Nussbaum describes in infants. She ascribes a level of
abstract and conceptual understanding to their emotions—frustration at lack their lack of
omnipotence and acceptance of imperfection—that leaves her theory susceptible to this
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Deigh, “Concepts of Emotions,” 29-32.
Deigh, “Concepts of Emotions,” 29.
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critique. Despite her efforts to include and analyze infant emotional development, her
analysis remains abstract.
Another critique that can be leveled against Nussbaum’s description of children’s
moral development is that it is disproportionately negative in its focus. While she
mentions that children need to learn morality in the context of loving relationships, she
focuses her attention on children’s wrong-doing and the importance of fostering
children’s recognition and acceptance of their own bad actions so that the children can
make reparation for them. On one hand, this confirms the theological anthropology that
affirms children’s capacity for sin, and in one way their moral agency, and as such, it
concurs with Aquinas’s anthropology that holds that all human beings share in original
sin and are disordered because of this (ST I-II.82.4; ST I-II.81.1). On the other hand, it
places the child’s failings at center stage and does not acknowledge the child’s capacity
for relationship with God and for engaging in good actions and attitudes that go beyond
making reparation. I find this a troubling approach to children and their moral formation.
Nussbaum’s consideration of children in light of the imperfection of all human beings
insightfully suggests that children must learn that they are imperfect and accept this
imperfection in themselves and in others. They must learn to recognize when they have
done wrong and to atone and make reparation for their wrongs. But that is not the only
foundation of morality. Morality, I would argue, also begins when good actions are
modeled for the child, and when she imitates them, receives affirmation that they were
indeed good, and then moves on to perform good actions of her own volition. Some
virtue ethicists emphasize the powerful effect mimesis can have on a person’s moral
formation. Recall that Herdt advocated mimesis of Christ and of the “rainbow cast of
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saints” in a Christian’s moral development.25 In contrast to this view, Nussbaum’s
description seems overly concerned with combating perfectionism and not enough
concerned with the whole person—both the good and the bad aspects—who is learning to
be moral. Despite these limitations surrounding her depiction of children’s moral
development, her argument does help to advance the case that emotions are significantly
involved in the formation of morality and agency.
The relevance of emotion in people’s lives extends beyond its involvement in
moral formation to include the way people experience and respond to the world, and this
has bearing on emotion’s place in agency. Human engagement with circumstances,
objects, people, and relationships is more than an exercise in intellectual learning or
rational analysis. People generally have a level of investment in themselves and in those
with whom they have relationships such that their encounters with other human beings
and objects are also emotional experiences. Robert Solomon shares this view and argues
that people live through their emotions. At the same time, as does Nussbaum, he defines
emotions as constituted by evaluative judgments. Solomon provides some nuances to this
interpretation, but his theory of emotions remains cognitive. Further, he contends that as
human beings, we have the ability to manage our emotions.26 This is highly significant
for thinking about moral agency with respect to emotions. If moral agency involves
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engagement in and action with the moral world, and if emotions influence how we
experience the world and serve to motivate action, then emotions are paramount to moral
agency. Further, drawing on Solomon’s argument that we can manage our emotions, it
seems that emotions are significant in our learning to be accountable as moral agents.
One of the difficulties in using Solomon’s thought for an account of children and moral
development is that he acknowledges that the theory he has developed is only effective
for considering older children and adults who are able to be self-reflective (218-219).27
Nevertheless, his theory helps advance the case for the centrality of emotions in moral
agency.
Solomon’s theory of emotions is cognitive, and in his early work, similar to
Nussbaum, he was rigid in his identification of emotion with judgment.28 However, even
in his final book, True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us
(2007),29 he states, “if an emotion is structured by evaluative judgments, this means that
understanding an emotion is understanding its constitutive judgments, whether or not
there may be much more to understand as well…. Evaluative judgments are both based
on beliefs and express attitudes. They also have their reasons (often good reasons) and
they constitute, not just accompany, our emotions” (206). It is because emotions are
evaluative judgments that Solomon thinks they have ethical import. The judgments
constituting emotions are value judgments, meaning that they are based on values that the
person holds. He writes, “the emotions have ethical significance not just because they
27
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take place in ethically charged situations but because they are constituted by judgments
that are through and through value laden. They provide our basic orientation to the world
and to one another” (217). In addition, emotions are ethical because people (of adequate
cognitive capacity) are able to reflect on them (126). Solomon states that infants are not
capable of this kind of reflection, but that “it has become an essential part of our [adult]
emotional life” (218).
Solomon nuances the identification of emotion with judgment by including other
components in what it means to have an emotional experience. He argues that emotional
experience is about the self in the world (242), and in addition to its constitutive
judgment(s), it is comprised of thoughts (243), desire, action (which includes the body)
(238), and feelings, although emotion is not reducible to feelings (141). By incorporating
these aspects, Solomon endeavors to account for the complexity of what it means to have
an emotion. However, because his theory remains cognitive, it succumbs to a further
critique of cognitive theories of emotion, namely that it does not always reflect human
experience. Diana Fritz Cates expresses this concern in her discussion of Nussbaum’s
work, but it is relevant to Solomon’s thought as well. Cates notes that, “there is
sometimes a psychological gap, and there appears to be a logical distinction, between
judging that ‘this is good for me,’ and being drawn toward it—or between judging that
‘this is bad for me,’ and being repelled by it.”30 This distinction, or gap, is one that
Aristotle—and Aquinas after him—remedy by distinguishing between appetite (or desire)
and thought. I will develop this point in some detail in chapter three.

Diana Fritz Cates, “Conceiving Emotions: Martha Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought,”
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30

81

Even with these caveats, Solomon’s theory is useful for our consideration of
children’s moral agency because he holds that emotions are central to human life. He
states, “we live in and through our emotions. Our lives do not just include episodes of
anger, fear, love, grief, gratitude, happiness, humor, shame, guilt, embarrassment, envy,
resentment, and vengeance. Our lives are defined by such emotions” (10, emphasis in
original). Emotions are not add-ons to an otherwise neutral life. Emotions are the way we
live our lives, and to an extent, they “have the power to constitute reality” (162). By this,
Solomon means that we tend to attribute to the object of our emotions the characteristics
that we are perceiving in our emotional response to that object. Thus, if we are afraid of
something, it is frightening and possibly dangerous in our minds. It is not that we see the
object in a neutral way and then notice that certain of its characteristics are eliciting
emotions in ourselves. Through our emotion, which is an evaluative judgment, we see the
object as dangerous, and that is its reality for us. Solomon’s idea that emotional
awareness is the way we learn about ourselves can be useful for considering children and
their agency. It suggests that the way a child learns who she is in the world and how she
experiences the world happen though her emotions. Further, because emotions are the
way she experiences herself, the world, and herself-in-the-world, emotions are key to her
ability to interpret and act on her environment.
Emotions are also something for which people can have a degree of
accountability, according to Solomon. While this element of his theory requires
developed cognitive capacities and so excludes infants and young children, it is
instructive with respect to the education of emotions. A person’s ability to reflect on her
emotions allows her to have a level of responsibility for those emotions (126). Reflection
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enables us to gain a perspective on why we are feeling the way that we are feeling, to
understand what feeling that way means for us (“What am I getting out of this?”), and to
experience emotions less as happening to us and more as though we have some control
over them (200). Further, Solomon contends that reflecting on our emotions is the means
through which we gain a sense of self—of who we are (219). Being able to reflect on our
emotions requires a level of thought that allows us to separate “me” from “how I feel,”
which is something it is unlikely a young child will be able to do.31 Solomon holds that
emotions are not separate from us; they are not something that happens to us from the
outside. Rather, our emotions can be “cultivated, educated, and sometimes even willed,
not just controlled” (144). The ability to foster certain emotions within ourselves makes
us responsible for more than our particular emotions. In some ways it makes us
responsible for the quality of our lives, because the purpose of emotions is “to enhance
our lives, to make them better, to help us get what we want out of life” (182). If we were
subject to the whims of emotions that were beyond our control, our participation in
achieving a good life and in attaining goals in life would be largely usurped by something
external to ourselves. Claiming that people can be instrumental in determining their
emotions allows Solomon to hold that emotions’ purpose is beneficial and worthwhile to
our lives and at the same time that people are somewhat responsible for whether or not
their lives are so enhanced and made better. If we extend Solomon’s ideas to children, his
claim implies that emotions are educable and that children can be taught to be reflective
agents of their emotions (provided their cognitive capacities are sufficiently developed).
31
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The duration Solomon attributes to some emotions is also significant for
considering children’s moral and emotional development. As Nussbaum does, he holds
that many emotions have a narrative quality that proceeds through time. He uses the
example of romantic love that begins, develops, and continues in a fairly predictable
pattern in people’s lives, thus unfolding as a narrative. Other emotions—nearly all of
them—have a narrative quality as well (148-149). Solomon goes on to place the narrative
of emotions within the narrative of a person’s life. “Emotions are processes, and even
brief emotions take time, refer to the immediate past and anticipate the immediate future.
Most emotions, however, are very much involved in time. They involve memory and
anticipation” (263). Thus, the unfolding of a person’s life contains the history (the
narrative) of emotion, such that “any emotion of any significance will involve a
background of other emotions” (241). He is, of course, referring to people who have lived
long enough to have a background of emotional experience to influence their current
emotions. I would argue that infants and young children are building that background.
This is important to keep in mind when considering how children develop emotionally.
The child’s circumstances and personal history (her life narrative) as well as her history
with a particular emotion (such as love for a caregiver) will contribute to how her
emotions and the morality that stems from them develop.32
Another dimension of Solomon’s analysis that can be extended to children’s
emotional development is the attitude that is conveyed through the ways we discuss and
describe emotions. Often, the words we choose to name emotions are already evaluative.
For example, describing an emotion as love or as infatuation reflects how deep we think
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the emotion is and how seriously we take it. Saying we hate someone is different from
saying we resent someone (7, 135). It seems plausible that the way we name a child’s
emotion as we reflect back to her what we see in her expression of that emotion can
influence the child’s interpretation of it and feelings about it. Further, our own attitude
toward the child’s emotions will impact our response to the child, and this attitude will
likely be evident in the tone and words we use to discuss the child’s emotions and
emotionally motivated actions with her. All of this will redound in the child’s future
attitudes towards and experiences of emotion, which will, in turn, impact how she
perceives and values that which she encounters, and how she manages her emotions and
her agency stemming from them.
Both Solomon and Nussbaum define emotions as evaluative judgments, and they
recognize that experience contributes to the judgments and valuations each person makes.
On this view, individuals can have distinct emotional repertoires based on different
experiences and different interpretations of those experiences. A person’s emotions
reveal the way she encounters the world. Marcia Cavell’s theory of emotions concurs
with this assessment. Cavell is a cognitivist philosopher, and her analysis of emotion falls
very much in line with the theories of Nussbaum and Solomon.33 Focusing on the
subjective quality of emotions, Cavell argues that they are psychological attitudes of a
particular person that reveal the experience of being that particular person (133).
Emotions are comprehensible only within the context of the person’s life; they are
indicative of what she cares about, or values; and they reveal her orientation to and
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relationship with the world (126). Cavell argues that emotions form in a person a
disposition to act, but they are not the cause of the acting (128).34 She does think
emotions serve a motivational role, and she makes a brief but poignant reference to
motivation in children:
A consensus has been growing in psychoanalytic theory that places
emotion, rather than ‘drive’, at the heart of a theory of motivation. This
emerging theory accommodates the fact that the child does not come
equipped with a fixed repertoire of motives; it helps us understand both
the flexibility and the fixity of human motivation; and, most important, it
sees the individual as embedded in the world, becoming what she is only
through interactions with other persons and things beyond her own skin
(137).
Similar to the interactive theory discussed in chapter one, this understanding of emotion
and motivation points to the influence that the world has on the child, and to the budding
awareness in the child of her own ability to impact the world. The person’s becoming in
the world will include her developing her emotions in relation to the world and in
relationship with others.
Cavell also contends that emotions have an objective component because they are
conditioned by external factors. The person experiencing the emotion appraises the
factors and places value on them (126). Because they are assessments of external
realities, her emotions themselves can be appraised. An individual can converse with
other people regarding their emotional responses to a given object, and in this way she
can expand her thinking and refine her own emotional responses (133-134). This kind of
dialogue and comparison is how Cavell explains the “objective” dimension of an
emotion. She is not suggesting that a person test her emotions to determine whether they
correspond to objective reality. If Solomon is correct and we live through our emotions,
34
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then everyone assesses reality through the lens of their own emotional experience, and
achieving an Archimedean reference point with respect to reality is not possible. Cavell’s
claim is that we can turn to others to gain outside perspectives, and our own sense of
reality can be enriched as we gain experience. However, a concern remains because it is
possible that a whole community will have a particular sense of reality that is grounded in
an emotional response that is distorted. Instances of communal hatred of another group
illustrate this. Nussbaum’s contention that emotions are needed to correct emotional
tendencies that are grounded in disgust, hatred, stigma, and exclusion underscores this
point.35 In addition, emotions can distort our perspective such that what we perceive to be
real is distinctly different from the reality someone who is not emotionally invested
would notice.
This potential distortion is at the root of Peter Goldie’s critique of cognitive
theories of emotion. Goldie maintains that emotions involve both feeling and thought,
mutually influencing one another, and both affecting the judgment the person has of the
object of her emotions. Examining the thought component of emotions can provide
valuable insight into a given emotional experience,36 perhaps allowing a person to
discover what sort of an emotion she is experiencing.37 At the same time, the person’s
judgment is impacted because of the feeling component of her emotion.38 Contrary to
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cognitivist theorists who do not conceive feeling as a necessary part of emotion,39 Goldie
argues that the proper place of feelings in a “correct conception of emotional experience”
is at center stage, “playing a centrally important epistemic role in revealing things about
the world.” Once we acknowledge the epistemic place of feelings, we can address their
potential to misguide us in providing information about the world.40 In a fascinating
critique of the cognitive view, Goldie argues that emotions are essential to how we see
the world, and it is they that shape (and distort) our knowledge of and interpretation of
the world. It is not the case, he contends, that emotions follow from or can be equated
with judgments. Emotions are our response to our surroundings, and we perceive our
emotions to be reasonable because we perceive their objects to have the properties to
which our emotions respond. For example, we think that an object that elicits the emotion
of disgust actually is disgusting.41 This, Goldie argues, is because “our emotional
responses can reveal to us what we value, and what we value might not be epistemically
accessible to us if we did not have such responses.”42 According to Goldie, young
children and animals are capable of unreflective emotional responses to situations,43 and
as children grow older and their mental abilities develop, they can reflect on their
emotions and then ascribe to the objects of their emotions the properties that the emotions
perceive.44 Emotions can also be educated such that children learn appropriate emotional
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responses to situations, for example, responding with fear when the child recognizes
danger.45
Goldie’s critique has serious implications for considering how people perceive the
world and emotion’s place in shaping that perception. Not only do we tend to think that
the object of our emotions has the properties we emotionally observe it to have, but
moods and recent major emotional experiences can also interfere with our perceptions.
Goldie states, “emotions can also distort perception and reason so that the world seems to
us other than it really is: as I will put it, the emotions skew the epistemic landscape.”46
One result of this skewing is that, because it is generally more feasible to change one’s
thoughts than one’s emotions, people tend (often unconsciously) to allow their thoughts
to be skewed to remain in line with their emotions, rather than alter their emotions to
acquiesce with their reason.47 Goldie is not saying that it is impossible to change one’s
emotions; he is saying that it is more likely that a person will change her thoughts to
match her emotions. In contrast to cognitive theorists, Goldie’s argument presents
emotions as sources of knowledge that are different from and sometimes more
compelling than knowledge gained through reason.48 If emotions have such epistemic
power, then strong emotion will likely be difficult to sway, even in light of persuasive
arguments that draw on “objective” reality and appeal to reason.
The relative entrenchment of emotional patterns in a person indicates the ongoing
impact of significant childhood emotions on the whole of a person’s life and underscores
45
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the importance of attending to children’s emotional and moral formation. Ronald de
Sousa’s theory of paradigm scenarios offers an explanation for why emotional patterns
that are established early in a person’s life can exhibit this tenacity and resistance to
change. He addresses the formation of emotions in human infants through what he calls
“paradigm scenarios.”49 The paradigm scenario comes into being when an infant has an
instinctive response to a particular situation, and the instinctive response becomes
associated with the infant’s emotional response to that situation. For example, perhaps an
infant has an instinctive response of smiling in moments of comfort or pleasure, and she
connects smiling with happiness such that smiling comes to be an aspect of the emotion
(happiness) for her. Thus, if a child smiles when she feels joy, her response is an
expression of her emotion (285). But smiling (or crying or other instinctive expressions)
are not part of an emotion if they occur outside of an emotional “scenario” (286). De
Sousa’s argument seems to suggest that an infant who smiles because she is exploring the
muscle movements of her face is not expressing an emotion; on the other hand, an infant
who smiles because her discomfort is alleviated or because she perceives the arrival of
some pleasant object is expressing an emotion. As the infant grows, de Sousa argues that
the child learns what instinctive and emotional responses are appropriate to which general
types of situations (paradigms), and these paradigms form her emotional framework for
the rest of her life. For instance, an infant whose smiles are met with positive responses
from those around her will learn that smiling with happiness is an appropriate response to
pleasant objects. She will be likely, when encountering other pleasant objects, to be
happy.
Ronald De Sousa, “Self-Deceptive Emotions,” in Explaining Emotions, ed. Amélie
Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), 285.
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De Sousa claims that “we learn our repertoire of emotions, much as we learn at
least some of our verbal repertoire—our vocabulary of concrete predicates—by ostensive
definition. In the paradigm situation, an emotion is appropriate ‘by definition.’ Once
learned, it is correctly ‘applied,’ like a learned predicate, to situations that are relevantly
similar to the paradigm scenario in which it originates” (286). The foundation these
paradigm scenarios build becomes a permanent feature in the person’s later emotional
life. “Paradigm scenarios determine the meaning of the emotions of which they constitute
the prototypes.”50 Further, through transference, we apply to new people and situations
the emotional significance of those from the past. The patterns from childhood are never
overcome; they remain a part of the emotional landscape. De Sousa explains, “acquiring
genuinely novel emotions, like coming to understand novel concepts, is like building a
cantilevered platform: standing on a firm old section, you reach out to set up and
consolidate the new.”51 Because people have different contexts for their emotional
development, they will have paradigm scenarios that are specific to them.52 These
divergent experiences can result in emotional misunderstandings, since each person has a
particular interpretation of an emotion based on the long-forgotten original experiences
(paradigm scenarios).53 Paradigm scenarios continue to be shaped “both in their origins
and in their reenactments through our lives, by the increasingly complex contexts in
which they occur.”54 Emotions that are learned in this way become deeply formed habits
in the person.

50

Ronald De Sousa, Emotional Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 34.
De Sousa, Emotional Truth, 34.
52
De Sousa, Emotional Truth, 101.
53
De Sousa, Emotional Truth, 34.
54
De Souse, Emotional Truth, 102.
51

91

De Sousa’s argument suggests that the family, community, and culture in which a
child grows up will help to shape the kinds of paradigm scenarios she encounters as well
as the emotional responses that she learns are appropriate in those situations. This means
that the interrelationality that we saw was central to theological anthropology is also
fundamental to emotional development. In particular, a child will learn the moral codes
of her community through her interaction with the members of that community. Peter
Hobson is a psychologist who studies the ways that this interpersonal interaction serves
to advance children’s development such that they become able to distinguish which
dimensions of their experience are feeling, which thinking, and which willing.55 While he
agrees that emotions are mental components of a person’s life, Hobson contends that
thinking, feeling, and willing are not yet separated in children, and that learning to
separate them is a “developmental achievement” (447). In order to accomplish this, a
person’s emotional development must be interactive. He writes, “what become the
relatively, but never wholly, separate components of thinking, feeling, and willing have
their origin as aspects of relatedness between a human being and the personal and nonpersonal world,” and this “accounts for the connectedness between thoughts and what
those thoughts are about” (461). That is, the connection between the emotion and its
object is something we learn through our relationships with the world and with other
people in the world. This is how the intellectual aspects of emotions come into being and
can be explained. However, Hobson argues that even as the child learns to separate the
different components of her thinking, the intuitive and unconceptualized understandings
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of the world that she gained as an infant and a young child are never completely replaced
by cognitive understandings (457).56
If Hobson is right that the child retains these non-conceptual components into
adulthood, then this raises questions about the identification of emotion with cognition in
cognitive theories. In chapter one, I discussed Arpaly’s argument that non-deliberate
dimensions are always part of deliberated rationality. The same would seem to be true for
emotions and cognition. Thoughts and judgments about the world will always, according
to Hobson, retain something of the pre- or non-rational in them. This means that the
judgments that constitute emotions in cognitive theories will always contain pre- or nonconceptual interpretations and understandings. Aquinas’s theory of emotion will prove
useful for explaining what these non-conceptual contributions are and how they connect
to the person’s reason. Hobson’s contention that the person’s perception of objects
continues to be informed by her early experiences seems to corroborate De Sousa’s
position with respect to paradigm scenarios that continue to impact a person’s perceptions
and upon which her new experiences and understandings are based.
The ability to distinguish between her emotion and its object extends to the
child’s burgeoning understanding of herself as a person and of other people as distinct
individuals in their own right. Hobson argues that children come to learn that other
people are “persons-with-minds” because children have the emotional experience of
identifying with other people. It is not the case that children come to have emotional
experiences of identifying with other people because they understand those people as
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separate persons-with-minds (468). Social experiences are necessary to understanding
ourselves and others, and if children do not have these engagement experiences, they
develop only a partial understanding of “what it means to have mental states” (449).
Children develop an understanding of person-world relatedness through identifying with
other people’s emotions and responses to shared experiences and objects. They come to
know their surroundings, in part, through the responses of their caregivers,57 and they
learn that other people might have different responses to the same object or experience.58
As Hobson puts it, “an infant can identify with someone else’s attitudes prior to
conceptualizing another person as a person”59 through their emotional connection with
the other people.60 This is imperative to keep in mind as we consider the role of emotions
in moral development. Hobson’s research indicates that a lack of emotional attachment
leads to a deficit in moral development based on the inability to perceive the other
person’s needs, to understand how one’s own actions might impinge upon the other
person, and to want to behave in a way that does not negatively affect the other. If
emotional development is not properly interactive and does not include experiences of
identifying with others, then it is possible that the person’s later morality will be
compromised through her not being able to see others as a full persons-with-minds.
I am convinced that this differentiation between self and other is essential to
normal emotional and moral development, and Hobson argues that people learn this
57
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discernment through the developmental achievement of separating feeling, thinking, and
willing. Being able to attain some detachment from one’s emotions in order to determine
whether they are appropriate and contributing to one’s moral growth is important.
However, one cannot live in a constant state of intellectual reflection on one’s emotions.
To do so would compromise not only one’s ability to live in an engaged way, but also
one’s capacity for being attuned to moral situations through one’s emotional response to
them. (This point will be developed more in the next section.) Further, I think it is
plausible that the achievement of Aquinas’s conception of virtue involves the
reintegration of a person’s thinking, feeling, and willing, not into one indistinguishable
mode, but in terms of wanting to do that which we think to be right and good. I will
discuss Aquinas’s theory of virtue in more depth in the next chapter, but here I point to
his contention that a right or good action performed without the person’s emotions being
involved is incomplete as a virtuous action (ST I-II 58.3). Thus, for an action to be
virtuous, a person would need to know that the action is good, would want to perform it,
and would will herself to do so. Too much of a separation among thinking, feeling, and
willing would not foster virtue. At the same time, we do need to be able to distinguish
among these functions in order to reflect on and control our emotions and the actions that
stem from them.
Philosophical thought on emotion advances several important ideas for
considering children’s emotional and moral development. The evaluative component of
cognitive theory points towards the moral import of emotions. Emotions are certainly one
way—although arguably not the only way—we engage the world and assess the
significance of what we encounter. When we relate to other people, their emotions also
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have an effect on us, and this interplay is part of the emotional experience of both parties.
That our emotions impact others gives them moral significance beyond indicating the
value we ascribe to their objects. In the next section, I discuss the work of two Christian
theologians who take up some of these themes within a theological framework.

Theological Contributions
In this section, our considerations of theological contributions to the
understanding of emotions are centered around two theologians—Simon Harak and
Diana Fritz Cates—who bring Aquinas’s thought into conversation with contemporary
thinking on the emotions. Both Harak and Cates explicitly engage Aquinas in extended
studies of the emotions, and so their work has particular relevance for my own project,
which is also focused on Aquinas and his theory of emotions.61 Both theologians base
their theories of emotion on Aquinas’s understanding of passions as movements of the
soul, and they argue that emotions have cognitive components but are also physical
experiences.62 Most important for this project, they argue that emotions shape human
morality. Simon Harak makes the case that the valuation involved in emotions has moral
significance not only because it indicates the kinds of things we value, but also because
the way we value other people influences how they come to see themselves. Diana Fritz
Cates argues that discussions of emotions must include considerations of the religious
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ethics that inform our morality, and she contends that our emotions are deeply entwined
with that morality.
Harak utilizes an interactive model in his theory of how emotions arise and how
they shape people’s lives over time. By interaction, Harak refers to the same process
described in chapter one,63 by which the person is influenced and formed by her
surroundings—including her relationships—and she also impacts her environment and
changes it. This is the social dimension of virtue ethics.64 Grounding his theory in a
theological anthropology that includes the incarnational character of Christian theology,
Harak subscribes to a whole-body moral anthropology, in which emotions cannot be
detached from the body (4). In so doing, he rejects the mind-body dualism that is a legacy
of Cartesian-based ethics (29ff). Harak defines passions65 as the experience of being
moved (2), and the social-science idea of interaction is at the core of his theory of
emotions. He contends that what moves us, what our emotions are, is indicative of what
kind of person we are (47), which has moral implications and ramifications.
In order for interaction to occur among people, Harak argues, there must be
emotion. Without being moved, a person will not relate with other people or with her
surroundings. She will be “impassible,” unmovable. Through her emotions, that which is
external to her can influence who she is as a person and how and why she responds to
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situations. This is because, in order for a person to notice something in an interaction, it
must have meaning for her—it must move her—which means that she will have an
emotional response to it. Something that has no meaning for a person will not move that
person—it will not even register with her (21). Because a person’s emotional responses to
her surroundings hinge on the meanings she ascribes to those surroundings, Harak
maintains that emotions include a valuation of the object toward which they are directed
(32). The moral implications of Harak’s claim are substantial. People will not notice that
a situation is moral or that it deserves their attention if the features of the situation hold
no meaning for them. Further, what moves a person will have direct bearing on her moral
agency because it will delimit what she notices and how she responds.66
In the interactive model, the person responds to her environment, and she is also
formed by it. One way that she is formed is through the way that others see her. Harak
explains that other people’s responses to a person in word and action shape the way she
learns to view herself and the kind of person she becomes (21). To illustrate this point,
Harak tells the story of a young man named Fabian who was serving as a “big brother” to
a child who had been beaten repeatedly. After a soccer game, Fabian raised his hand to
give a congratulatory pat on the shoulder to the child. Because of the child’s experiences
with being beaten, he perceived a raised hand to be a threat, and he recoiled (1). Harak
goes on to describe the conversation he himself had with Fabian following this incident.
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Fabian described himself as being “moved” by the reaction of the boy (2). Both the child
and Fabian were formed by their interactions with others. The child’s experiences had
shaped him such that his entire body recoiled at the sight of a raised hand. The boy’s
response underscores the ways in which human beings experience the world physically,
and it is plausible to infer that this bodily knowledge contributes to the person’s thoughts
and emotions. Fabian was also “moved” by the experience. The way the child reacted
affected Fabian’s own experience of the situation, and in that sense, the child was an
agent and Fabian’s emotion was in response to the child’s actions. Harak does not use
this story to advance a deterministic theory wherein a person is completely at the mercy
of her surroundings and the people in them. In any interaction between people, he
maintains, each person is influenced by the interaction, but each remains a distinct
person, and the tension between each person’s organic integrity as an individual and the
impact her environment has on her must be borne in mind (39).67
One of the moral implications of the interactive model, as Harak describes it, is
that people ascribe value to others and perceive the way others value them through
interpersonal interactions. When a person encounters an “other,” she ascribes value to
that other. By “other,” Harak means anything that is not the agent’s self, including other
people, inanimate objects, and events (2). At the same time, both the person in question
and the other have intrinsic value. A morally good interaction requires that a person
correctly assess the value of the other; if the interaction is between people, then each
person should ascribe the appropriate value to the other (32). Christian theological
anthropology holds that each person is made in the image of God, and so fitting valuation
67
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of each person must reflect this basic dignity. I think it is important to extend this idea to
include the proper valuing of oneself.68 When a person does not value herself, she will be
more likely to allow herself to be treated as a person without worth. If she does not see
her own value, she will not know what she is able to contribute to the world. At the same
time, an overvaluation of the self can result in an imbalanced view of the world that
focuses too much on the individual herself. Recall that Nussbaum highlights the necessity
of curbing self-centeredness in children and teaching them that other people have needs.69
For this reason, Harak’s insistence on the importance of interactions between infants and
their caregivers cannot be overemphasized (23). These interactions, claims Harak, are
how infants learn emotions—how they learn to be moved, and how they learn what
should move them, including how they should value themselves and others.
A person cannot be held responsible for the emotional patterns that result from
interactions early in life, but she is responsible for her emotions over the course of her
lifetime. A person’s emotions have significant bearing on her morality, and when they are
properly integrated with her thoughts and will, they foster virtue. One way she can
exercise responsibility for her emotional formation is through the influences she chooses
to bring into her life. According to Harak, the formation of habit is due in no small part to
the “training” a person receives, and to the degree that a person chooses to engage in
68
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repeated actions that shape her responses, she is responsible for the habits that result
therefrom. Particular learned actions and responses will lead to particular types of
appraisals of situations; a person will be more or less attuned to different aspects of a
situation depending on what she is in the habit of noticing. Therefore, to the degree that
we choose and invest in our own training, we are responsible for how that training shapes
our thinking and our appraisals (34). In addition, we have a degree of choice regarding
what we allow to capture our attention and focus (35), and the activities to which we
choose to give our time and energy will have a bearing on our becoming attuned to
particular features of objects and situations. We grow into these levels of responsibility as
we mature, but we are always involved in the interactions that shape our emotions.
It is possible to extend Harak’s case for emotional responsibility and his
interactive approach to a consideration of the distinction between accountability and
agency I discussed above. To the degree that a child notices and responds to her
environment, she exercises her agency. As she grows, she can direct her agency to help
shape who she is and who she is becoming, and in this way, she begins to be accountable
for herself, her formation, and her actions.
The moral significance of being (and becoming) emotionally responsible is
central to Diana Fritz Cates’s work on emotions. Cates equates Aquinas’s passions with
emotions, which leads her to define emotions as “interior motions.”70 As is the case with
Harak, her view is that emotions are always mediated physically.71 Emotions include
cognition, although Cates does not subscribe to the cognitive school of thought that holds

70

Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 2. Despite this identification, Cates uses the term
“emotion” in her work.
71
Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 8.
101

that emotions are cognitions or that they are in essence value judgments. She maintains
that cognition and evaluative judgments are aspects of emotion that influence the
person’s experience of emotion, but they are only part of the story. In her critique of
Nussbaum, Cates makes a place for appetites or desires as a component of emotion.72
According to Cates, “for good or for ill, an emotion can affect the way we function as
moral agents. It can affect our thoughts, perceptions, desires, judgments, deliberations,
decisions, actions, and interactions.”73 Because Cates says that emotions “affect” these
aspects of our lives, it follows that she is not equating emotion with any one of these
aspects. In assessing the prevailing thinking on emotion, Cates states (accurately, from
my read of the literature) that most scholars “agree that emotions have a cognitive
dimension, that they involve thought, judgment, and evaluation.” There remains,
however, disagreement on how cognition relates to emotions,74 a dispute that Cates does
not attempt to resolve. Most scholars “agree that emotions have objects, and that they
tend to be about people, things, or circumstances that a person considers to have some
bearing on his or her own happiness or well-being.”75 Some philosophers call into
question the perception of reality that is reflected in the value judgments of emotions (see
Goldie,76 for instance), and most ascribe a level of educability to emotions, although
scholars might disagree on how to educate emotions and to what degree they can be
educated.77
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Cates does contend that emotions and thoughts mutually inform one another. In
the course of a discussion on the virtue of compassion,78 Cates argues that the best form
of passion is one that has been educated and is shaped by thought, and that the best form
of thought is responsive to feeling and is shaped by love.79 Thinking and feeling can
influence one another for ill as well as for good. The moral judgments involved in
emotions can be erroneous, resulting in emotions that miss the mark of morality. Cates
states, “the emotion has as its defining focus an object of perception or imagination (such
as a person or a situation) that we judge to be morally good or bad. Moral judgments can
be wrong, and the emotions that are informed by them can be misguided.”80 She cites as
an example emotions directed toward a person whom we construe to be evil. It is morally
wrong, Cates argues, to direct toward that person an emotion that derives only from our
judgment of her wickedness and that does not also take into account her basic humanity
and human dignity. This is because our emotions should be nuanced and informed by our
thoughts and knowledge. In the case of the person who is perceived as evil, we know that
she is made in the image of God, and our emotions toward her must reflect this
knowledge of her human dignity in conjunction with our judgment of her immorality.
Thus, for Cates, emotions involve moral thoughts and judgments, which are, in turn,
informed by emotions, and because of this mutual influence, emotions have moral
import.
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Cates’s contention that emotions are part of the moral life leads her to advocate
cultivating particular emotions, especially those that lead to particular virtues. Cates
argues that morality in everyday life has several defining features. First, “morality is
partly a practice in which persons give and demand reasons of one another…and…of
themselves,”81 and as long as people are not behaving in a way that is obviously immoral,
they usually do not have to justify their actions to others. Second, “to the extent that one
acquires good habits of character one is likely to take many of one’s moral commitments
as given, not needing to be subjected to constant reflection,”82 provided they coincide
with the moral norms of one’s community. It is exactly this general lack of reflection on
one’s moral commitments—especially those that are learned early—that makes it
difficult to ascertain which habits in oneself are bad and to try to change them. When a
person has a habit of a particular moral commitment, it often does not occur to her that
she should reflect on it. By following the moral norms of one’s community and culture,
one is “participating in a morality,”83 and this participation is usually not highly
articulated or intellectualized. Cates goes on to say that “much of the moral life is not
about defending particular moral views and challenging others to do the same; it is about
trying to form our views in the first place and trying to figure out what to do with those
views as we gain additional information and perspective.”84
How, then, do we shape our emotions such that they are properly informed by
thought and are able to help direct our thoughts toward what is morally good? Cates
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maintains that we are responsible for our emotions over time.85 Some emotions are
reactive or instinctive responses that do not involve deliberation. In other cases, there are
points within the emergence of an emotion at which we can make a choice about the
emotion. That we are responsible for how we act under the influence of the emotion is
generally accepted,86 but Cates is submitting that we have responsibility for the emotion
itself, particularly for whether we continue to feel it or not. “Inasmuch as an emotion
affects our own or another’s well-being, and we have some choice in its regard, the
emotion is something for which we have a degree of moral responsibility.”87 We should
ask ourselves from time to time whether it is appropriate in a given circumstance to feel
the emotions we are experiencing, and, Cates argues, “the very act of observing our
emotion and asking the question of whether it is appropriate to the situation…changes the
emotion in subtle ways.”88 Choosing what sorts of emotions to cultivate in ourselves
contributes to our capacity to choose what sorts of persons we would like to be. We can
also cultivate within ourselves virtues that have significant emotional components (such
as compassion89) by reflecting on our emotions in the context of a given situation. This
seems a difficult task, given the possibility that our rational reflection on a given emotion
in light of the circumstances eliciting the emotion will be distorted by that same emotion.
For this reason, Cates insists that conversation about emotions must include
considerations of morality and religious ethics.
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Cates holds that morality is best understood within the framework of religious
ethics in which it develops because that ethical construction will advance conceptions of
how people should think and feel.90 She finds Nussbaum’s exploration of the “socially
conditioned nature of much human emotion”91 useful on this point. Cates writes,
Nussbaum’s work helps us to appreciate that some emotions are
composed, at least in part, of religious beliefs, assumptions, intuitions,
wonder, and concern. Some religious ‘thoughts’ might function primarily
as background beliefs until they are evoked by a situation that demands
more than a surface interpretation and assessment. Some of them might be
at work in composing emotion-laden meanings in ways that are barely
evident to consciousness and are difficult, even upon reflection, to
identify.92
Having a religious perspective, according to Cates, involves being attuned to what is
extraordinary or revelatory in the world. “Religion involves ‘seeing’ certain things or
situations as involving or possibly involving something more or other than meets the eye
of the inattentive, unenlightened, or unimaginative observer.”93 Cates holds “that
developing a theory of the emotions requires delving extensively into questions about
what is really (and not only apparently) real.”94 She acknowledges that the difficulty of
knowing that what one perceives is an accurate reflection of how things really are makes
it complicated “to determine how one ought to feel.”95 At the same time, addressing
questions of what people believe to be really real is indispensable in ethics because the
answers to those questions will shape what people think morality is and how they think
90
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moral people ought to act. Religions tackle these questions; therefore, in order to
understand people’s moral commitments, we must investigate the religious dimension of
their lives.96
Cates’s position is compelling. We have seen that emotions reflect values, even if
emotions are not equated with value judgments, and those values will often stem from the
religious beliefs and values of the culture and faith in which the person is formed. When
people are formed by the moral commitments of their religion, those values often remain
unarticulated, unexpressed, and unexamined. And yet they underlie our emotional life;
they influence, shape, and frame our thinking, what we value, and what we construe as
good and praiseworthy, and in so doing inform our emotions. Thus, when reflecting on
the morality of emotions, Cates holds that it is important to bring religious values into the
conversation. We can apply the importance of religious values to her example of how we
feel about a person whom we perceive to be evil. Cates contends that we must include
that person’s basic humanity in our emotions about that person, and this position reflects
Cates’s own underlying beliefs in the value of each person’s basic dignity. Harak’s notion
that people and objects should be valued properly also has its basis in his Christian
beliefs.
While Cates does not fully explore children’s moral development, it is important
to note that her description of the moral life as including the formation of a person’s
moral views in light of her gaining new information and perspectives97 lends itself to
being extended to considerations of the ways children are participating in the moral life.
Children, whose reserve of experience is quantitatively less than adults’, are gaining
96
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information and perspective at a rapid rate. When a child gains a new experience, it is
proportionally more significant to her limited reserve of experiences than it would be to
an adult’s. Through this process, children are arguably deeply engaged in the moral life.
Their interaction with the morality and religious ethics they encounter shapes the kinds of
moral commitments that they will take for granted later in life. If Cates is right that
children’s thoughts and emotions mutually inform each other during this formation, then
children’s emotions and moral life are inextricably bound up together. This will be an
important point to keep in mind when thinking about Aquinas’s theory of emotions with
respect to virtue below. However, much of the responsibility for emotions that Cates
advances occurs through reflection on one’s emotions, which as we saw above, is beyond
the capacity of infants and young children. Nevertheless, if we consider Cates’s account
in conjunction with the interactive model of agency advanced by the social sciences, it
seems plausible that children’s agency in the moral life is based on their emotions, while
their responsibility for their emotions and their moral accountability come later as they
gain cognitive maturity.98
Children’s moral agency, as I use the term, involves interaction with their
surroundings. Harak explains how this can occur on an emotional and personal level in
terms of the valuation people extend to one another. Cates affirms the significance of
religious ethics in morality, and her description of the moral life allows for children to be
active participants in it. Because emotions function in the moral life and reflect values,
emotions are critical components of children’s moral agency and moral formation. In the
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next section, I turn to recent philosophical and theological scholarship that more
explicitly addresses the role of emotions in moral development.

Emotions and Moral Development
A person’s emotions have moral import not only in terms of the values they
reflect, but also in terms of how she develops as a moral person with agency. Here I
engage philosophers and theologians whose work on emotions explores the contribution
emotions make to a person’s moral development. The scholars in this section are not of
one mind in every aspect of their analyses, but they all agree that without emotion, a
person’s moral development is stunted.

Philosophical Accounts
In this section, I engage several philosophers whose work addresses the ways
emotion aids moral development and moral motivation. None of these scholars subscribe
to the cognitivist theory of emotions that equates emotions with evaluative judgments,
although all of them maintain a place for cognition within emotional experiences. Several
of them explicitly treat the role of emotion in children’s moral formation. It is important
to think about the emotional dimension of moral development and motivation when
addressing children’s moral agency, in part because children’s rational powers are still
developing and cannot guide their actions in the way that reason might be able to guide
the actions of adults. Nevertheless, as I will argue in later chapters, the emotional
component of moral motivation allows children’s responses to moral situations to be
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reflective of their agency in those situations, despite their inchoate reason and lesser
accountability.
A person’s morality includes the value and importance she ascribes to herself,
other people, objects, and so on. Bennett Helm is a philosopher who argues that this value
arises from emotion, which he distinguishes from desire and judgment. At the same time,
he maintains the logical consistency of these three—desire, emotion, and judgment—with
one another. Helm defines emotions as “intentional feelings of import,”99 where import
means vigilance in attention to something and a preparedness to act on that thing (309).
Emotion and desire arise with import in a holistic way, both responding to import and
constituting that import (313). The import a person ascribes to an object also stems from
the value she places on it, and Helm contends that this valuation is a commitment to
having other emotions that follow logically from the first emotion (319),100 but he does
not think they are properly identified as judgments. In fact, he suggests that emotions
function in concert with judgments and desires to create the evaluative perspective
through which the agent sees the world (315). These three dimensions—emotion, desire,
and judgment—are “rationally” connected and together form a single world-view (317).
The rational connection among judgments, desires, and emotions is such that the
import they ascribe to an object will forge a unity of perspective among them (315). It
follows, then, that conflict between emotion and judgment will always be a non sequitur
(317). For example, if I value my car, and I believe you have stolen it (to use Helm’s
Bennett W. Helm, “Emotions and Motivation: Reconsidering Neo-Jamesian
Accounts,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, ed. Peter Goldie (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 310.
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example, 315), my judgment registers that this is an offense toward me and my property,
I experience the emotion of anger, and I desire to act in such a way that you are brought
to justice and I retrieve my car. Helm’s theory requires further that my commitment to the
import of the object of the emotion implies that I also commit to feeling the emotions
related to the continuation of the situation (316). This position suggests that if my car is
returned, I will feel relief. If my car is not retrieved, I might continue to feel anger
towards you or sadness at its loss. The rational connection between judgment and
emotion disallows the possibility that I value my car and yet feel relief at your having
stolen it, or that I discover that you have not, in fact, stolen it, and yet I continue to feel
angry with you.
Although emotions and judgments are not equal in Helm’s view, emotions still
follow logically from external situations that we deem to be important. Helm writes,
“emotions motivate not because they involve mere dispositions to behave but rather
because they are rational responses to things we care about, responses that sometimes
rationally demand intentional action” (303-304). Emotions involve desires as well as
judgments, and he writes that desires indicate “something in favor of pursuing the
relevant course of action in light of its significance to the subject.”101 He contrasts this
with the actions a computer that is programmed to play chess well will perform. The
computer will make the relevant moves, but it will not do so because it cares about
winning or about the game. Its programming gives it a goal toward which to work, but
the goal contains no significance for the computer, as it might for a human being.102 A

Bennett W. Helm, “The Significance of Emotions,” American Philosophical
Quarterly 31, no.4 (1994): 319.
102
Helm, “The Significance of Emotions,” 319.
101

111

human being who cares about winning will be motivated in the chess game because
winning has significance for her, a significance that has arisen in concert with her
emotions and desires.
Helm’s theory seems consistent with the theology of childhood that points to the
life-long significance of one’s early years. Because he argues that import develops with
emotion and desire, the objects to which a child ascribes importance will also have
emotional meaning for that child, and the correlation between the emotion, the object,
and the import will likely be difficult to change later. At the same time, Helm’s view
connects emotion and judgment in such a way that explaining anomalous emotions
proves difficult. His theory does not seem to account for how complex emotional
responses can be. For instance, it is possible that a victim of child abuse will feel both
love and hatred (a well as other emotions) toward her parent, and I find Helm’s theory to
be inadequate for explaining such situations. Further, while the judgment, emotion, and
desire might be logically connected to and consistent with one another, it does not
necessarily follow that the import they are ascribing is itself praiseworthy. The internal
consistency Helm argues for does not contain an appeal to external sources for validation
of the evaluative perspective through which the person views the world. It is possible to
have an evaluative perspective in which judgment, emotion, and desire are logically
connected but skewed such that the person deliberately engages in harmful or immoral
behavior. This possibility serves to highlight the importance of ethics in emotional
formation. In order to contribute to moral functioning in a positive way, emotions must
be formed well, and they must ascribe the appropriate import to objects.
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Helm’s argument points to the importance of establishing good and ethical
emotional and thought patterns in children. If children are inculcated with destructive or
hate-filled rhetoric and emotional reinforcement, then that will likely be difficult to
change later since it will have been part of their formation in their early years.103 This is
supported by Helm’s connection among desire, emotion, and judgment, but the ascribed
power of early emotional formation is even greater in theories that maintain the
precedence of emotion. Philosopher Jesse Prinz focuses on the function of emotions in
moral life, with their “eliciting conditions and their action tendencies.”104 He is not
concerned with the cognitive/non-cognitive debate surrounding what emotions are, but he
argues that emotions motivate moral behavior and play a crucial role in moral
epistemology (520). As Helm does, Prinz associates emotions with perceptions, but he
argues that when a person has an emotional response to something, that emotional
response is the basis of the person’s moral evaluation. This is distinct from the cognitive
theories that hold that emotions are evaluative judgments. According to Prinz, our moral
evaluation follows from our emotions (520), and praise and blame emotions impact our
moral responses to moral situations and are pivotal to moral education.
Moral emotions of praise and blame function in society as a way of maintaining
moral standards, argues Prinz. Deviating from the standards of one’s culture will evoke
emotions of blame from others (anger, disdain), and often from oneself (shame, guilt).
Because these emotions are unpleasant for most people, most people will avoid occasions
that elicit them and will comply with social norms. Praise emotions arise in response to
103
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moral goodness, but we tend to reserve them for instances of extreme or unusual displays
of moral goodness, not for complying with moral norms. We generally expect that people
will follow the moral standards of their culture, and so we do not find it praiseworthy
when they do. Because Prinz holds this position, he wonders if blame emotions are more
important than praise emotions for maintaining social moral standards (529).
Another category of emotion that Prinz finds significant for fostering moral
functioning in society is “prosocial emotions”—empathy, sympathy, and concern (531).
Empathy is not itself an emotion, but the capacity for it leads to other emotions. When I
apprehend that you are experiencing an emotion, such as joy, and my recognition of this
causes me also to feel joy, it is empathy that allows me to experience your emotion.
Empathy is not the emotion—joy is—but my empathy gives me the capacity to
experience joy in the given situation (531). This has moral significance in that it can lead
the person experiencing empathy to be motivated to action in a situation. Prinz cites an
example of my feeling empathic fear because you are in danger and afraid. If this
motivates me to act in a way to bring about your safety, then a moral action has been
motivated by emotion (532).
Sympathy is also a capacity to feel emotion rather than an emotion itself, and
Prinz thinks the emotions it elicits are always negative. A person experiences sympathy
when she feels a negative emotion about someone else’s emotion. For example, if you are
angry and I feel sad that you are enraged, that is sympathy. The emotions we feel as a
result of empathy are always the same as the emotions to which they are responding. The
emotions that arise because of sympathy may be the same as or different from their
eliciting emotions. As with empathic emotions, sympathetic emotions can motivate
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people to act in morally significant ways (532). Concern is slightly different, on Prinz’s
view, such that I can experience concern for you without your having any negative
emotions. As does sympathy, concern always leads to a negative emotion for me (the
person who is concerned), but unlike sympathy, it implies that I want to do something to
help you. Sympathy may lead to moral action, but Prinz thinks concern is likely to result
in my finding a way to help you (533). Each of these prosocial emotions can motivate a
moral agent to act in ways that alleviate suffering.
I would argue that there are also moral implications to the interrelational benefits
of mutual joy and other positive emotions. Relationships between human beings must
include concern and sympathy, but bonds are also formed through shared experiences of
joy, success, and so on. According to the theological anthropology outlined in chapter
one, interrelationality is essential to being human, and so, I would argue, it must be part
of the emotional landscape of morality. In addition, it is plausible that deeper bonds
between people will serve to increase their prosocial emotions toward one another, and in
this way further motivate the actions Prinz describes.
Prinz maintains that teaching children morality involves their emotional
development and emotional lives. Caregivers use blame emotions and punishment (or the
threat of punishment) to dissuade children from engaging in negative behavior in what
Prinz describes as a “careful manipulation of emotions.”105 He cites studies in which
children explain the importance of maintaining moral codes by appealing to emotions,
particularly emotions that exhibit the sympathy the child feels for the victim of the moral
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infraction.106 Prinz suggests that the understanding children develop of the distinction
between moral and conventional norms (for example, between stealing and neglecting to
raise one’s hand in class) stems from the emotional responses that adults have when the
child behaves contrary to one of the norms. Moral-code violation tends to produce a
stronger response in the caregivers than conventional-code violation does.107
Many caregivers also use words of praise in response to the child’s behaving well
in an attempt to elicit positive emotions in the child that will encourage the child to
continue to engage in morally praiseworthy behavior. This is a significant part of how
children learn what the norms of their society are and how to follow them. Prinz
speculates that children crave love, and so they will act in ways that help them avoid
blame emotions. In addition, their natural aptitude for empathy allows them to perceive
and experience the negative emotions of caregivers, and learning which actions have
negative emotions associated with them will inspire children to avoid those behaviors.108
I think Prinz is correct that cultivating the prosocial emotional tendencies in children is
vital to their moral development, a contention to which I will return below.
If moral codes were transmitted only through praise and blame emotions, children
would not learn to make moral assessments and judgments in new circumstances. Patricia
Greenspan concurs with Prinz that emotions play a key role in establishing and
maintaining social and cultural norms, but on her view, the process of being educated
morally includes learning moral judgments, moral language, and moral emotions
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simultaneously.109 Moral judgments and emotions are distinguished later in a person’s
life.110 Greenspan purports that emotions play a substantial role in children’s moral
education. Because there is an inherent emotional part of each human being that is
educated and formed by cultural norms,111 she argues that the mechanisms by which
children learn emotions seem to be innate.112 Further, “specifically moral emotions result
from having the linguistic resources to capture social norms, plus some way (whether
evolutionary or social) of acquiring an aversive reaction to a norm violation.”113 Thus, the
emotions are part of how a child learns to be a moral person in the particular culture into
which she is born. Her moral language, her moral emotions, and her moral judgments of
particular situations will arise together and form her moral perspective. This hearkens
back to Helm’s idea of the integrated nature of judgment, emotion, and desire in a single
evaluative perspective. As with Helm’s position, the unity Greenspan espouses in moral
education presumes a level of consistency in a person’s moral life.
Although both Helm and Greenspan argue that emotion and judgment become
distinguishable later in a person’s life, Greenspan’s contention that these aspects of moral
development are united in children raises the question of what happens to the child who
is taught contradictory messages. Recall the woman Robert Coles interviewed whose
father was a blatant racist and whose mother tried to counter these messages.114 The
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woman he interviewed chose to educate herself and escape her poverty;115 her brother
became a member of the Ku Klux Klan.116 These children were taught conflicting moral
messages by their parents, and each child chose a different path as they matured. Perhaps
as they were able to distinguish their moral judgment from their moral emotion, they
were able to make a conscious choice based on judgment. However, given the role
emotions play in teaching children the moral code of their culture and then in maintaining
the social and moral norms, it does seem likely that the woman interviewed and her
brother, even as children, had different emotional experiences of and responses to the
conflicting messages they received and the parents who transmitted those messages, and
that those emotions had a hand in shaping their subsequent actions and choices.
Greenspan strengthens the case for emotions’ role in moral agency because she
argues that emotions are what give moral judgments the motivational impetus to result in
action.117 While she asserts that acting on emotions is distinct from exhibiting
emotions,118 she does maintain that the motivational force of emotions lies in “the
pressure they exert on us to express them somehow in behavior.”119 This pressure results
from the deep investment of the person in her emotions. Whereas “‘perfect’ rationality” is
detached,120 emotions are motivational because they reflect our values and are (as Cates
and Harak argue) that which moves us. Greenspan distinguishes two phases of emotional
“reasoning”: first the object of emotion evokes the emotion, and then the emotion leads to
115
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behavior.121 Because she holds that these two phases are distinct, she can argue that we
usually have some control over whether we act on our emotions.122 Similar to Prinz,
Greenspan thinks that one way emotion serves to motivate behavior is through blame
emotions. Greenspan agrees that blame emotions can function to dissuade people from
actions that break social norms, and she adds that this functioning must incorporate a
concept of the future. Without being able to conceive of what will likely follow from a
particular action, including “self-punitive” emotions such as shame and guilt, the
motivational force of the blame emotions will remain inert.123 Thus, anticipated emotions
have motivational force as well. Because she ascribes such motivational significance to
emotion, Greenspan holds that morality must be learned in conjunction with emotion if
the person is going to live the morality.124
These accounts explain how important emotions are in moral formation and moral
living. Of particular significance is that children develop the capacity to recognize and be
moved by the circumstances of other people. Prosocial emotions are a focal point for
theological considerations of the place of emotions in moral development, and it is to
those that we now turn.

Theological Accounts
In this final section of the chapter, I focus on theological accounts of the role of
emotions in children’s moral development. As do philosophers, the theologians I engage
here cite the significance of prosocial emotions (empathy and sympathy) in terms of
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moral motivation. Emotions contribute to the development of moral awareness and to
learning the moral codes of one’s community. Further, the case can be made that
emotions are necessary for people to be in relationship with God and for children’s
spiritual formation.
Christine Gudorf makes a case for fostering empathy as a central part of how one
becomes a moral person. She argues that people need to be able to read each other’s
emotions in order to function morally.125 Before we can help another person in need
(110) or respond to someone’s suffering (112), we must realize that they are in need or
suffering, and empathy is the means through which we become aware of this. Gudorf’s
research leads her to suggest that accurately reading other people’s emotional cues is a
capacity that can be cultivated (114). Moral interaction requires that we also be able to
express our needs and suffering, trusting that others will notice and respond (112). This
contention of the mutuality of empathic responsibility can be extended to considerations
of children’s moral formation. A child who is learning moral interaction with others must
have her own needs met and should also learn to ascertain and feel motivated to meet the
needs of others. This can help to foster the child’s sense of another prosocial emotion—
compassion.
Compassion can be taught in lived and concrete experiences, but it can also be
taught through modeling it to children in other ways. Catholic theologian John Hesch
explores compassion as an example of pro-social behavior that is interconnected with
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empathy and sympathy.126 He defines empathy as “having a feeling that is more
appropriate to another’s situation than to one’s own” (31), and sympathy as occasions
“when major elements of condolence, pity, and/or agreement are present” (31). He,
unlike Prinz, allows sympathy to include positive emotions. Prosocial behaviors occur
when the situations causing empathy or sympathy result in actions “intended to alleviate
the other’s distress or come to the other’s aid” (31). One way Hesch suggests to foster
prosocial behaviors in children is through narratives.127 It is not necessary that the child
understand the story completely; the image of the compassion (or other prosocial
behaviors) that the characters exhibit will serve as examples of how to think with
compassion, empathy, or sympathy. It will provide illustrations of the way prosocial
behaviors function—what kinds of situations elicit them and what kinds of responses are
appropriate—and it is possible that this modeling will foster those attitudes in the child as
she grows (35-36). Another way of thinking of Hesch’s suggestion is that stories can
offer examples of agency at work. The multiple characters on which the child can draw in
learning compassion and other prosocial emotions are similar to the “rainbow cast of
saints” Herdt pointed to above as models of Christian mimesis.128 The child can “try out”
through play, imagination, or imitation, the kinds of actions and responses the stories’
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characters engage in. In this way, she will have multiple models of prosocial behavior to
explore as she determines how she will exercise her own agency.
Learning to control or manage one’s actions that result from emotions, as well as
to manage the emotions themselves, is a key aspect of moral development. Johannes van
der Ven explores this issue in his practical-theology text, Formation of the Moral Self. He
works within the interactive model described in chapter one, meaning that he conceives
of human development as a process whereby the individual impacts her surroundings,
and the individual’s environment is a formative influence on her.129 He discusses various
aspects of the person’s development as a moral being, and his work on emotional
formation is of particular relevance for this project.130 After explaining what an emotion
is and then delving into how emotions form and why they matter for moral development,
van der Ven discusses the ways in which people can manage their emotions.
Van der Ven subscribes to a “cognitive interaction emotion theory.” He clarifies
that “the term cognitive refers to human goals and beliefs, with which emotions are
connected and from which they receive their intentionality” (287). Thus, van der Van is a
cognitive emotional theorist. He explains that emotions are “cognitively embedded” and
involve the person’s having some frame of reference in which to understand them. The
frame of reference can be unconscious, but the person will have some sense of the cause
of the emotion.
Whether consciously present or not, this cognitive frame of reference, or
web of meanings, channels, mediates, and directs the emotions that are
felt, and it does so by, for example, identifying the cause of these emotions
(oneself, another person, a situation), and by interpreting, assessing, and
129
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evaluating them. A theory of emotion is nothing other than making
explicit, elaborating on, and explaining this cognitive embeddedness of
emotions (287).
Thus, emotions are processes that are intimately connected with other aspects of the
person and her life, such as her goals, beliefs, and context (288). The term interactive, he
writes, “concerns the way in which the person interprets the context he/she is in,
appraises the events that take place in this context and change it, copes with these
changes, acts from this coping, feels emotions, and expects future outcomes of both the
changing context and his/her actions in that context” (287-88). His perspective can serve
as a good reminder that emotional responses involve not only the person’s values and
emotional history, but they are also deeply engaged with the other aspects of a person’s
life at any given moment. Coping strategies can be diminished and emotional responses
intensified when a person is functioning on a sleep deficit, for example. It is possible that
these contextual factors are more significant in children than in adults because children
lack the experience to put a given context in a broader perspective.
Emotions are morally significant because we need them for moral action and
moral dispositions. Van der Ven explores the development of a number of different
emotions that he perceives to have moral relevance: ego-identity (309-310), basic trust
(310-312), empathy and sympathy (313-315), justice (315-318), shame and guilt (318323), and sex and love (323-331).131 I will take as an example his discussion of empathy
and sympathy because they are the emotions commonly addressed by other scholars I
study in this chapter. The literature I have reviewed so far indicates that empathy and
sympathy have to do with understanding that other people have emotions, being able to
Van der Ven categorizes these as follows: “‘natural emotions’ [are] ego-identity, basic
trust, empathy and sympathy, sex and love… ‘moral emotions’ [are] sense of justice,
shame, and guilt” (van der Ven, Formation of the Moral Self, 309).
131
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identify those emotions, and experiencing an emotion in response to the emotions of
others. Van der Ven distinguishes between empathy and sympathy by saying that
sympathy includes “the desire to help the other” (314), whereas empathy is the ability to
discern what the other is feeling and to share those feelings (313-314). He, like Prinz,
does not define empathy and sympathy as emotions per se, but as propensities for
emotions (313). That these tendencies exhibit very early in human life is clear from the
studies van der Ven cites showing that human infants cry in response to hearing another
baby cry (313-314). After tracing empathy and sympathy through a number of
developmental stages (314-315), he concludes that they are necessary to normal, healthy
social functioning. Being able to perceive that others have emotions and to have that
perception evoke an emotional response in oneself is key to motivating a person to
action, and it has serious moral implications. If a person can understand on a rational
level that others are also persons, but she does not connect with them emotionally, she
will likely not be motivated to help when they are suffering. She might be unable to
identify situations that warrant interventive action, and so she will lack social
functionality (315). He draws similar conclusions with respect to the other emotions he
discusses—without these emotions and emotional tendencies, the person is ill-prepared
and ill-equipped to function socially and morally (310-312, 315-331).
With this framework in mind, it is defensible that the formation, management, and
education of emotions is essential for the moral life. Van der Ven identifies two
interconnected approaches to managing the emotions (307), both of which he holds are
necessary for establishing ways of dealing with and thinking of emotions such that they
foster the moral life. These two approaches working together allow emotions to provide
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information about what we value, and at the same time, they can be brought into
collaboration with our goals such that they promote the fulfillment of those goals. The
first approach is called “ordering,” and those who subscribe to it view emotions as
needing to be ordered properly such that “their affective flow is directed toward the moral
goal or value at which the person is aiming, while their affective energy is purposively
used for approximating and reaching it” (303). Van der Ven associates this approach with
Aquinas and with virtue theory. In it, “the emotions are not inspected for their possibly
negative influences, but positively taken up into the purposive human striving to perform
virtuous actions and approximate excellence in virtue” (304). The second tack that van
der Ven finds useful is the “processing” approach, which views emotions as unique
sources of information to which we need to pay attention (304-305). Processing does not
conflate emotions with thoughts or judgments; in fact, it values emotions because they
are sources of knowledge that are distinct from thoughts and judgments. Van der Ven
further argues that the dialectical relationship between the ordering and processing
management approaches reflects the interactive model that frames his work. Thus, the
person experiences emotion (processing) and then discerns which emotions are
“authentic” and will be acted on (ordering). The processing is the environment’s
influence on the person; the person’s ordering and subsequently acting on her emotions
includes her impacting her environment (308).
Van der Ven claims that children’s emotions form through observation,
experience, and concept. Observation can aid a child’s emotional development when the
child sees adults who genuinely and consistently care about her and each other, and who
deal with emotions (even negative ones) and conflicts as they arise (332). Observation is
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part of how a child is socialized (121), and this includes learning to compromise (123).
Experience involves children themselves dealing with emotions. They learn to navigate
their emotions in different situations and to allow the emotions to guide them morally.
For example, experiencing authentic shame and guilt help a child to know when she has
broken a moral norm or harmed someone else (334-335). Finally, conceptual learning
happens later when the cognitive capacities are more developed, and the child is able to
think abstractly about emotions, although conceptual learning must also include concrete
cases. Conceptual learning can be used to reinforce and correct learning that results from
observation and experience, and for this reason, caregivers need to talk to children about
their emotions (336).
I find van der Ven’s explanation of children’s moral formation to be a more
comprehensive and balanced reflection of children’s experience of emotion than
Nussbaum’s. He includes observation of good and loving behavior, whereas Nussbaum
centered her description of children’s emotional formation on their concern about their
own wrong-doing and their own limitations. Van der Ven includes the morally significant
and necessary process of learning to curb one’s tendencies toward bad actions, but he
adds the equally necessary dimension of observing and emulating good and loving
behavior. It is not enough to teach children what to avoid. They must also see what they
ought to do. For this reason, I would argue that praise emotions are often just as
significant as blame emotions in children’s moral formation. Prinz might be right that
blame emotions are in fact more important than praise emotions in maintaining social and
moral norms,132 but I think both are needed to establish the child’s understanding of those
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norms. Further, from a Christian standpoint, human beings are created by God for
relationship with God and each other. Those relationships involve emotions of love and
good will as well as of keeping oneself in check. Thus, moral development from this
standpoint must go beyond Nussbaum’s idea of accepting and atoning for one’s bad
behavior. At the same time, I do think her insistence on the reparation for bad actions is
an important piece of moral formation that is largely neglected in the other research on
children’s moral and emotional formation. Every child is going to do something wrong at
some point, and the child must be taught to try to repair the damage done by her actions
in order to foster and maintain good relationships with others and God.
Van der Ven’s work is useful both for the way it associates emotional
development with moral learning and for its emphasis on the interpersonal aspects of
emotional development. At the same time, it remains uncommitted in terms of what a
well-developed moral emotional life leads to specifically. Presumably the goal will vary
depending on the social and cultural context in which one finds oneself. However, as is
the case with other thinkers, his position seems to be that emotions’ function is to serve
pre-existing social and cultural moral norms. What those norms are must be fleshed out
with thick theological descriptions of moral development. Because his work uses
interactive theory, the potential exists to extend his thinking to include children’s moral
agency. However, his insistence on the cognitive embeddedness of emotions makes his
theory susceptible to Deigh’s critique that cognitive theories are not able to accommodate
infants and very young children.133

133

See Deigh, “Concepts of Emotions,” 29.
127

Including infants and young children is central to my argument and to the
Christian theological anthropology I advanced in chapter one, which holds that infants
and young children are created by God for relationship with God and so are already
spiritual. This spirituality requires emotion, contends Laurence Scheindlin. He argues that
emotions are also necessary for moral perspicacity. On his view, emotions are both
judgments regarding the “personal salience” of a situation or object and the mechanism
through which we are aware of our judgments.134 Similar to Harak, he contends that
emotions are the way that we notice a moral problem to be a moral problem; they are how
we see the problem and are the reason that we see the problem (182-183).
Scheindlin goes further and claims that emotions are also crucial to spirituality
and spiritual experience, and he sees the greatest hindrance to children’s moral and
spiritual development resulting from our cultural animosity towards emotion. He writes,
Spirituality’s cultural nemesis is neither secularization nor individualism
per se, but rather the prevailing climate of emotional coolness.… [This
issue] contains, I believe, significant practical consequences for those of
us interested in the spiritual and moral development of children. This
project will be greater than overcoming privatization, and even more
fundamental than developing moral and spiritual emotions. A society that
tamps down intense emotion in everyday life and which deploys
embarrassment (itself a reduction in emotional intensity from shame) as a
means of social control…quite naturally stigmatizes as an embarrassment
spiritual experience, which is, by definition, intense. Before spiritual
emotions can be nurtured, emotional experience itself needs to be restored
as a primary means by which we apprehend the world and connect with it
(186-187, emphases in original).
Whether or not current American culture is tamping down emotions is an issue that
requires its own study, and I will not attempt to prove or disprove it here. Scheindlin’s
point remains relevant either way. He is crediting emotion—strong emotion—with being
Laurence Scheindlin, “Emotional Perception and Spiritual Development,”
International Journal of Children's Spirituality 8, no. 2 (2003): 182.
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the “primary means” by which human beings engage the world. Further, theological
anthropology maintains that one of the aspects of being human, indeed one of the
purposes of human life for which each human being is created, is relationship with God.
Scheindlin offers emotions as a mode of relating to God. His account seems to indicate
that emotion is significant for more than being a value judgment or a means through
which to maintain social norms and order. Emotions go beyond fostering a preference for
choosing actions that lead to virtue for the sake of virtue. These aspects of emotion are
morally relevant, but emotion, when it is how we engage the world and how we fulfill our
humanity in relationship with God, is also the foundation of human agency. If agency is
based on interacting with the world and God, and emotion is the “primary means” of that
interaction, then emotion will be at least one of the primary means through which people,
including children, exercise agency.

Much of the work studied in this chapter can serve as a useful resource for
thinking constructively about emotions’ role in children’s moral agency. The definition of
moral agency I am using in this dissertation centers on a person’s ability to engage with
the morality of her context. Emotions function in teaching children moral norms and
moral behavior, and they themselves can be educated and formed. In addition, the
centrality of emotions in relating to others and to God is key to thinking about children as
created by God for relationship. While the philosophers and theologians I have studied in
this chapter help make the case for emotions’ part in moral development and moral
agency, I turn to Aquinas for a robust theory of emotions that integrates—without
conflating—thought and passion in the complex, multilayered experience that we call
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emotion. Aquinas’s thought incorporates the whole person, body and soul, in her
relatedness to the created world, to other people, and to God. His theory offers a thick
theological description of the purpose and goals of a human life, thus positioning emotion
within a religiously ethical system. Further, it accounts for the cumulative effect of
emotions and experiences throughout a person’s life, thus maintaining and underscoring
the importance of childhood experiences.
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CHAPTER 3: AQUINAS ON THE EMOTIONS

The philosophical and theological accounts of emotions reviewed in chapter two
provide useful tools for thinking constructively about moral agency, particularly in terms
of the role of the emotions in the moral life. Understanding the emotions as partly
cognitive allows us to see that emotions are at least one component of the way that a
person engages and interacts with the world. However, cognitive theories tend to base
emotions on levels of evaluative judgment that are beyond young children’s intellectual
capacity. Aquinas’s thought on emotions maintains the cognitive dimension that helps to
ensure that emotions are part of the moral life, and it goes beyond strictly cognitive
accounts of emotions (such as Nussbaum’s) by separating the assessment of the object of
the emotion from the attraction (or repulsion) the person experiences with respect to the
object. This distinction provides a way of explaining both anomalous emotions—those
that contradict a person’s thoughts and beliefs—and children’s emotions without
requiring that they be based on propositional knowledge. Aquinas would likely have
resisted using his work to include children as agential participants in the moral
community, since he thought their inchoate rational powers rendered them basically
irrational. However, when his thinking is incorporated into a contemporary context, and
considered as a resource for working with a theological anthropology that includes
children as already fully human beings, Aquinas’s understanding of the ways that
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thoughts, feelings, senses, and reason interact in a complex web of mutual and
cumulative influence opens the realm of emotions and morality to those whose rational
powers are immature.
In this chapter, I focus on Aquinas’s thought as it pertains to emotions, beginning
with a brief overview of how he conceives of the human soul, which is necessary to
understanding his views on human passional and emotional responses to the world. I first
consider the distinct powers of the soul and their functions, and I then strive to show how
these work collaboratively rather than in isolation from one another. I argue that it is in
the mutual influence and interaction of the powers of the soul, over time, that the
person’s emotional life unfolds. In chapter four, I will elaborate on the role of emotions
in the moral life, including the connections between emotions and virtue.

The Human Soul
Aquinas’s conception of the human soul and its relationship to the body is the
context within which his thoughts on emotions are developed. He believes that the human
being is a union of body and soul, and that neither on its own adequately encapsulates
what it is to be human.1 His is a hylomorphic anthropology, in which the soul and body

Barnes calls this a “metaphysical unity” (Cory Ladd Barnes, “Thomas Aquinas on the
Body and Bodily Passions,” in The Embrace of Eros: Bodies, Desires, and Sexuality in
Christianity, ed. Margaret D. Kamitsuka [Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2010], 88).
The hylomorphic unity of body and soul indicates Aquinas’s positive view of the body,
although the desires of the body are corrupt by sin. Barnes summarizes: “the hylemorphic
[sic] nature of a human being grants positive value to the body and bodily passions. The
faculty of sensuality is a natural and beneficial feature of humanity, providing the sense
data necessary for cognition and fostering the preservation of the individual and species.
Aided by original justice in the state of integrity, the body and the sensitive appetite are
perfectly ordered to the soul and reason…. Original sin disrupts this proper order with the
result that the sensitive appetite immoderately desires mutable goods beyond any rational
1
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are united such that they are mutually dependent. Although the soul is “something
subsistent,” it is only complete when considered in union with the body (ST I.75.2 ad 1).
Aquinas eschews an anthropology that equates the person with her soul, and he insists
that the person is both body and soul.2 Although the soul is subsistent, it is not itself
corporeal, but it is the form of the body, meaning that it gives the body (matter) its
actuality.3 To give the body its actuality is to take the potential of the material that makes
up the body and give it the qualities that make it this particular person.4 The dependence
is not unidirectional. The soul also depends on the body and the ability of the senses to
perceive the world in order to gain knowledge (ST I 84.6, 7).5 That being said, my focus
in this chapter is on Aquinas’s thoughts on the (embodied) soul, as they pertain to the
emotions.
All living beings have souls, according to Aquinas. Plants have vegetative souls;
irrational animals have sensitive souls; and human beings have rational souls (ST
I.78.1).6 The vegetative soul in a plant acts only on the corporeal plant itself (ST I.78.1)
and performs the functions necessary for the plant to live and grow (ST I.78.2). The
vegetative soul does not allow the plant to interact with other objects because its powers

limits and without any proportioned relation to the preservation of the individual or the
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are limited to the plant itself. In animals, the sensitive soul allows for interaction with
other sensible objects, in addition to acting on the given animal’s body, to which it is
united (ST I.78.1). For this reason, creatures with sensitive souls are able to perceive and
respond to the objects they encounter, which they do in cooperation with their physical
senses.7 The intellectual soul of the human being is created by God (ST I.118.2, ad 2) and
distinguishes humans from other creatures.8 The rational soul is the principle of life in
humans (ST I.76.1), and it is capable of comprehending universals (ST I.75.5, ad 1),
whereas the sensitive soul perceives particulars. Aquinas holds that human souls are by
definition intellectual, but that they contain the powers of the sensitive soul and nutritive
soul as well (ST I.76.3).
Within the sensitive and intellectual souls, Aquinas distinguishes between
apprehensive and appetitive powers, a distinction that will prove central to developing an
understanding of emotion that maintains its cognitive component but does not equate it
with cognition. Generally speaking, the apprehensive power is the ability to perceive
some object or idea,9 and the appetite is the inclination toward that object or idea. In
humans, intellectual apprehension perceives universals and truths, while sensitive
Aquinas holds that “sensation and the consequent operations of the sensitive soul are
evidently accompanied with change in the body; thus in the act of vision, the pupil of the
eye is affected by a reflection of color: and so with the other senses. Hence it is clear that
the sensitive soul has no ‘per se’ operation of its own, and that every operation of the
sensitive soul belongs to the composite [of body and soul]” (ST I.75.3).
8
God, who is the highest intellectual power, is also the source of “light” for the
intellectual soul (ST I.79.4).
9
Cates provides a useful description of apprehension: “The power of apprehension makes
it possible to find an object of thought intelligible; it allows one to regard an object as an
object of a certain kind. The power of apprehension also makes it possible to find an
object of sensation sensible; it allows one to pick something out as a sensible object and
recognize its sensible properties. In short, the power of apprehension makes it possible to
entertain something as an object of consciousness or awareness” (Cates, Aquinas on the
Emotions, 66).
7
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apprehension perceives particular objects. The apprehensive power then presents the
object it has perceived to the appetitive power to which it corresponds (ST I-II.13.1).
Intellectual appetite follows intellectual apprehension, and sensitive appetite follows
sensitive apprehension (ST I.79.1, ad 2).10 In Aquinas’s words, “We must needs say that
the intellectual appetite is a distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the appetitive
power is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended” (ST
I.80.2). Thus, if the “thing apprehended” is particular, the sensitive powers apprehend it,
and sensitive appetite follows; if the “thing apprehended” is of a universal nature, the
intellect apprehends it, and intellectual appetite follows.11 The appetitive power always
follows apprehension and is that which “inclines” the being toward or away from the
object or idea apprehension presents to it (ST I.80.1). Aquinas explains that this means
that the person apprehends something as “sensible or intelligible,” and she then desires it
(with her appetitive power) as “suitable or good” (ST I.80.1, ad 2). The goal of the
apprehensive power is to perceive an object, and once that object is perceived, the

There is a third appetitive power, which Aquinas calls “natural appetite,” and it tends
toward “a form existing in the nature of things, while the sensitive appetite, as also
the intellective or rational appetite, which we call the will, follows from an
apprehended form” (ST I-II.8.1). The apprehension on which natural appetite is based
does not come from its own powers; rather, it is “an appetite which arises from an
apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but in some other” (ST I-II.26.1),
for instance, a rock having a natural appetite for the earth and so falling to the ground
when lifted. The sensitive appetite is higher than the natural appetite: a “superior
inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able
to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form”
(ST I.80.1).
11
Aquinas goes on in the same article to say: “It is not accidental to the thing desired to
be apprehended by the sense or the intellect; on the contrary, this belongs to it by its
nature; for the appetible does not move the appetite except as it is apprehended.
Wherefore differences in the thing apprehended are of themselves differences of the
appetible. And so the appetitive powers are distinct according to the distinction of the
things apprehended, as their proper objects” (ST I.80.2, ad 1).
10
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power’s work is complete (with respect to that object), and it rests. The function of the
appetite is directed toward moving the person toward or away from the object that
apprehension presents to it, and it achieves this goal in inclination or movement (ST
I.81.1).
These four are the main categories of powers in the human soul in Aquinas’s
system: intellectual apprehension, intellectual appetite (called the will), sensitive
apprehension, and sensitive appetite (which are the passions). They are distinct but
interrelated powers. This is not to say that the separate powers of the soul mean that the
person is divided in herself. Rather the distinctions are for the sake of discussion, and are
not to be taken as literal divisions among independent and isolated powers.12 In what
follows, I consider each of these powers, beginning with intellectual apprehension, then
the intellectual appetite that follows from it. I then turn to the sensitive powers of the soul
and discuss sensitive apprehension. I end this chapter with sensitive appetite. This
category of powers is the one most frequently associated with our contemporary
conception of emotions, and I will explore it in some detail, both as a power in its own
right, as well as how it functions in relation to the other powers of the soul. All four of
these categories of powers are interconnected in Aquinas’s account of the human soul,
and they are mutually influential in my interpretation of his thought on emotions. It is,

“[A]lthough Aquinas employs a ‘faculty psychology’ in his analysis, he does not divide
the self into various semiautonomous agencies. The divisions are used only for analysis
or convenience. Statements about what a power does always can be reformulated as
statements about what human beings as possessors of a power do or can do” (Lee H.
Yearley, “Mencius and Aquinas’s Theories of Virtue,” in Mencius and Aquinas: Theories
of Virtue and Concepts of Courage [Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
1990], 72).
12
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therefore, important to set the stage for the discussion of the emotions by examining all of
the powers of the soul.

Intellectual Apprehension
Intellectual apprehension allows a person to perceive intellectual objects and to
make sense of her world. Aquinas writes, “We must therefore assign on the part of the
intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species
from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect” (ST I.79.3).13
The intellect’s act is to understand (ST I.79.10), and to understand on the basis of
universals abstracted from particulars. In human beings, “whatever we understand, we
know by comparison to natural sensible things. Consequently it is not possible for our
intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the senses are suspended, through which
sensible things are known to us” (ST I.84.8). Aquinas is saying that the intellect is able to
abstract the essence of a given object from its particulars. For example, it can determine
that a particular chair fits into the category of “chair” because the intellect is able to
understand the principles of “chair” that are present in that chair.14 People gain this
understanding by abstracting what it is to be a chair from their experiences with particular
chairs. They do not begin with a pre-existing concept of “chair” which they then apply to
particular chairs; they are only able to apply the category “chair” to a given chair after
they have successfully abstracted the concept of “chair” from experiences of other chairs.

13

Aquinas also posits a passive intellect (ST I.79.3, ad 1) that receives and retains
apprehensions (ST I.79.7).
14
The intellect does this through “phantasms,” which are created by the sensitive
apprehension. A phantasm presents an image of the material object to the intellect, which
is then able to know it (ST I.85.1).
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This process does not guarantee that the person will have an accurate understanding of
the world or the objects in it, an important caveat that Cates mentions. She explains that
“human intellect is a power that makes it possible for one to find intelligible the world in
which one lives,” but using the intellect does not guarantee an accurate understanding of
that world.15 We are capable of mistaken apprehensions.16
The human intellect depends upon the sensitive powers in order to perceive and
make sense of the world. To be sure, it does not require the body in order to operate: “the
human soul is the highest and noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in
its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has
no share whatever. This power is called the intellect” (ST I.76.1). At the same time,
Aquinas explains that, because humans are the lowest of the rational beings, human
intellect does not have knowledge of truth by its nature. Rather, humans must gain
knowledge through particulars, and this requires the senses, which are corporeal.
Therefore, in humans, the intellectual soul is fortuitously united with a body in order to
move towards knowledge of the truth (ST I.76.5).17 The hylomorphic unity of the human
person is such that the sensitive and intellectual apprehensive powers function in a way
that is often simultaneous and mutually influential. These intellectual apprehensions are
then presented to the intellectual appetite.

15

Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 167.
See ST I.85.6.
17
Angels, on the other hand, are pure intellect and have knowledge of the truth naturally
(ST I.76.5).
16
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Intellectual Appetite
Aquinas identifies the intellectual appetite, or the will, as that which “flow[s]
freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite” (ST I-II.26.1). Because it
follows from the intellectual apprehension, which is concerned with universals, “the
intellectual appetite, though it tends to individual things which exist outside the soul, yet
tends to them as standing under the universal” (ST I.80.2, ad 2), and it is moved by
objects with respect to their goodness. Because it flows freely, it is not inclined to objects
by necessity, but “free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will
man moves himself to act” (ST I.83.1, ad 3). Choice is an act of the will (ST I-II.13.1),18
and free will is not a separate power from the will (ST I.83.4). Therefore, the will is free
in its choosing. Aquinas explains that the will can choose or not choose any given object,
in part because the will is free to think or not to think of the object. However, there is one
exception to this: when the will is offered an object that “is good universally and from
every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it
cannot will the opposite.” And it necessarily tends away from an object that is “not good
from every point of view” (ST I-II.10.2).19 This universal and unqualified good is
happiness (beatitudo): “the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is
happiness” (ST I.82.1; also ST I-II.10.2).20 For every other good, the will makes a choice.

“Choice is the final acceptance of something to be carried out. This is not the business
of reason but of will…. Choice is nevertheless not an act of the will taken absolutely but
in relation to reason” (Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, vol. 3, trans.
Robert W. Schmidt [Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Company, 1954], Q22.15, p. 90).
19
The will can be mistaken, as when it incorrectly thinks an action (such as fornication)
will lead to happiness (Aquinas, On Truth, vol. 3, Q22.6, p. 58).
20
Jean Porter argues that Aquinas’s claim that all human actions are aimed at one final
end must be understood as a “metaphorically informed analysis of rational action, which
still leaves room to admit that some behaviors which do not meet this ideal can still be
18
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Being able to make a choice about a particular good requires that the person know what
the good (in that instance) is, and that she be able to apply it to the particular situation21
(this is done by means of the particular reason, as we shall see below). Although humans
do not choose their own telos,22 human choice is significant in the means we choose to
achieve that end (ST I.82.1, ad 3), and there is no necessity in the means.23 Intellectual
apprehension can present several things to the will at once and is able to make
comparisons among those things. The will is then able to choose among them (ST I. 82.2,
ad 3), because the end to which the will is inclining the person is happiness (beatitudo),
and “there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary connection with
happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the will does not
said to be rational, and hence true human actions, albeit in a derivative sense.” This is
because she correctly assesses that “if Aquinas does indeed claim that each person always
directs all her actions and activities toward some one goal or ideal, then I do not see how
that claim could be defended” (Jean Porter, The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of
Aquinas for Christian Ethics [Louisville, KY: Westminster / John Knox Press, 1990],
73), and the person who comes close to the ideal seems “fanatical” (72).
21
Porter illustrates this point in reference to choices that will promote health in the
individual, and she distinguishes the human being’s selection from among various
options with the inclinations in animals that lead them to opt naturally for that which
promotes their health and survival (Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, 71).
22
“Although the will wills the last end by a certain necessary inclination, it is
nevertheless in no way to be granted that it is forced to will it…. The will does not will
anything necessarily with the necessity of force, yet it does will something necessarily
with the necessity of natural inclination” (Aquinas, On Truth, vol. 3, Q 22.5, pp. 52-53).
Eleonore Stump argues that Aquinas’s account of freedom of the will does not equate
freedom with the ability to do otherwise. While he does hold that coercion is contrary to
freedom, being inclined to something by natural inclination is not (Eleonore Stump,
“Aquinas’s Account of Freedom: Intellect and Will,” in Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae:
Critical Essays, ed. Brian Davies [New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
2006], 215-216).
23
Until we have seen God in the Divine Vision, we do not necessarily desire either God
or “those things which are of God” (ST I.82.2). Cates’s read of Aquinas’s view is that
“there is no intentional content, short of the direct vision of God, that necessitates a
motion of the will in relation to that content. The direct vision of God is possible only in
the life to come,” which means that the person is free to will or not to will, to think or not
to think about this end and the means to it (Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 207).
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adhere of necessity” (ST I.82.2). This is not to say that the will is always inclined toward
right or good things. It can make mistakes, usually on the basis of mistaken intellectual
apprehensions and judgments, which then incline the person toward objects that are not
good.24
This possibility of error, especially error based on intellectual apprehension, is
one of the reasons it is imperative not to equate moral agency with moral accountability
when considering children. Aquinas’s position is that children, because their intellect is in
its formative stages and their rational powers are undeveloped, are not capable of
committing sin.25 They are still gaining knowledge of the world through their encounters
with particular objects, and they are still growing in their experience and moral judgment
of what is good and right. Cates’s explanation of the function of the will is helpful here:
“the main function of the will in a human being is to enable one to tend toward the good
as it appears in—or with reference to—particular objects. The main function of the will is
to enable one to make one’s way in the world as a moral agent by engaging daily
situations in ways that contribute to one’s own or others’ complete happiness, as one
understands that,” both in terms of one’s ultimate end and in terms of particular and
intermediate ends.26 I think it is plausible to say that children do not lack a will when they
engage the world, but that they often lack the knowledge, wisdom, and experience to
Yearley, “Mencius and Aquinas,” 75. Aquinas holds that these errors are caused by
faulty use of the intellect rather than a mistake on the part of sensitive apprehension. He
argues that the sensitive apprehension and intellect relate to one another as follows: “in
its relation to the intellect, sense always produces a true judgment in the intellect with
respect to its own condition, but not always with respect to the condition of things”
(Thomas Aquinas, The Disputed Questions on Truth, trans. Robert W. Mulligan, vol. 1
[Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Company, 1952], Q 1.11, pp. 48-49).
25
ST Suppl. 69.6. See also Commentary on the Gospel of St. John, 189, ST I-II.89, and
ST Suppl. 32.4.
26
Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 192.
24
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have a full grasp of the import of their actions. Thus, while it seems evident that children
are making choices that pertain to happiness and so utilizing their wills in their moral
engagement with the world, their responsibility for those choices needs to be in accord
with what they can be expected to understand based on their experience and knowledge.
As they live, they will encounter more objects and situations from which they can
abstract knowledge, and these encounters will occur through their sensitive
apprehensions.

Sensitive Apprehension
The sensitive powers of the soul include apprehension and appetite, and they
function with the intellectual powers to play an important role in Aquinas’s
understanding of how human beings interact with the world. Sensitive apprehension
functions through both exterior and interior senses. Exterior senses are what we think of
as the five senses—sight, hearing, taste, touch, smell (ST I.78.3)—and they know a
sensible object in its proper sense, meaning that they perceive the object as it is, having
the properties that the particular corporeal sense organ perceiving it apprehends (ST
I.78.4, ad 2).27 When encountering an upholstered armchair, for example, the sense of
sight can distinguish colors in the pattern of the upholstery, hearing senses a high-pitched
noise from the squeak of the springs when someone sits in the chair, and touch
apprehends the texture of the fabric. Aquinas’s understanding is that each of the external
27

Aquinas states that the soul is in each part of the body as act, but it is in each part of the
body with the particular powers it gives to that part of the body; thus, it is in the eyes as
sight, the ears as hearing. “The whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of
perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. For it is not in each part of the
body, with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight, it is in the eye; and with
regard to hearing, it is in the ear; and so forth” (ST I.76.8).
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senses is designed to accommodate the various powers of the soul (vision, hearing, and so
on). It is not the case that the soul is adapted to perceive what the corporeal organs sense
(ST I.78.3). Therefore, the power of vision is the reason that we have eyes that are
designed for seeing, not the other way around. Apprehensions of objects that occur
through the external senses involve a change in the body of the being who is perceiving
(ST I.75.2, ad 2); for instance, seeing an object involves a change in the eyes. The
exterior senses are significant because without them we would be incapable of any
knowledge of the world.
The soul also apprehends by way of its interior senses, which Aquinas describes
in three categories: common sense, the memorative power, and cogitation, which is also
called particular reason. Common sense (sensus communis) is the “common root and
principle of the exterior senses” (ST I.78.4, ad 1). It functions by taking in information
from the exterior senses and understanding it in a unified way. In the example of the
upholstered armchair, each exterior sense is only able to apprehend those features that are
proper to it, so that sight cannot perceive the squeak of the springs. The exterior senses
notice only distinct bits of information about the object. However, when common sense
compiles the information that the separate exterior senses apprehend, we are able to
comprehend a chair that is at once patterned, soft, and squeaky (ST I.78.4, ad 2).28
The memorative power allows humans to “apprehend a thing not only at the
actual time of sensation, but also when it is absent,” and we can not only call to mind but
also seek that absent thing (ST I.78.4). Because we have memory, we can think about the

On Cates’s read, “the common sense makes it possible to have a unified sensory
experience of an object that has many sensible properties, and to be aware that one is
having such an experience” (Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 113).
28
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upholstered armchair when we are not with it, we can remember its particular features,
and we can be inclined to go to it and sit in it. Aquinas explains that the memorative
power does this by way of imagination, or “phantasy,” which is, “as it were a storehouse
of forms received through the senses” (ST 78.1). In human beings, memorative power
also allows the person to think or reminisce about the past (ST I.78.4), thus permitting a
person to remember times when she sat in the upholstered armchair, and this
reminiscence can be part of her inclination to seek out the chair. Aquinas places the
memorative power in the sensitive part of the soul because it deals with individual things
being held in memory from the past; but there is also an intellectual memorative power
that retains general concepts, or “species,” rather than particular individual
representations of species (ST I.79.6). By this distinction, Aquinas seems to mean that a
person’s intellectual memory retains the concept of “chair,” while her sensitive memory
holds the “phantasy” of the upholstered armchair.
The third category of interior sense apprehension is the cogitative power. This
power is most closely linked with the intellect, and it serves as a medium through which
the intellectual and sensitive parts of the soul are able to communicate with one another.
It is also a source of motivation towards action. Aquinas explains that the cogitative
power in humans is a higher version of its corollary in animals, the estimative power,
which allows the animal “to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are
pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other advantages and uses, or
disadvantages” (ST I.78.4). He gives two examples of an animal’s estimative powers at
work: one is a sheep that perceives a wolf and understands it to be dangerous or
potentially harmful to said sheep, and the second is a bird that comprehends that straw is
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useful for nest building (ST I.78.4). Both examples are illustrative of how the estimative
power perceives what Aquinas calls the “intentions” of objects. Rather than simply
apprehending the wolf as large, grey, and so on, the sheep is able to assess the wolf’s
danger to the sheep. The bird sees the straw’s usefulness rather than only long, thin,
yellowish objects. These estimations also serve as motivators to the animal, so that the
sheep flees from the wolf, and the bird gathers the straw and builds a nest.29
Whereas animals’ estimative power determines the relative usefulness or nonusefulness, advantages or disadvantages of objects it apprehends as a function of natural
instinct, in humans, the cogitative power functions through a “coalition of ideas” through
which it “discovers these intentions” (ST I.78.4). Cogitation “compares individual
intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions,” and because of
this it is also called particular reason (ST I.78.4). Intentions and particular reason are
central concepts in Aquinas’s understanding of how the sensitive appetite functions in
humans, and I will discuss their role in more detail in the section on the passions below.
For now, it is worth noting that the particular reason serves as the mediator between the
intellect and the sensitive appetite: “in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by
this particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved
according to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions
are drawn from universal propositions” (ST I.81.3). An example of a syllogism that
combines the universal with the particular reason might be:
Promoting health is a good thing.
This apple will promote my health.
Therefore, this apple is good.

29

In animals, the estimative power naturally moves the sensitive appetite (ST I.81.3).
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In this way, the particular reason functions with the universal reason to determine that
this apple is good.30
Aquinas writes that “the cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their
excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to a certain affinity and
proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them” (ST I.78.4, ad
5). Cates interprets this to mean that “Aquinas posits the cogitative power…as the power
of interior sensory apprehension that is closest in operation to the power of the
intellect.”31 Thus, human sensitive apprehension is not isolated, nor does it function
independently from the intellectual powers of the soul. It works in cooperation with the
intellectual powers to provide the material to which the sensitive appetite responds.

Sensitive Appetite
The sensitive appetite follows the sensitive apprehension. Sensitive appetite is
also called “sensuality” (ST I.81.2) or the passions, and it involves a physical change—a
“corporeal transmutation”—in the person experiencing the inclination (ST I-II.22.3). As
we saw in the previous section, on Aquinas’s account, sensitive apprehension is
comprised of both the exterior and interior senses. For this reason, sense appetite is more
30

Just as intellectual apprehension can be mistaken, so too can practical reason. Drawing
on ST II-II.53-55, Osborne highlights the ways in which practical reasoning can fail or be
erroneous, and he argues that we require grace to overcome the tendency to err. “All of
these failures either involve a mistake in the reasoning itself, a mistake in the premises of
a practical syllogism, or in the act’s execution. The mistaken premises are most important
for understanding erroneous practical syllogisms…. Aquinas argues that the uncertainty
of human affairs shows that practical reasoning about the good life requires not only the
infused virtue of prudence but also a special gift of God,” which is the gift of counsel
bestowed by the Holy Spirit (Thomas M. Osborne, Jr., “Practical Reasoning,” in The
Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump [New York: Oxford
University Press, 2012], 282-283).
31
Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 171.
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complex than a person’s simply being inclined to an object she finds attractive for its
observable characteristics. Sensitive appetite arises from sensitive apprehension’s
assessments of the object’s advantages and usefulness in addition to its appeal, and from
the person’s ability to compare any particular object with others from her memory.
Further, the intellectual powers are able to influence sense appetite through their
association with the particular reason.
The sense appetite and the emotions in Aquinas’s thought will occupy the
remainder of this chapter. I will first discuss the passions considered in and of themselves
and will aim to show that when the roles of the intellect and cumulative experience are
included in the account, the experiences they describe are emotions. Further, I will argue
that Aquinas’s system successfully addresses critiques leveled at contemporary cognitive
theories of emotion, while maintaining the cognitive component needed for the emotions’
role in the moral life.

The Passions
Aquinas’s “Treatise on the Passions” (ST I-II.22-48) provides his most developed
thought on the passions of the soul.32 In the Treatise, he provides an account of passions
that presents them as at once passive and dynamic. He distinguishes eleven passions,
which are broken down into two categories—concupiscible and irascible—and these
function in collaboration with the sensitive apprehension and the intellectual powers.
The sense appetite, according to Aquinas, is passive. Passivity can mean one of
three things, which he describes in ST I-II.22.1. First, something can be passive by virtue
Peter King, “Emotions,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and
Eleonore Stump (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 209.
32
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of receiving something without losing anything. But this is not how a passion is passive
because “this is to be perfected rather than to be passive.” The second description of
passivity is the “proper sense” of passive, and it is “when something is received, while
something else is taken away,” as when someone loses something suitable and gains
something unsuitable (such as losing health and becoming sick). The third way of being
passive is the reverse of the second, namely losing something unsuitable and gaining
something suitable (losing illness and gaining health). Aquinas contends that a body is
more clearly passive when it is drawn away from what is suitable to it (as in the second
sense of passive). Therefore, he can maintain that “when this transmutation is for the
worse, it has more of the nature of a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow
is more properly a passion than joy,” because sorrow involves the person being drawn
away from what is suitable to her.
Passions are passive potencies, according to Peter King, which means that the
soul is able to experience them, but that their experience is caused by an external object. 33
King explains that this means that a given passion arises because of something external to
the passion itself. “The external principle exercises its influence on the subject, causing a
change within it in some way, one that persists so long as the external principle continues
to exercise its influence.”34 His example is the anger that arises as a result of an insulting
comment. When I hear the comment and understand it to be insulting, anger is brought
from potentiality to actuality in my soul.35 King uses the analogy of vision, which is also

Peter King, “Aquinas on the Passions,” in Aquinas’s Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of
Norman Kretzmann, ed. Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1999), 102-103.
34
King, “Aquinas on the Passions,” 104.
35
King, “Aquinas on the Passions,” 105.
33
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a passive potency, to clarify the nature of passions. Just as a person’s eye must be moved
by an external object in order for vision to occur, so too must the sensitive appetite be
moved by an apprehension in order for a passion to occur. Both vision and passion have
an object; the eye sees something, and the passion is about something. However, whereas
the object of sight must be present, the object of passion need not be present,36 and
Aquinas says that imagination, which includes memory since it is the storehouse of
sensory impressions, can cause passions (ST I. 81.3, ad 2).
King’s description of the passions as passive potency might lead one to conclude
that “we are at the mercy of our passions” and that “passivity entails that the passions are
not voluntary.” That would be an error, he argues, and he makes a convincing case
against both of these “fallacies.”37 The first argument falls in line with the complex and
interrelated nature of the soul and its functions that we saw above. The reason that “the
passivity of the passions does not make us passive with respect to our passions”38 is that
the soul is not limited to the sensitive appetite. The sensitive appetite is part of the soul as
a whole, and the soul as a whole includes the intellect.39 The sensitive and intellective
powers of the soul work together so that, most of the time, the will consents to a given
passion in order for it to continue.40 The consent of the will answers the concern of the
second fallacy, that the passions are not voluntary, because the will consents freely. The
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integration of the sensitive and intellective powers of the human soul allows us to be
influenced by, but not completely controlled by, our passions.
Aquinas’s account of emotion involves two moments—the apprehensive
perception and the appetitive response. This is distinct from the Stoic view that emotion
is the second stage of a two-stage process. The Stoics maintain that in the first stage, the
person experiences the onset of a “first movement.” A first movement is always a
disruptive force; it is not something over which the person has control;41 and it is not a
thought.42 A first movement includes the person perceiving that something seems to be
good or bad, but this is limited to the level of appearance, and it is not yet an emotion.43
The second movement, which is voluntary,44 constitutes the emotion, and it occurs when
the person consents to the first movement by way of two judgments. The first judgment is
that the person’s apprehension that something is good or bad is accurate, and the second
judgment is that acting in response to this is apposite.45 Seneca postulates a third
movement in his discussion of anger, and this final movement occurs when a person
disobeys her reason and is carried away by emotion.46 Similar to cognitive theories, the
Stoics hold that emotions arise as evaluative judgments. However, the Stoic position that
emotions are cognitive evaluations and judgments does not mean that they think emotions
are based on proper assessments of reality. In fact, Stoics think of emotions as something
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to be eradicated from one’s soul.47 According to Knuuttila, the Stoics define emotions
rationally in terms of being evaluative judgments, but they also hold that emotions are
inherently irrational in terms of being value judgments of particular objects that ascribe a
level of importance and worth to those objects that is out of proportion with reality and
with what the wise or good person would assign.48
In Aquinas’s system, the sensitive apprehension determines the “sensibility” of
the object and presents it to the sensitive appetite. It is the sensitive appetite that then
desires the object as suitable (or rejects it as unsuitable) (ST I.80.1 ad 2). The passion is
the second “movement,” and it is not equivalent to thought. Although apprehension and
appetite occur simultaneously much of the time, logically, apprehension precedes appetite
for Aquinas (ST I.80.1). For the Stoics, the emotion is the second movement precisely
because it is thought. Thus, as do the Stoics, Aquinas places the appearance of an object
before a person’s passional response, but unlike the Stoics, his category of passion or
emotion is distinct from cognitive judgment.
The proper sense of passion in Aquinas’s thought involves a physical change in
the one whose appetite is moved (ST I-II.22.1),49 and because of this, passion is in the
sensitive rather than the intellectual appetite. The bodily change necessary for passion
means that the proper sense of passion can only be said to be in the soul accidentally, in
terms of the composite nature of humans as body and soul. The transmutation occurs in
47

Knuuttila, Emotions, 55. This is due in part to their view that emotions represent
valuing particular objects beyond what is appropriate (59). However, Knuuttila notes that
this view was considered unrealistic and “inhuman” (68).
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the body, and because the soul is composite with the body, the soul can be said to have
passions.50 Nicholas Lombardo’s interpretation of the interaction and mutual influence of
the body and soul on one another with respect to the passions is helpful in thinking about
children and their emotions. Lombardo explains that,
two main principles emerge in [Aquinas’s] discussions of body-soul
dynamics. First, the relationship between bodily aspects of passion and the
mental aspects of passion is more than accidental: the body expresses and
resembles on a physical level the experience of the soul. Second, bodily
conditions and changes have a direct bearing on our passions, since they
can make us disposed to react more or less powerfully to various stimuli.51
People’s bodies—their health, their well-being, their relative state of hunger or tiredness,
and so on—have an impact on how they interpret the world around them and experience
and express emotions.
Children’s physical discomfort can be the source of an emotion that they express,
and can sometimes be an indication to their caregivers that they need something. This can
be beneficial to children who are pre-verbal, and their fussiness or crying indicates that
they are hungry or tired or otherwise in physical need. Further, the experience of being
hungry or tired will often cause a child to react to situations differently from how she
would when full or well-rested. She might find that even small frustrations lead more
quickly than usual to a state of emotional frustration or irritation. Expressing themselves
emotionally does not solve the problem, but it does alert those around them that all is not
copacetic, and provide a moral call to provide care. If these needs go unmet on a regular
basis, the child’s perceptions of the world might be developed in a way that reflects her
physical deprivation, and this may have an impact on her emotional development.
See also ST I-II.22.3: “Passion is properly to be found where there is corporeal
transmutation. This corporeal transmutation is found in the act of the sensitive appetite.”
51
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A person’s passional experience can indicate a basic human desire, such as
hunger that leads a person to desire food, but appetites have a significance in human life
that goes beyond identifying physical needs. Lombardo offers an interpretation of
Aquinas’s view of the appetites that highlights this importance. Although Lombardo’s
treatment of appetites falls within a discussion of creation in general, his position lends
itself to a claim that appetites are good and are necessary for people to engage the world
and to grow toward fulfilling their potential. He states:
The perfection of anything is also good…and (we can infer) so too must
be the appetite that inclines it toward that perfection. In God’s plan,
creation is inherently dynamic: created imperfect and permeated with
appetite, it cannot help moving toward its perfection. Without appetite,
there would not be this dynamic movement, and creation would not move
toward its perfection. Instead, creation would stagnate. Appetite is not just
intrinsically good; it is integral to creation’s inherent dynamism.52
Without appetite, then, the person would not seek the good; she would not grow; and she
would be unable to move toward her telos of happiness in this life and the Divine Vision
in the next.53 Appetite—including sense appetite—is necessary for a person to function as
a human being and to live fully. It is important to remember that Aquinas would not give
carte blanche to appetitive desire as a catalyst to growth and human flourishing. Desire
must be directed toward good objects, and it must be ordinate with respect to reason. For
52
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example, the sensual appetite can be experienced in accord with natural law, or it can
lead to lust and to fornication of one sort or another (ST II-II.154.1).
Thus far, we have seen that, according to Aquinas, the sensitive appetite is both
passive and dynamic. The passions respond to sensible objects54 in a way that either
draws the person toward the objects or drives her away from them. They operate in a
sequence that includes three parts: inclination, movement, and rest (ST I-II.23.4). When
the object is good, the progression of passions is from love to desire to joy. The good
object first causes an inclination that Aquinas calls love, which is a “complacency in
good” (ST I-II.25.2) with respect to that object. Next, if “it be not yet possessed, it causes
in the appetite a movement towards the attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs
to the passion of ‘desire’ or ‘concupiscence.’” Finally, “when the good is obtained, it
causes the appetite to rest…and this belongs to the passion of ‘delight’ or ‘joy.’” When
the object is evil, the progression is from hatred to aversion or dislike, and finally to
sorrow or sadness (ST I-II.23.4; also ST I-II.26.2).55
The movements involved in these progressions are the concupiscible passions,
which are the appetitive power “through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is
suitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful” (ST I.81.2).56 There are
three pairs of concupiscible passions corresponding to the three-part sequence described
Peter King cautions against interpreting “sensible” too literally; on his read, “Aquinas
only means that, as the sensitive appetite depends on sensitive apprehension (perception),
its object must be capable of being perceived. He certainly does not mean to exclude nonpresent targets of the passions, and he carefully allows some passions to be directed at
things in virtue of the kind of thing they are” (King, “Aquinas on the Passions,” 110).
55
This is the order of execution of the concupiscible passions. In the order of intention,
love is last because resting in the good is the goal that drives the progression (ST III.25.2).
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Aquinas explains that “the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil,
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above. The pairs are: love and hatred, desire and aversion, and joy and sorrow (ST III.23.4). Love in this sense means a recognition and acceptance of the goodness of the
object (ST I-II.26.2). Hatred, on the other hand, has as its object evil (ST I-II.29.1), and it
arises because the object is “contrary to a suitable thing which is loved” (ST I-II.29.2). In
Aquinas’s system, hatred serves a useful purpose by inclining a person away from that
which would be detrimental to her (ST I-II.29.1).57 A simple example of a sequence of
concupiscible passions might be seeing a delicious-looking apple on the kitchen counter
and recognizing that it is good (love). The person then desires the apple, and when she
picks it up and eats it, she experiences joy in attaining that which she desired. Or, if she
sees a rotting apple, she might feel repulsed by it, be inclined to avoid it, and perhaps
seek to destroy it or discard it.
When attaining (or evading) the object of the sense appetite involves some
difficulty, Aquinas says the irascible passions are involved.58 Any good or evil that is “of
an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty.” These passions
“regard good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid” (ST I-II.23.1).
The irascible passions arise from and rest in the concupiscible (ST I-II.25.1), and for this
reason, they only occur in the middle portion of the three-part movement. The
57
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Beast: Hatred in Cross-Traditional Religious and Philosophical Perspective,” Journal of
the Society of Christian Ethics 29, no. 2 (2009): 188-191.
58
The concupiscible and irascible powers are only in the sensitive appetite; they are not
in the intellectual appetite (ST I.82.5).
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concupiscible power of love (or hatred) gives rise to desire (or aversion), and when this
desire (or aversion) involves difficulty, the irascible powers are engaged. Just as the
concupiscible powers can be categorized in contrary pairs, so too can the irascible
passions: hope for the good and despair in the face of evil that is difficult to overcome;
fear of difficult evil and daring in facing that same evil; and finally anger, which has no
contrary (ST I-II.23.4) because is arises from the presence of evil, but the presence of
good elicits no irascible passion (ST I-II.23.3; ST I.II.25.3).
The order of generation of the eleven passions (six concupiscible and five
irascible) is outlined by Aquinas based on the inclination-desire-rest sequence, and on
whether the object of the passion is good or evil, with good preceding evil. Because
hatred is aroused by an evil object that is apprehended as being contrary to a good (ST III.29.2), the good logically precedes the evil. That is, complacency in the good (love)
must exist prior to a passion that responds to something that is contrary to that good. The
order of the eleven is: “love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion; hope precedes
despair; fear precedes daring [which precedes anger]; and joy precedes sadness” (ST III.25.3). In this way, we can see that Aquinas places the passions whose object is good
prior to those whose object is evil, and the concupiscible passions give rise to and
complete the irascible.
From among these eleven passions, Aquinas highlights four as the principle
passions. Two are concupiscible and two are irascible, and they have to do with good and
evil, present and in the future. Joy and sadness are the (concupiscible) passions in which
“all the other passions have their completion and end,” and so Aquinas argues that “they
arise from all the other passions” (ST I-II.25.4). Joy arises from a present good, and
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sorrow arises from a present evil. The other pair of the principle passions, fear and hope,
“complete [all the other passions] as regards the movement of the appetite towards
something” that is in the future; hope completes the movement toward a future good, and
fear completes the movement toward a future evil (ST I-II.25.4). The Stoics also posit
four principle passions, and as Aquinas does, they categorize them according to whether
they are responding to perceived good or evil, and whether that is present or anticipated
(future). The Stoics’ four are: “distress” (present evil), “pleasure” (present good), “fear”
(future evil), and “appetite” (future good).59 Whereas Aquinas describes these four as the
passions toward which and from which all other passions arise, the Stoics’ categories
purportedly encompass all other emotions.60
Even though Aquinas’s schema proposes a more extensive list than the Stoics
offer, when we reflect on our passional experiences in terms of Aquinas’s system, the
limitation of the passions to eleven does seem to curtail fine-tuned distinctions among
emotions that cognitive theories provide tools to distinguish. The passions Aquinas
discusses in the Treatise might better be thought of as categories of passions into which
human experiences can be sorted such that, in the example we saw in chapter two of an
insulting comment, the contempt that results from a general disregard for the person
59
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making the insult, and the anger that results from the judgment that the other person’s
behavior is a wrongful affront,61 are two versions of the irascible passion arising from a
present evil (anger). Aquinas’s discussion of and reduction of various passions to these
eleven throughout the Treatise supports this read.62 When I discuss emotions below, the
role of the intellectual powers of the soul will contribute to a fuller explication of emotion
in Aquinas’s thought.
As King explains, the sensitive appetite is a response to something external—
something good or evil, present or anticipated.63 Recall that sensitive appetite follows
sensitive apprehension, and so all of these external things to which the passions respond
must be perceived by the sensitive apprehension and presented to the sensitive appetite.

Sense Appetite Works in Conjunction with Sense Apprehension
One way the sense appetite functions, in Aquinas’s system, is by being drawn to
physical objects that are apprehended through the exterior senses. He writes, “we desire
things which are apprehended through the bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses
appertain to sensuality as a preamble” (ST I.81.1, ad 1). Exterior senses apprehend
objects, which are then either desired or rejected by the sensitive appetite. The visually
appealing apple that I see on the kitchen counter becomes an object of desire because the
The example was cited in Deigh, “Concepts of Emotions,” 26.
See, for instance, Aquinas’s discussion of anger, in which he categorizes wrath, ill-will,
and the desire for vengeance as “things which give increase to anger” rather than distinct
passions (ST I-II.46.8), as contemporary theories might be inclined to do, particularly
when seeking to determine the cause of the emotion.
63
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apprehension of my sight is able to comprehend its sensible attributes, which my appetite
then desires as suitable (ST I.80.1). This type of appetitive movement is among the most
basic of the passional responses. I apprehend something; I am inclined toward it because
of its sensual appeal; I desire it; and when I have the apple and am eating it, I experience
pleasure or joy.
However, there is more involved in the appetitive movement toward the apple
than simple sight apprehension. This is evident when we consider the ways in which
infants and toddlers seem to be drawn to objects in their vicinity. They are often drawn to
objects that appeal to them visually, but they are unable to discern what about the object
is attractive to them. Often it involves contrast of light and dark, color, or movement that
simply attracts their attention. They have no way of understanding why a red apple might
be desirable the first time they see one. Their investigation of their world involves
discovering which objects are pleasant to experience with their exterior senses. As they
explore, they begin to build a memorative reserve of which objects they enjoy and which
they do not. The result is that, after several pleasant encounters with apples, a person
remembers that apples are desirable.64 The practical reason will be engaged in
determining that this particular apple is desirable.65
In this way, the interior sensory powers play a crucial role in the activation of the
sensitive appetite (ST I. 81.3, ad 2), which means that, for Aquinas, passions can be more
than mere urges or inclinations. Passions can involve memory, thought, and an
Lombardo makes a claim for the role of memory in Aquinas’s account of the formation
of the “intention” of a given object (Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 25).
65
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remember and desire an object or a category of object without abstracting a universal
concept of that object on a conscious level.
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engagement with the intellectual powers. Thus, in the example of the apple on the kitchen
counter, the memorative power is at work reminding the person of the tastiness of apples.
The person’s cogitative power is also engaged, working in conjunction with her universal
reason to discern that this particular object is an apple possessing qualities that other
apples possess, qualities such as a delicious flavor, nutrition that promotes health, and so
on.
The apprehensions of the interior sensory powers not only allow a person to
discern qualities of particular sensitive objects, but they also present the person’s
sensitive appetite with more complex objects. Robert Miner’s discussion of the causes of
passions includes an insightful look at the interior sensitive apprehension. He argues that
common sense (sensus communis) is able to evoke the appetite in ways that simple
sensory apprehensions are not. Recall that common sense is the faculty that allows a
person to observe multiple facets of an object and unify them in her perception. Miner
writes, “if I perceive a certain combination of qualities as united in the same painting, I
may be affected by the painting as a whole in a way quite different from how I would be
affected if I were only to perceive the proper sensibles of texture, color, shape, etc.,
without recognizing them as belonging to a unified object.”66 Thus, the common sense’s
unification of several individual sensory qualities results in an apprehension that is
distinct from any of those qualities in itself. Further, the interaction between sensation
and imagination can result in a passion that neither would have elicited on its own. Recall
that the imagination is how Aquinas thinks past sensory apprehensions are retained in the
soul. Because they are retained, a sensory apprehension of something here and now can
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elicit a memory of a past object or event that results in a passional response on the part of
the person perceiving and remembering that exceeds the response she would have had
without the memory.67 In addition, a person can imagine an object that is not present and
have an appetitive response to it.
Finally, in terms of the cogitative power, on Miner’s read, “the particular reason is
the capacity to arrive at estimations of utility or danger by associating sensible forms,
neutral in themselves, with stored images that are charged with pleasure or pain. As such,
it presupposes the imagination.”68 These “estimations” then move the sensitive appetite.
While animals do this instinctively, human beings must learn to discern what is good for
them and what is not.69 Returning to the example of the apple, the cogitative power must
be a cause of the appetitive movement if the appeal of the apple involves its flavor or
nutritive properties, both of which would be learned through experience, either direct
encounters with previous apples (flavor) or through being taught that fruit is beneficial to
health. Through these previous encounters, the person would have discerned that “apple”
is pleasant to eat and nutritious, and she would use her particular reason to determine that
the red object on the counter fit the category of “apple” and so has the desirable qualities
of “apple.” The cogitative power is an interior sensory power, but it is also the conduit
through which the intellectual powers interact with the sensory powers. How the intellect
influences the passions is the topic to which I now turn.
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Sense Appetite Works in Conjunction with the Intellectual Powers
Generally, the sensitive and intellective powers function simultaneously and in
cooperation with one another, and both intellectual apprehension and appetite influence
the passions. Through practical reason, the universal reason of the intellect has an indirect
impact on sense appetite. In Aquinas on the Emotions, Cates considers in some depth the
ways in which the different powers of the soul operate in collaboration with one another,
and her analysis is helpful for understanding the interplay between intellectual and
sensitive apprehension. She makes the important observation that when encountering a
sensible object, “a person is generally able to reflect on the sensible object intellectually
as well, finding it intelligible; in a rational animal the sensory powers ordinarily function
in tandem with the intellectual powers.”70 These powers can function such that they agree
with one another (the intellect discerns that the attractive object is indeed good), or such
that even though the sensory impression one has of an object is attractive, one’s intellect
tells one that it would be better to invest one’s energies elsewhere.71 This is because the
intellect is able to consider the universal qualities of goodness that a sensually attractive
object has for a person’s overall pursuit of true happiness. Specifically, “it is the power of
the intellect that allows one to consider forms of union with sensible objects as
intermediate ends with respect to one’s highest end.”72 This is the function of the
syllogism of the universal and particular reason noted above (see ST I.81.3). When
considering a particular object, the intellectual apprehension provides a standard of
goodness on a universal level that the particular reason is then able to compare with the
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qualities the sensitive apprehension has perceived in the object, and then the person can
determine the advantages of this particular object for her. This process of discerning
useful and advantageous qualities in particular objects is vital to human beings because
we do not live in the universal—we live in the material world as hylomorphic beings
pursuing our telos. As Cates puts it,
humans rarely wish simply and abstractly to unite with goodness as such.
Usually we wish to unite with particular objects in respect of their
goodness. In tending toward good things, we tend toward possibilities for
ourselves and for others that we cannot help but imagine, in some form,
with reference to phantasms, examples, or experiences. If a way of uniting
with a prospective good strikes us as significant for our well-being, partly
through the use of our interior sensory powers, then our sensory appetite is
likely to become engaged.73
I think Cates is correct that humans strive toward their goal of happiness that comes
through uniting with the good by seeking that good in particular objects and encounters,
and this is possible because of the intellect’s collaboration with sensitive appetite.
Lombardo also agrees with Cates on this point, and he explains how being able to
encounter and discern the good in particular objects results in appetitive movements
toward those objects. He makes the case that the apprehensive powers, both intellectual
and sensory, work collaboratively in practice and produce the “intention” a person has
about a given object.74 Intentions result from the interior sensory apprehensive power of
cogitation, as discussed above in the section on sensory apprehension. However, the
cogitative power, as we saw, does not operate in isolation; it functions as a medium
between sensory and intellectual apprehension. For this reason, Lombardo argues that
Aquinas distinguishes between sense and intellectual “cognition” as a
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structural clarification, and that they should be understood as usually
simultaneous and mutually interpenetrating. The kind of apprehension that
elicits passion is more than sheer perception. It involves both kinds of
cognition and includes shaping the perception into a coherent object from
an undifferentiated blur of data, and some evaluation of the sensible object
vis-à-vis the subject. Aquinas refers to the sense perception of an object
combined with cognitive evaluation of its relevance to the subject’s
interests as an “intention.”75
According to Lombardo’s description, intentions are necessary for perceiving the value a
given object has for a person and her goals, and intentions also impact the sensitive
appetite by presenting it with a “coherent object” whose perceived value will likely elicit
an appetitive response. As Cates argues (above), people do not usually respond
emotionally to universal and abstract concepts of goodness, but they can respond to the
goodness in particular objects, which they understand by way of the particular reason or
cogitative power. Further, Lombardo proposes that “the concept of intention is necessary
in Aquinas’s account to explain how memories shape the passions.” Repeated encounters
with the same or similar objects will be stored in memory and will then be transferred as
intentions either to those objects or to new objects that evoke memories of the original
objects. His example is a basket of visually appealing apples, several of which we try and
find to be tasteless and mealy. Following these experiences, which are then stored in our
memories, we will cease to find the apples desirable, despite their visual beauty.76
It is clear that the intellectual powers work in collaboration with the sensitive
apprehensive powers—both interior and exterior—in applying universals to particular
objects or experiences that will often lead to a movement of the appetite. This means that
as a person gains experience, she will simultaneously abstract universals from particulars
and apply those universals to new particulars by way of intentions. Young children who
75
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are exploring their environments are gaining a storehouse of particulars from which their
intellects will begin to abstract the universals. Those abstractions can then be applied to
new particular objects in ways that involve intentions and that might elicit emotions.
Further, through encounters with particular goods, children will be able to abstract the
concept of universal goodness. This is because the human intellect gains knowledge by
abstracting universal concepts from particular objects (ST I.84.8). The developing
conception of universal good then functions with the practical reason to evaluate the
goodness of other objects. In these experiences with other objects, the child (or adult, for
that matter) has the opportunity to abstract further understanding of universal goodness,
and so on. The sensitive and intellectual powers work together, mutually informing one
another, and as a result, they also influence the passions.
When a person experiences a passion, the will becomes engaged and either grants
or withholds its consent with respect to the passion. In this way, the intellectual appetite
influences human passions. Whereas animals’ movements follow directly from their
sense appetites (ST I.81.3), humans possess a “superior appetite” in the will, which is the
source of movement in humans. Aquinas writes, “man is not moved at once, according to
the irascible and concupiscible appetites: but he awaits the command of the will, which is
the superior appetite. For wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, the
second only moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower appetite is not sufficient to
cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents” (ST I.81.3, sed contra). Elsewhere,
Aquinas writes that passions can arise on their own, but the will provides the necessary
consent to their continuation. “Although the will cannot prevent the movement of
concupiscence from arising…it is in the power of the will not to will to desire or not to
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consent to concupiscence. And thus is does not necessarily follow the movement of
concupiscence” (ST I-II.10.3, ad 1). By consenting to a given sensitive appetite, the will
permits the passion to continue and to be experienced by the person.
The Stoics also maintained that first movements are involuntary.77 Their
distinction between the first movement and the person’s acquiescence to the appearance
of good or evil hinges on the person’s judgment being in agreement with the appearance.
Richard Sorabji argues that in the Stoics’ thought, assent is given to propositions.78 For
this reason, the Stoic view of emotion is susceptible to the same critiques that Deigh
levied against the strictly cognitive theories of emotion in chapter 2. At the same time,
because judgment is engaged in the transition from first movement to emotion, the
implication is that people have a choice in whether or not to consent to a given first
movement. The Christian Evagrius takes this notion of consent and incorporates it into a
theory of sin. A person cannot control when she experiences first movements, which
Evagrius describes as thoughts and temptations, but she can control whether she allows
the thoughts to continue.79 Evagrius claims that permitting herself to take pleasure in
these thoughts is sin.80
Aquinas’s account of the influences of the sensitive appetites does not necessarily
equate them with sinful inclinations, and he posits a direct influence of intellectual
powers on the passions. Cates interprets him as saying that the will’s consent to emotions

77

Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind, 69.
Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind, 41.
79
Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind, 358-359.
80
Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind, 360. Knuuttila explains that Evagrius was writing
for monks, for whom thoughts presented the primary source of temptation (Knuuttila,
Emotions, 141). Evagrius’s articulation of eight cardinal thoughts to be eradicated (143)
was later adapted into the Christian categories of the seven cardinal sins (142).
78

166

is as follows: “The ‘will as agent’ moves the sensory appetite, in particular, by allowing
particular sensory-appetitive motions to continue in their initial form, by allowing those
motions to continue in some other form, as directed by reason, or by disallowing their
continuation, such that one tries to stop them in their course.”81 Her summary of the ways
in which the will can affect passion approaches the issue of a person’s responsibility to
control emotion, which will be taken up in chapter four.
For Aquinas, the intellectual soul’s influence on the sensitive appetite means that
humans are not at the mercy of their passions. Further, it is this influence that allows the
cultivation of emotions that can benefit a person in her moral life. In the next section, I
aim to show how Aquinas’s account of the interaction among the powers of the soul
results in a description of emotions that can be used to understand how children, through
their emotional lives, are able to participate in a moral community.

Aquinas on the Emotions
The interaction that Aquinas posits among the various powers of the soul in
bringing about a response of the sensitive appetite points to the rich resources of his
thought in terms of human emotions. Although he does not write about emotions as we
understand them today, Aquinas’s account can make a constructive contribution to
contemporary thought on emotion. This section on emotions contains two main parts: the
first considers the relationship between reason and passion, and the second focuses on
drawing together the themes from the rest of the chapter into a unified description of
Aquinas’s conception of human emotion.
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The Rule of Reason and the Passions
In order for the passions to be moral in Aquinas’s schema, they must be under the
rule of reason (ST I-II.24.3). Although Aquinas thinks the passions have a level of
freedom of their own, he also holds that being under the rule of reason comes naturally to
the passions and does not violate this freedom. In justifying his position, Aquinas
differentiates between passions in irrational animals and passions in human beings.
Passions in irrational animals arise “from necessity and not from free-will. Such is, in
irrational animals, the ‘sensitive appetite,’ which, however, in man, has a certain share of
liberty, in so far as it obeys reason” (ST I-II.26.1). This argument suggests that because
human sensitive appetite can obey reason, the passions themselves possess a level of
freedom, and at the same time that human agents are not necessarily subject to their
passions. The alternative to the passions’ being able to obey reason is that passions would
arise as necessary responses to apprehensions, which is what happens in irrational
animals, who possess no freedom with regard to their passions. For Aquinas, then, the
passions’ being under the rule of reason is a positive thing. If the human passions were
not by nature amenable to reason, the rule of reason would do violence to the passions.
They are, however, inclined to obey reason, as Aquinas explains: “the sensitive powers
have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason…in so far as they obey reason, in
a certain sense they are said to be rational” (ST I-II.50.3, ad 1).82
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Lombardo makes the point that passions do not obey the whole intellect, but only obey
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The sensitive appetite is not itself rational, but it is rational by its participation in
human reason. According to Aquinas, “it is manifest that the sensitive powers are
rational, not by their essence, but only by participation” (ST I-II.50.4). Because of this,
Aquinas is able to propose that passions are under the command of reason in a way that
does not do violence to them but cooperates with their natural inclinations.83 Passions
come under the rule of universal reason by way of the particular reason. Aquinas states:
[The cogitative power] compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man
the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason. But this
same particular reason is naturally guided and moved according to the
universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions
are drawn from universal propositions. Therefore it is clear that the
universal reason directs the sensitive appetite, which is divided into
concupiscible and irascible; and this appetite obeys it (ST I.81.3).84
Because practical reason functions by way of syllogisms, such that the universal
principles known in the intellect are applied to particular situations, intellectual reason
directs practical reason, which guides the sensitive appetite with a natural kind of rule
which the passions are inclined to obey.

The primacy of reason over the passions follows from Aquinas’s teleological ordering
of the human soul, according to Mark Jordan. In Aquinas’s teleological hierarchy, reason
is above passion, and thus the passions come under the rule of reason (Mark D. Jordan,
“Aquinas’s Construction of a Moral Account of the Passions,” Freiburger Zeitschrift Für
Philosophie Und Theologie 33, no. 1-2 [1986]: 95). Jordan bases this idea in part on the
lack of moral exhortation within the “Treatise on the Passions,” which he says points to
the function of passion within the Summa. Namely, Aquinas’s goal “is not to lead one to
choose the good, but to place in one’s possession a clear knowledge of the ways that lead
to a good already chosen” (96). Aquinas assumes that his readers have “already been
passionately converted by the Gospel,” and so they have already chosen the proper good
in terms of the hierarchy of the soul (97).
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reason is the key to perfecting the passions” (Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions,
82).
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In addition to the passions’ possessing the freedom of an “inborn aptitude” to
acquiesce to reason’s commands, human freedom with regard to the passions also follows
from the passions’ having “something of their own” by which they can resist reason. This
does not mean that they must resist reason, just that it is possible for them to resist, and
on this basis, Aquinas describes reason’s rule as political rather than despotic. Despotic
rule is likened to the rule over slaves, where they are unable to “resist in any way”
because “they have nothing of their own.” The soul rules the body in this way (ST I.81.3,
ad 2). In political or royal rule, the subjects have “something of their own,” which means
that, although they are subject to the authority of the leader, they “can resist the orders of
him who commands.” Therefore, according to Aquinas, the sensitive appetite
has something of its own, by virtue of which it can resist the commands of
reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved… in man by the
cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the
imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible
and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or
imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which
reason commands (ST I.81.3, ad 2).85
Even if a person knows what is right or good with her reason, her passions might have a
contrary response to it, such that she wants to do what she knows to be wrong, or does
not want to do what she knows is right or good.
Aquinas’s account of the passions’ freedom in relation to reason distinguishes
passions such that they cannot be equated with thoughts or judgments. At the same time,
his system integrates reason with passion as a naturally occurring and desirous state,
although one that does not occur necessarily. His theory accommodates those occasions
when our emotions run contrary to our thoughts, something that the strictly cognitive
theories of emotion are less well-equipped to handle because they claim that emotions are
85
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constituted by evaluative judgments. While the case can be made that there are
simultaneous but contradictory evaluative judgments and so contradictory emotions in the
cognitive theory system, Aquinas’s distinction accounts for the experience of disjunction
between what we hold to be true and good and what we sometimes want because his
system distinguishes evaluative judgment from desire.
The way in which the passions obey reason and whether they are beneficial or
something to be overcome is debated among some interpreters of Thomas Aquinas.
Elisabeth Uffenheimer-Lippens explains that passions can be beneficial in human life
because of their participation in reason. She writes,
according to Thomas, the sensitive soul can obey reason…and is meant to
obey reason…. By its very nature the sensitive soul is directed toward
reason and open to its influence…. If this original, mutual relationship
between reason and the passions of the soul did not exist, the influence of
reason on the passions would be an act of violence, and further, the
passions would never be able to constitute a positive contribution to the
human act.86
The passions are naturally amenable to being ruled by reason, but at the same time, they
have “a dimension of something uncontrollable,” and it is this dynamic—the tendency to
obey reason as well as the “independence of the passions”—that results in the political
relationship rather than the despotic, according to Aquinas.87 In other words,
Uffenheimer-Lippens concludes that reason must rule politically (rather than
despotically) as a consequence of the “something of their own” possessed by the
passions, and at the same time, the independence and rule-ability of the passions makes
them constructive contributors to human acts. Reason increases the qualities of passion
Elisabeth Uffenheimer-Lippens, “Rationalized Passions and Passionate Rationality:
Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Reason and the Passions,” The Review of
Metaphysics 56, no. 3 (2003): 543.
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that are already inclined toward reason, and it diminishes “their unpredictable and
uncontrollable character,” thus lessening the reactive dimension of passions’ arousal by
impacting the apprehensive or evaluative perception upon which they are based.88
Reason can exert its influence over passion either before or after passion arises.
Claudia Eisen Murphy clarifies the role of reason at different moments of the emotional
experience by demonstrating that reason can exercise control over the passions either by
instigating a passion or by controlling the passion once it is aroused. Some passions arise
directly and often obviously from reason (by way of particular reason) or from overflow
of the will,89 and they are consistent with our perception of the good in a universal
sense.90 An example of this might be the syllogism mentioned above in which the person
desires and eats the apple in order to promote health. In these cases, the reasoned
judgment can be said to be the cause of the passion;91 the benefit of the apple leads to the
desire for the apple. This is not the same as saying that the judgment of the apple’s
goodness is itself the passion or emotion, as cognitive theories purport. The Stoic view
concurs with that of the cognitive theories, and for them the judgment that the apple is
good and therefore something to which they should react (worth eating) is the emotion.92
Murphy maintains Aquinas’s differentiation between apprehension (perceiving or judging
that the apple is good) and appetite (wanting the apple). One helpful result of the
distinction is that, in human experience, some passions arise from the sense or the
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imagination, and these do not have reasoned judgments as their cause,93 although these
passions can still depend on reason in a non-causal way in cases where the person’s will
consents to the passion.94 For instance, if I feel suddenly delighted by the taste of
chocolate, my sense of taste might be the immediate cause of the passion, but in order for
delight to continue, my will must consent to it.
Thus, according to Murphy, Aquinas’s system involves a two-part understanding
of reason’s relationship to passion, either as the source of passions that arise from
reasoned judgments or as the consent needed for passions to continue when they are
caused by encounters with objects of sense or imagination. However, given Aquinas’s
commitment to the integrated nature of the soul, I do not think the distinction should be
overdone. As we have seen from the discussions of the interrelation among the sensitive
and intellectual powers, as well as their cumulative effect and mutual influence on one
another, it is fair to say that some emotions arise from a conscious consideration of
universal good and others do not, but it is also plausible to say that emotions that are not
caused by reason can contain the indirect influence of reason. That is, given that the
intellect and sense depend on one another for human beings to engage and interact with
the world, it is possible that some seemingly spontaneous emotions include an aspect of
universal understanding of goodness in their causes, although this is not true of all
spontaneous emotions, particularly those of young children who might not have had time
to abstract universals from their particular experiences.

These passions stem from our “cognition of objects as having naturally attractive
properties” that we perceive to be “sensory goods that naturally move my sensory
appetite, but won’t be able to appeal to goodness in general, or overall” (Murphy,
“Aquinas on Our Responsibility,” 189-190).
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The idea of spontaneous emotions is an instance in which Aquinas’s account goes
beyond exclusively cognitive theories of emotion. Cognitive theories, as we have seen,
claim that evaluative judgments constitute emotions, and in so doing they exclude
children whose cognitive powers do not yet function on the propositional level.95
Aquinas’s theory allows for the sensitive appetite to function non-propositionally because
sense appetite is a passional response to an object, and it serves as the building block for
more complex emotional experiences. While reason is ideally the ruler of the passions, it
is plausible that passions’ independence allows them to function in the moral lives of
those people whose rational powers are undeveloped. At the same time, in order to
become complex emotions, the spontaneous passions must be incorporated into the other
powers of the person’s soul, including (when she is able), the person’s reason. Because of
the nature of the passions themselves, the way reason brings even spontaneous passions
under its rule must be political.
Not all scholars agree with Murphy and Uffenheimer-Lippens, however. In terms
of bringing the passions under reason’s rule, Leonard Ferry takes a different position and
sees no dissimilarity between political and despotic rule.96 He understands passion’s
ability to resist reason as a negative quality.97 Ferry makes this claim in response to
Miner, who thinks that there is a difference between bringing the passions under perfect
subjection to reason by way of political rule, and the despotic rule that would dominate
them.98 When Ferry discusses the relationship between passions and reason in Aquinas,
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he conflates political and despotic rule. Ferry asserts “that there is really no difference to
the distinction between control-as-subordination and control-as-domination,”99 and he
states that “in trying to understand what Aquinas has to say about the emotions it makes
better sense to treat domination, subordination, and perfect subjection as largely
synonymous terms.”100
Ferry misses the distinction between the two types of rule that results from
Aquinas’s position that the passions are to be shaped by reason, not dominated by it, and
that this is a natural occurrence. Although the passions can and sometimes do resist or
rebel, as Miner shows,101 they are naturally inclined to obey reason and often cooperate
with it. The difference is between shaping an emotion in a way that elicits cooperation so
that it willingly agrees with reason (political rule), and forcing or demanding obedience
(tyrannical rule), which, as Uffenheimer-Lippens points out, would do violence to the
passions.102 Let us assume for a moment that reason did dominate the passions
despotically. Such a situation would do violence to the passions and would not result in
the integration of a person’s thinking, feeling, and willing that is part of virtue for
Aquinas. Further, it seems plausible that passions that are forced into submission through
domination would use their independence to rebel more frequently than those that
acquiesce through shaping and cooperation. On the other hand, those passions that are
molded by the political rule of reason might be more likely to respond in a manner in
keeping with reason in new and unexpected situations. It seems that the ruling style that
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is used can affect whether the passions are amenable to continuing to obey reason as the
person strives to live a life that approaches virtue.
Ferry’s consideration of the passions in Aquinas’s account leaves him skeptical
about the potential of the passions to contribute to good living.103 His point is worth
remembering since Aquinas does not say that the passions are unqualifiedly good. Ferry
concludes, “the passions are disruptive and threatening. They can contribute to human
good, but they can also endanger it by undermining the resources that rationality can
bring to bear in our practical decision-making.”104 His concern should be kept in mind,
but so too should Aquinas’s contention that passions are (in general) naturally inclined
toward the good, however that is perceived.105 They are naturally designed to be
responses to apprehensions and to draw people toward their telos of happiness in this life
(ST I.82.1) and the divine vision in the next (ST I-II.2.8; ST I.12.1). Aquinas is realistic
that the passions have the potential to derail a person’s striving for virtue, in part because
spontaneous and strong emotions can influence action in a way that is contrary to what
the person would choose when engaging her reason (ST I-II.77.2).106 At the same time, as
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we saw in chapter two, the independence of the passions that keeps them distinct from
reason allows them to be a source of information regarding a person’s perceptions of the
objects she encounters, and this can be influential in her moral life. This constructive
function of emotions will be suffocated if reason rules them despotically.
It is clear that reason can mold human passion, but it is also possible to argue on
Thomistic grounds that emotions affect reason. One way this can happen is if a particular
kind of emotion recurs and is repeatedly consented to by the will. In these instances, the
passions arise, and the will’s consent allows them to continue. Then, because they are
permitted to persist, these emotions can become part of the way the person responds to
and rationally interprets the world.107 Another way of looking at passion’s impact on
reason is to recall that Aquinas holds that the way people come to understand universals
is through abstracting from particulars. It is plausible that the particulars from which the
universals are abstracted will include an appetitive component. The influence of the
passions on the intellect can certainly go badly and lead a person away from good living,
but the effect is not necessarily negative. For instance, a person might learn the concept
of “dog” in a detached way, but if she has interacted with dogs, her concept of “dog”
might include the emotional component of these encounters, perhaps pleasure if she has
liked dogs, or fear if she has been attacked by them.108

the Passions Back In: The Emotions in Political Philosophy, ed. Rebecca Kingston
[Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008], 104). The more complex the cognitive participation, the
more responsible the person is for the resulting emotion (81).
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Aquinas does not think that passions, even with their independence, are
something to be feared or avoided—a point that is crucial for thinking about their role in
children’s morality. Rather, they are to be shaped and guided by reason so that they
contribute to the moral life. The mutual influence of the passions and the other powers of
the soul, some of which I just mentioned, is helpful in developing a description of the
complex human experience of emotion.

Human Emotions
Describing a discrete moment of appetite or apprehension can be useful for
specifying the powers of the soul and their distinctions, but it is artificial in terms of
human experience because those moments are extracted from a person’s life, which is
lived as an organic whole rather than as a series of disconnected moments. In chapter
one, we saw that contemporary Christian theology of children, particularly as expressed
by Rahner, presents an understanding of life as a unified whole, of which childhood and
past experiences are a part. Past apprehensions and appetites have a cumulative influence
on the person and her subsequent experiences. Aquinas holds that “The sensitive appetite
has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite,…but the rational powers of
apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers” (ST I-II.50.3,
ad 3). This mutual influence means that the different powers of the soul are able to work
together. Kevin White explains,
If the human intellect is not fully an intellect without sense-powers,
neither is it wholly itself without two further powers: will, the tendency
following from its own universal apprehensions, and sense-appetite, the
tendency following from the time-and-place-conditioned apprehensions of
its sense-powers. The completed intellectual power of the human soul as
an intellectual substance is constituted by intellect, senses, will, and the
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sense-appetite together. Sense-appetite and its movements, the passions,
are themselves “intellectual”—present on account of the intellect—in the
human soul.109
Apprehensions and appetites, intellectual and sensory, and their interactions with one
another accumulate in the person’s storehouse of experiences, and they affect her future
interactions with the world, both how she interprets her surroundings and how she
responds to them.
It follows, then, that Aquinas’s account of passions presents them as being more
complex than simply being instinctive urges or inclinations toward particular objects
irrespective of the rest of the person’s thoughts and appetites. Aquinas’s discussion of
passions rather than emotions makes it difficult to determine exactly how his theory
corresponds to our contemporary understanding of emotion, and scholars debate which
aspects of the person’s experiences should be definitive of emotion. Some scholars
equate Aquinas’s passions with emotion, which requires that emotions include a physical
component, while others claim that the intellectual category of (non-corporeal) affection
is sufficient for emotion. One of the difficulties scholars face in studying Aquinas on the
emotions, and one of the reasons for the debate over what in Aquinas’s theory qualifies as
an emotion, is that Aquinas did not provide an explicit account of emotion as we
understand it today. As Lombardo puts it, “The central difficulty in reconstructing
Aquinas’s account of emotion is that Aquinas never wrote about emotion. He wrote about
appetites, passions, affections, habitus, virtues, vices, grace, and many other subjects that
relate to the contemporary category of emotion, but the word ‘emotion’ has no direct
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parallel in the Latin vocabulary of the thirteenth century.”110 In this section, I will explore
the complexity of the concept of emotions in Aquinas’s thought with an eye to showing
how the integration of intellect and sense in the human person allows us to think of the
passions, in their collaboration with other powers of the soul, as emotions. In what
follows, I find the arguments that posit a physical dimension in the experience of emotion
to be convincing, given an incarnational, hylomorphic, Christian anthropology.
One way scholars understand emotion in Aquinas’s thought concludes that
passion is not necessary for an experience to be an emotion, and they argue that the
Thomistic category of affection is emotion. This line of scholarship portrays emotion as
only sometimes an embodied experience, and it does not require a physical dimension
(including the sensory powers) for an emotion to occur. Jettisoning the physical
dimension of emotion does not bring these interpretations into the realm of strictly
cognitive theories. Nussbaum and other cognitive theorists hold that emotion does not
require a physical component, but they also equate emotions with evaluative
judgments,111 which is distinct from what the scholars here are doing. The Thomistic
scholars to whom I am referring advance a definition of emotion that includes affections
of the intellect in addition to sensitive appetitive responses, which they base in part on
Aquinas’s statement about affections in the Summa: “Love, concupiscence, and the like
can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions…. They may,
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however be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or
commotion of the soul, and thus they are acts of the will” (ST I.82.5, ad 1).112
Anastasia Scrutton appraises the distinction between passions (as corporeal) and
affections (as emotions that do not involve the body) to be a result of Aquinas’s argument
for the possibility of something resembling emotions in God. She interprets Aquinas to
say that “real emotional feeling and personal involvement with creation is attributed to
God, and yet this is never contrary to God’s reason and will, and never results in
fickleness or infidelity to the world.”113 Scrutton asserts that, in Aquinas, “passions are
viewed as involuntary, in the sense of not authorized by the will, while affections are
both voluntary and active.”114 She also agrees that passions involve a physical change,
while “affects and affections are not necessarily related to the physical.”115 Her
suggestion for solving the passion-emotion debate is to stop using the term emotion with
respect to Aquinas’s thought, and to return to “the Augustinian-Thomist distinction
between passions as extreme and overpowering feelings, and affections as feelings that
are in accordance with reason and the will.”116 Scrutton seems to be arguing that some
passions arise on their own, and if the will consents to these, they become affections. But
she also appears to understand affections as including both consented-to passions and
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incorporeal acts of the will.117 Therefore, her distinction is between sense appetites,
which are passions, and intellectual appetites, which are affections, but neither is properly
called emotion. In fact, she suggests avoiding the term emotion when discussing
Aquinas’s thought, and using the more exact vocabulary of passion and affection.118 Such
a distinction might be helpful for precision when discussing Aquinas’s work, but if we
want to bring the richness of his thought into conversation with current scholarship, we
must strive to determine how that thought corresponds to contemporary understandings
of human emotional experience. Further, Scrutton’s separation of passion and affection
does not account for the mutual influence of the powers of the soul that we saw above is
one of the constructive elements of Aquinas’s thought.
Thomas Dixon’s argument has echoes of Scrutton’s, but it goes further is its
separation of passions and affections. He writes that, for Aquinas, the “passions proper
involved physiological modification and were ungodly. Affections were acts of will,
therefore they involved no bodily disobedience, and were quite godly.”119 On his read of
Aquinas, “passions proper were diseases or disturbances in so far as they were allowed to
run wild. However, once under the control of reason, these passions were tamed to
become acts of movements of the will, which were quite proper parts of virtuous
living.”120 According to his interpretation, the goal is to bring passions under the control
of reason so that they cease to be base passions and become acts of will, or affections,
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whose objects are incorporeal.121 On Dixon’s read, the passions that are directed toward
physical or worldly objects (including other people) are among the vicious passions and
affections. Emotions, on the other hand, are good and consist of those movements that are
acts of will (“rational and voluntary”) and are directed toward an “incorporeal ideal.”
Thus, he contends that for Aquinas the “reason – passion dichotomy was decidedly not a
reason – emotion dichotomy.”122 Dixon’s negative interpretation of the passions in
Aquinas’s thought123 disallows his viewing them as naturally inclined toward the good or
as that through which we constructively encounter, engage, and interact with the world.
Further, his read denies the physical dimension of the hylomorphic anthropology
undergirding Aquinas’s thought on human beings. Human beings live in the material
world and must interact with that world. It is through our living in the world that we are
able, in this life, to acquire virtue and to strive toward happiness. Dixon’s insistence that
emotions are directed toward incorporeal objects (perhaps a notion of universal good)
does not resonate with real human experience which seeks the good in particulars.
Lombardo’s critique of Dixon includes several clarifications of Dixon’s read of
Aquinas. First, Lombardo corrects Dixon’s understanding of the passion-affection
distinction and explains that sometimes passions and affections are referred to
interchangeably by Aquinas himself. Further, passions, contrary to Dixon’s dismal view
of them, are important to the pursuit of virtue. Lombardo notices that Aquinas “regards
passion as essential to virtue,” and that by placing passion in the sense appetite, Aquinas
opens the possibility of virtuous passions. The passions naturally incline us toward what
121
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is good (ST I.81.2), as well as toward “happiness and moral excellence.” Finally, Dixon’s
constrained categorization of passions as having corporeal objects and affections as being
inclined toward incorporeal ideals is too strict. As we have seen, the sensory and
intellectual powers interact and do not function in isolation from one another in a human
being. Because of this, “virtuous passions may well respond to abstract ideals, either by
being shaped by rational considerations or by sharing by overflow in the affections of the
will. Similarly, the affections of the will may rejoice or sorrow virtuously in sense objects
(see ST I-II.31.3, 34.1, 34.4).”124 Lombardo’s critique is valid, and it helps to correct the
strict dichotomy that Dixon sets up between passion and affection, between the material
world and the incorporeal ideal, which in human life are not as mutually exclusive as
Dixon wants to make them.
Lombardo’s own view of the affections approaches a more integrated
understanding of the human person in Aquinas’s thought in terms of the human being as
a body-soul composite and the place of the passions within that schema. Lombardo
argues for defining emotion as affection rather than as passion. Although he notes that
“affection…is never explicitly defined by Aquinas,”125 which makes defining emotion in
terms of affection something of a challenge, he reads Aquinas such that all passions are
affections, but not all affections are passions. “Aquinas should be seen as advocating a
theory of emotion that equates emotion with intentional feeling, views emotion as
intrinsically dependent on cognition (including perception), and usually but not
necessarily involving the body, and limits emotion’s extension to discrete psychological
events, thus excluding long-term affective dispositions from being considered
124
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emotions.”126 By “discrete psychological events,” I understand Lombardo to be saying
that an emotion is a particular experience in time, not that it is isolated from the rest of
the person’s life and experiences. On his read, “for Aquinas, the category of affection
denotes a class of psychological phenomena that includes both movements of the sense
appetite and movements of the intellectual appetite, that is, the will. Unlike passion,
affection does not necessarily imply either corporeality or passivity.”127 Unlike Floyd and
Scrutton, he thinks that affection is a category broad enough to include the passions, but
also to include acts of will that do not involve corporeal change. In making this claim,
Lombardo is arguing in a manner reminiscent of Nussbaum’s, that emotion can and often
does involve the body, but that it does not need to.128 Lombardo’s theorizing about noncorporeal affections is consistent with Aquinas’s claim that the operations of the intellect
do not require the body (ST I.75.2), but it is important to remember that all human
experience is embodied, so that if there are emotions that do not involve physical change,
they still occur within a hylomorphic creature.
Cates explicitly rejects the identification of Aquinas’s category of affection with
emotion. She focuses her study of emotion on Aquinas’s view of the passions as they
occur in embodied humans.129 She argues: “In my view, what Aquinas says about the
affections that we experience as embodied being is best understood by starting with the
emotions and then considering how the emotions function in relation to motions of the
will.”130 Her starting point is the human being, body and soul, and from this she considers
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the intellectual affections. She argues that affections and passions differ in Aquinas’s
thought in that “affections are ‘simple acts of the will’ that are ‘in one’s own command.
An act of the will…cannot be ‘sensible.’… An act of the will can, however, cause a
related motion of the sensory appetite which can be ‘sensed.’ Passions or emotions are
motions of the sensory appetite. They are always constituted, in part, by bodily changes.
They are subject to the power of the will but are not always obedient.”131 For Cates, then,
the passions (emotions) maintain a level of independence from the movements of the will
(affections). Lombardo, on the other hand, begins with affections and interprets
emotion—including passion—in light of the person’s intellect, which is not necessarily,
on his view, responding to the sensible world. I find Cates’s interpretation of Aquinas on
the affections and emotion convincing, and I will return to it below.
Loughlin’s position is somewhat comparable to Lombardo’s, but he successfully
navigates the possibility of intellectual emotions without separating them from the whole
person. Loughlin maintains that human beings experience both intellectual emotions and
sensitive emotions, and these share some characteristics but differ in others. Intellectual
and sensitive emotions are similar in that “the emotions attributable to, or having their
genesis in, the rational appetite are described by Thomas as they show a likeness to a
central characteristic of sensitive emotion, namely, the approach to and withdrawal from
the conveniens and inconveniens respectively.”132 The differences are that emotions of
the sensitive appetite involve a physical change and are directed toward particular objects
as specifically suitable or not, while the emotions arising from the rational appetite do not
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require a physical change, and they are able to take into account both the particular
suitability of an object “as well as a more universal good or evil, but both with respect to
the very reasons for the appetibility of something.”133 This second type of emotion seems
to draw on the particular reason, which is in the sensitive apprehension but is influenced
by and in conversation with the intellectual and universal powers of the soul. The
intellectual emotions, then, occur in relationship to the sensitive soul, even if there is no
perceptible physical change. Loughlin’s distinction does not hold a place for noncorporeal affections of the will that are unrelated to the sensible world, as some of the
other accounts do, and his assessment upholds the complexity of emotion that comes
from its association with both sense and intellect.
Other scholars contend that passions are a necessary part of emotion, but
emotions are not reducible to passions. Shawn Floyd suggests that, because human beings
are embodied, we experience our emotions as necessarily involving a physical change. 134
At the same time, he states that the emotions in living, embodied humans are not
equivalent to the passions. Emotions are constituted by the passions working in
conjunction with the person’s cognitive powers. “If emotion has a cognitive component,
which I will assume without further argument, then it appears that what we call emotion
consists for Aquinas in two acts: an apprehension of good or bad plus a passion. On this
view, it seems appropriate to reserve the term passion for the sort of changes that attend
sense appetite and emotion (and here I mean human emotion) for the combination of
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cognition and passion.”135 On Floyd’s read, it is possible to maintain that people’s more
instinctive responses to sense objects are properly called passions and their more complex
and advanced appetites are emotions. His distinction is reminiscent of the Stoic theory
that first movements are impulses of one sort or another and that the cognitive judgment
regarding the first movement constitutes the emotion,136 although his definition combines
the two movements and maintains a place for passion in emotion. Still, on Floyd’s read,
the passion is not an emotion until the cognitive powers become involved. To a degree,
his definition resonates with experience. There is clearly a significant difference between
complex experiences of love for a parent, for instance, and feeling the urge to eat
chocolate. Other cases will be more ambiguous and determining where exactly the line of
demarcation between passion and emotion might lie could prove difficult, particularly
given Aquinas’s understanding of the integrated relationship among intellectual and
sensory powers. Floyd’s point can be helpful for underscoring that there is a difference
between spontaneous sensory attraction and more complex emotional experiences,
although the requirement of cognition does make his description vulnerable to the
critique against exclusively cognitive theories in that it seems to exclude children’s
having emotions.
A third approach to Aquinas on emotion leans on his complicated and multilayered cumulative description of the powers of the soul, and it allows us to establish a
place for young children as agents in the moral community by virtue of their emotions. At
Floyd, “Aquinas on Emotion,” 168. Ferry’s read is similar: “Acts of the sensitive
appetite, accompanied by bodily change, are called passions. Acts of the will are not. Yet
the same emotion terms (such as love, joy, and delight) describe the acts of each of the
appetites, intellectual and sensitive. This means that we use such terms analogously, not
univocally” (Ferry, “Troubling Business,” 106).
136
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the beginning of his essay on the emotions in Aquinas’s thought, Peter King explains that
“Aquinas’s theory of the emotions (passiones animae) is cognitivist, somatic, and
taxonomical: cognitivist because he holds that cognition is essential to emotion; somatic
because he holds that their physiological manifestations are partially constitutive of
emotions; taxonomical because he holds that emotions fall into distinct natural kinds that
are hierarchically ordered.”137 King interprets Aquinas’s passions to be emotions, which
necessitates the inclusion of the physical aspect of emotional experience because passions
are necessarily corporeal. On his read, Aquinas’s theory is much like contemporary
perception theories, particularly in that in this system, emotions are “modes of
engagement with the world.”138 This engagement with the world—the material world in
which humans live as embodied beings—lends itself to the conclusion that the physical
aspect of emotions cannot be jettisoned in Aquinas’s thought. Simon Harak agrees, and
he argues that, given that human beings are hylomorphic, the body is always involved in
emotions.139 As we saw in chapter two, Harak also identifies emotion and passion,
arguing that an incarnational theological anthropology cannot maintain a dualism that
separates mind from body,140 or emotion from body.141
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Cates explains emotion in Aquinas’s thought by equating Aquinas’s “passions”
with what we would call emotions.142 In doing so, she does not reduce emotion to the
sensitive appetite as a physical response to a sensory apprehension, detached from the
intellect and the rest of a person’s life. Rather, she insists on the composite (body-soul)
nature of emotion, and includes the interior sensitive powers and the intellect as
influential in eliciting and sustaining the passion, or emotion. I find her understanding of
how emotions function in Aquinas’s framework to be fruitful for including children as
agents with emotions, and much of her robust explication is described throughout this
chapter. The following quotation is a summary of her read of Aquinas on the emotions:
[Aquinas] argues that passio or an emotion is a motion of a soul-body
composite. It is a motion that occurs with respect to the appetitive
dimension of an embodied soul. In other words, it is a motion that occurs
through the exercise of one’s appetitive powers. An emotion occurs, in
particular, through the exercise of one’s sensory appetite. As such it has a
material element. It is composed, in part, of patterned bodily changes that
can be subtle, but are often noticeable in the form of felt bodily sensations.
Yet an emotion is also intentional. It concerns some object—again, a
thing, a person, a relationship, a situation—which one apprehends in a
certain way, as bearing directly or indirectly on one’s well-being. An
emotion is evoked and defined, more precisely, by sensory judgments,
images, and impressions, which are basic forms of cognition. Yet a given
emotion is ordinarily informed, in a human being, by higher forms of
cognition as well, which allow one to interpret on different levels the
significance of an object of concern—in ways that further determine one’s
experience of emotion.143
Cates’s interpretation of Aquinas on the emotions resonates with the complexity of actual
human emotions, including the many layers of experience that underlie any one emotion,
as well as the values, goals, and other emotions (such as hope or fear) that undergird it.
Her read of Aquinas affirms the role of value judgments, meaning that if an object holds
value for me and my well-being, I am more likely to have an emotional response to it.
142
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Cognitive theorists also acknowledge that objects that impact the well-being of those for
whom I care will elicit emotions.144 However, unlike the strict cognitivists, Cates’s read
of Aquinas’s account incorporates the hylomorphic human being in emotion. In
Aquinas’s system, the interaction among sensory appetite and apprehension, and
intellectual appetite and apprehension is constant and mutually influential, and Cates
successfully maintains the distinctions among the powers of the soul without conflating
them.
The description of emotion-as-passion offered by Cates, King, and Harak, concurs
with cognitive theories to a point but differs from them with respect to the necessity of
physical involvement in emotion. Recall, for instance, that Nussbaum allows that the
body is often affected by emotions, but she maintains that the physical component is not
necessary for an emotion.145 The case for including the physical manifestations of
emotions in a Christian theological anthropological context has convincing aspects to it.
It is possible that people are not always aware of the physiological changes they
experience in conjunction with emotions, but that does not necessarily mean that the
physical dimension is not present. I do not intend to enter the fray of how physiology
plays a role in emotions—the debate is far too complex for the current project—but I do
want to suggest that in an incarnational and hylomorphic context, we must take seriously
the role of the body in human experience, including emotional experience. When
considering children, this will include their physical needs, wants, and experiences as
they learn about the world and respond to it. In the next chapter, I will address this type
For an account of how this functions in Aquinas’s system, see Kevin White, “Wanting
Something for Someone: Aquinas on Complex Motions of Appetite,” The Review of
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of need within a context of the virtues of acknowledged dependence, as outlined by
Alasdair MacIntyre.146

Conclusion
Emotions are not equivalent to passions in the sense of being uncontrolled urges
toward or away from sensible objects. Aquinas’s account of what attracts us and why is
rich and is tied to his hylomorphic anthropology, meaning that we do experience things in
our bodies, but that we are also intellectual, rational beings. The two are not separable.
The responses of the sensitive soul to the physical world, even at a simple and
preliminary level, serve as building blocks for the more complex emotions. The ability of
Aquinas’s thought to incorporate these experiences, which even infants and young
children can have, into a description of human emotion addresses the concerns we saw in
chapter two, namely that cognitive theories define emotion in terms of abstract concepts
that exclude children’s having them. I find the most fruitful way of approaching
Aquinas’s thought as a resource for thinking about emotion is by remembering the
cumulative effect and mutual influence of the sensory and intellectual powers as they
interact in a person’s encounters with the world through time. The emotional reservoir a
person begins to establish in childhood is brought with her as she grows into adulthood.
Her early emotions, even those she experiences as an infant and very young child,147
become part of the makeup of her soul, both the intellectual and the sensitive. Further, the
emotions she experiences are a mechanism through which she interacts with her
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surroundings. They are not merely appetites whose effect pertains only to her. Emotions
are also involved in the actions she performs and the relationships she develops, and as
such they are central components in Aquinas’s theory of human virtue.
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CHAPTER 4: CHILDREN’S MORAL AGENCY

Aquinas’s distinction between apprehension and appetite, which at the same time
maintains that reason and passion mutually influence one another and that emotions are
partially formed by the intellect, opens the possibility of thinking of moral agency as part
of but not equivalent to moral accountability, particularly in children. In this chapter I
will suggest that this model allows us to attribute moral agency to children because
children have emotions through which they engage the world and that partially motivate
their actions. Because their rational powers are inchoate, they cannot and should not be
held morally accountable for their actions in the way that adults are. This is not to say
that they stand outside the moral community and should bear no consequences for their
actions. Rather, children are learning right from wrong, good from evil, and are
discovering how to discern and follow the best course of action in each situation. As they
are learning the moral codes of their community and to use their practical reason, they are
already engaging in moral actions of which they are the agents.
In the first half of this chapter, I argue that emotion is necessary for an action to
be truly virtuous according to Aquinas. Morality is not for machines but for human
beings,1 who are by our very nature appetitive, and so passional and emotional. If we
could rationally calculate the best course of action and then follow it, we might be
Hayden Ramsay, Beyond Virtue: Integrity and Morality (New York: St Martin’s Press,
1997), 129.
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performing good actions, but they would be mechanical instead of virtuous. Acquiring
virtue, according to Aquinas, is a life-long process, and it is one in which children are
already engaging, both through gaining the knowledge and habits they will need for
virtues later in their lives, and also by acting in ways that reflect their desire for the good
as they perceive it. Virtue requires that we want to perform the good action (or refrain
from the evil one), and this emotional motivation occurs most easily in people who have
a level of connaturality with goodness such that they are already inclined toward good
without having to deliberate about it.
The second half of this chapter expands on Aquinas’s thought to make a case for
children as moral agents. Children are already on the path toward virtue or vice. Much of
what forms them is outside of their control, but they still participate in the moral
community through their (largely appetitive) responses to their surroundings. These early
appetitive responses are the building blocks of their later emotional tendencies and habits,
which can develop into virtues. The child’s emotions allow her to participate in the moral
community both as someone who requires a moral response from adults and other
children, and as a person who is learning the moral codes of her community and adapting
her behavior accordingly. Her moral agency is engaged as she interacts with others in the
course of learning those moral codes. Further, her actions within the moral system are
emotional responses that allow her to be a moral agent both in terms of her emotions and
in terms of her moral actions that are motivated by emotion. I will conclude the chapter
by briefly discussing a narrative that depicts the development of compassion in a child,
and I will point to the ways in which it illustrates how the child’s appetites and emotions
are involved in the process.
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Morality of the Emotions in Aquinas’s Thought
In this section, I consider whether and how passions and emotions can be deemed
moral in Aquinas’s account, and in the following section, I expand this discussion to
show that the emotions can and do play a role in his description of acquired virtue. The
passions, according to Aquinas, are not themselves good or evil (ST I-II.24.4). Their
moral quality depends on that which moves them. If they are inclined toward good
objects or away from evil ones, then the passions can be called good. Passions that
incline us toward evil or away from good are considered evil (ST I-II.24.4, ad 2).
Aquinas writes that in action or passion, “we do not consider anything pertaining to the
notion of good or evil: because movements and passions have not the aspect of an end,
whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end” (ST I-II.49.2). That is, the passion
itself is neutral, but the object of the passion can be assessed as morally good or evil.
Nevertheless, even within Aquinas’s system, passions and emotions are subject to
moral scrutiny. Stephen Loughlin argues that because Aquinas treats the passions within
the context of ethics,2 the passions are a fitting topic of moral assessment. Loughlin’s
main argument is that Aquinas’s theory of the passions, seen as a psychological
description, can be properly brought into the moral domain.3 He contends that
the fullness of Aquinas’s views concerning the passions, as well as the
justification for the transposition of a psychological doctrine into a moral
context, depend upon viewing the passions not as disparate psychological
phenomena acting freely within the human being (as if they had a life of
their own and were thus something that had to be subdued like a wild
animal), but rather as movements of the human appetitive aspect,
integrated into his whole being and living…. These phenomena involve
2
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the full human being in his physical, appetitive and cognitive aspects, not
only in their various and interdependent psychological operations, but
most importantly as these are the means by which the person attains to
what is most good and true in his life.4
Loughlin’s argument supports the position that passions are moral when considered in
conjunction with the other powers of the soul and as contributing to the whole of the
person. This integrated description of emotion that stems from the human appetite is one
of the foundations of human agency.
Aquinas holds that we know through reason whether the object of a passion is
good or evil. Therefore, a passion is considered good to the degree that its object is in
accord with the person’s reason, and evil to the degree that the object is not in accord
with reason (ST I-II.24.4). We can also determine the morality of the will—whether it is
inclined toward good or evil—by assessing that in which it takes pleasure. A will that is
inclined toward the good takes pleasure in good, and a will inclined toward evil takes
pleasure in evil. When it comes to the movements of the sensitive appetite, the object of
the appetite does not clearly indicate the goodness of the passion in the way that the
object of the will indicates the goodness of the will’s inclination. Aquinas uses the
example of desiring food. Simply desiring food, as long as the food is good food, would
be a morally acceptable passion if there were nothing else to consider. However, as
Aquinas points out, the way in which the food is desired makes a moral difference: “the
will of the good man takes pleasure in them [food] in accordance with reason, to which
the will of the evil man gives no heed” (ST I-II.34.4). Thus, in a situation in which the
object of the sensitive appetite and the will is the same (food), the inclination of the will,
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which as the intellectual appetite incorporates the person’s cognitive powers, determines
whether the passion is good or misguided.
While Aquinas posits the moral neutrality of passions considered without
reference to their objects, in actuality passions always do have objects. Because the
appetitive responses to those objects are either in line with reason or not, Robert C.
Roberts argues that Aquinas’s definition of emotions is such that they are intrinsically
rational or irrational:
an emotion is good if it ‘reflects’ or ‘represents’ the true value of its
object, and bad to the extent that it distorts or contradicts the object’s
value…. The ‘appetite’ is in itself normatively rational or irrational, and
thus good or bad, simply because as an appetitive movement it takes its
object to be good, and as a matter of fact its object is good or bad; and the
perception is in itself rational or irrational, and thus good or bad, simply
because its object is or is not as the perception represents it.5
Roberts contends that the passion is intrinsically rational or irrational, and so good or
evil, as a result both of the apprehension that moves the appetite and of the object
apprehended. The apprehension’s level of rationality is directly related to the “true” value
of the object that it perceives.
This interpretation of Aquinas aligns him with what the contemporary language of
moral philosophy would categorize as moral realism6 and cognitivism7 (although this
Robert C. Roberts, “Thomas Aquinas on the Morality of Emotions,” History of
Philosophy Quarterly 9, no. 3 (1992): 300.
6
For an overview of moral realism, see Geoff Sayre-McCord, “Moral Realism,” The
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designation does not mean that Aquinas’s emotional theory is strictly cognitivist). That is,
Aquinas holds that the moral value of objects resides in the objects themselves rather than
in the value people impute to the objects. Because the appetite is a passive power, it is
moved by the apprehension’s presentation of the object. Therefore, it seems that the
appetite can be considered rational or irrational in a given instance insofar as it accurately
assesses the qualities inherent in an object it apprehends. For instance, if fear arises in the
face of an object that the person perceives to be dangerous, then the fear is rational to the
degree that the object actually is dangerous and is perceived to be so by the apprehensive
powers. However, the generic passion “fear” is neither good nor evil, rational nor
irrational.
On this view, an emotion is elicited through the two-step progression from object
to apprehension and from apprehension to appetite. The apprehension is susceptible to
error, and it is also sometimes shaped by assumptions of which the person is not yet
conscious. For example, fear can arise as the result of an incorrectly perceived object that
is not actually dangerous. In such a case, it is the perception that is mistaken, and the
passion it elicits is rational with respect to the apprehension but not with respect to the
actual object. It is also possible that the apprehension perceives an object in a way that is
contrary to the conscious reasoning of the person. The case of Huck Finn (discussed in
chapter one) is such an instance. Huck’s reason told him that turning Jim in to the slave
catchers was right and good, but he could not will himself to do it. His thinking had
changed without his being aware of it, and he was acting on good moral reasons that were
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Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, accessed November 14, 2014,
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below the conscious level. Additionally, apprehension can be mistaken, and it can be
based on non-conscious reasons, as when it elicits surprising emotions and actions. For
example, a person who claims to view all people as equal might harbor subconscious
racial prejudice that results in her responding to people of the group against which she is
prejudiced in ways she would not have predicted. Finally, a person can experience
spontaneous passions and emotions that are contrary to the person’s reason, both
conscious and unconscious.
While Aquinas denies that passions have a moral quality per se, he maintains that
their presence can aid or hinder the morality of the actions with which they are
associated. He argues that some passions and emotions increase the moral goodness of an
action and are part of what makes the action virtuous. But he also recognizes the negative
influence emotions can have on a person’s decisions and actions, and so he makes the
case that some passions decrease the moral goodness of an action. Aquinas distinguishes
beneficial from disadvantageous passions according to whether they precede or succeed
reason. Antecedent passions, which arise prior to reason, hinder moral goodness;
consequent passions follow on reason and can increase moral goodness, provided the
person is reasoning well and the passion is in agreement with that reasoning.
Antecedent passions diminish the goodness of an act because they precede reason
and so “obscure the judgment of reason” (ST I-II.24.3, ad 1).8 Recognizing that these
passions might arise spontaneously, Aquinas explains: “Moreover it happens sometimes
that the movement of the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an
apprehension of the imagination of sense. And then such movement occurs without the
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command of reason: although reason could have prevented it, had it foreseen” (ST III.17.7). Richard Mansfield contends that antecedent passions diminish the moral
goodness of an action, but not because they are necessarily bad or influencing the person
to act in a way that is morally evil. Rather, he suggests that “Aquinas believed antecedent
passion necessarily hinders practical reason and therefore diminishes the moral quality of
the subsequent act.”9 Specifically, Mansfield explains that Aquinas is thinking of actions
that follow from the passion as their “per se principle,” in such a way that the passion is
influencing reason rather than being influenced by reason.10 According to Aquinas,
reason and will are needed for an act to be voluntary, and voluntariness is necessary for
an act to be morally good or bad. But antecedent passion precedes reason, and because of
this, antecedent passion diminishes the voluntariness and, therefore, the moral goodness
or badness of an act.11 At the same time, Mansfield notes12 that Aquinas acknowledges
that the antecedent passions that arise in a temperate person are less intense than those in
a continent or vicious person.13 Aquinas distinguishes temperance from continence by
stating that a temperate person’s passions are in accord with her reason, and she does not
need to resist them, while a continent person succeeds in resisting disordered passions
(ST II-II.155.4). The degree to which a person has cultivated her passions will determine
the intensity of her antecedent passions, and this variation underscores the cumulative
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effect of reason and passion on one another. The person whose passions are operating in
cooperation with her reason is the one who will be less disrupted by antecedent passions.
When considering children’s moral accountability, it is important to remember
that antecedent passions diminish the voluntariness of an act. It is arguable that children’s
actions are often motivated by antecedent passions because children do not have
developed rational powers, nor have they had time to shape their passions and to gain the
experience that will allow them to determine the right course of action in a given
instance. A person’s actions that stem from antecedent passions are less voluntary than
actions that are motivated by emotions that have been formed by reason and will.
Because antecedent passions will likely influence more actions in children than in adults,
the voluntariness of children’s actions is more frequently diminished than it is in more
mature persons. This is one reason we do not hold children accountable for their morally
blameworthy actions in the way that we would adults. The consequences that children’s
immoral actions have on others are not diminished, but the children who commit them
are not responsible for their actions in the way that an adult would be.
Antecedent passions can serve a constructive function as well, argue some
scholars. Philosopher Judith Barad shows that moderate antecedent passions can aid
reason by encouraging the person to reflect on the causes of the passion.14 For instance, if
a person reacts with a particular passion to an object (which could be a situation), she can
later think about why the object elicited that specific passion and come to understand how
she is approaching the object such that her passions arise as they do. If the passion
frustrates rather than fosters virtue, the person can then attempt to change the way she
Judith Barad, “Aquinas on the Role of Emotion in Moral Judgment and Activity,” The
Thomist 55 (1991): 408.
14
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approaches the object such that the passion does not arise in that way again. Thomas
Ryan draws on Barad’s work and notes that reflecting on one’s emotions requires a level
of awareness of the emotion,15 which not everyone has. He argues further that “negative”
emotions, such as anger, sadness, and shame, are “necessary, in their moderate form, as
responses and virtues, to foster and reflect moral development.”16 Noticing that the
emotions have arisen and thinking about why one is experiencing them in these particular
circumstances gives a person insight into her moral response to the situation. This is not
to say that all antecedent passions require intense reflection. Aquinas himself
acknowledges that occasionally antecedent passions arise that do not correspond to a
person’s character, although this happens less frequently in a virtuous person. However,
Barad’s point that antecedent passions can serve a constructive function in a person’s
moral life is helpful when considering children’s emotions and moral growth.
This claim that antecedent passions encourage self-analysis suggests that
children’s moral development will include reflection on their emotional lives. It is
important not only to teach children to shape and moderate their emotions, but also to
reflect on what their emotional responses mean. At first, adults will likely play a major
role in teaching children to reflect by communicating the appropriateness and
implications of the child’s emotional responses as they occur. Adults may also guide
children in this process of emotional reflection through exploring stories or narratives.
The ways characters respond to one another, to situations, and to other objects can be
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illustrative for the child regarding what emotions mean about a person’s thoughts and
values.
At the same time, as children’s intellectual powers develop and are formed, those
powers influence the kinds of emotions that the children experience, specifically the
consequent passions, which follow on the choice of the will. Aquinas maintains that an
action that includes the desire to accomplish it has a greater level of goodness than an
action that lacks emotional motivation (ST I-II.24.3). A passion that follows an act of will
(of voluntariness) increases the praiseworthiness of a good act because it “is a sign of the
greatness of the will.”17 For this reason, consequent passions are present in the virtuous
person.18 According to Aquinas, a consequent passion can mean one of two things. Either
the person’s will is so moved that the sensitive appetite (the passions) follow suit, or the
person deliberately chooses to bring up a passion that will help her engage more quickly
in a moral action (ST I-II.24.3, ad 1). Cates explains that some “emotions can affect the
will by making it easier and more pleasant for the will to carry out certain of its
operations…. Certain virtuous passions provide this sort of help primarily because they
cause changes in the body that help the person literally to move—and to move more
energetically—as needed to meet the challenges of the situation.”19 Whether they are
chosen or result from an overflow of the will, on Aquinas’s view, cooperative consequent
passions increase the moral goodness of the act (ST I-II.24.3, ad 1).20 Whereas an
antecedent passion “forestalls the judgment of reason,” a consequent passion, “when it
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follows that judgment, as through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the
execution of reason’s command” (ST I-II.59.2, ad 3).
The discussion of antecedent and consequent passions requires us to think again
about the cumulative effect of the different apprehensive and appetitive moments on one
another. It is consistent with experience that people occasionally have spontaneous
emotions that surprise them, and it seems likely that these are less intense in people who
are more virtuous.21 This is because the virtuous person has integrated her reason and
passions so that the passions that arise spontaneously are, for the most part, stemming
from a soul in which reason has already informed passion and the kinds of passions that
will arise. Theologian William Mattison underscores this point by suggesting that the
antecedent and consequent passions that Aquinas discusses might not have to be
considered as discrete moments of a person’s life. That is, the antecedent passion is not
necessarily devoid of habituation and so of the possibility of deliberated reason earlier in
a person’s life.22 It is possible for antecedent passions to arise independently of reason,
since the passions have something of their own,23 but they do not inevitably arise
spontaneously and without reason. Mattison’s position indicates that the distinction
between antecedence and consequence is more logical than temporal.24
In a stand decidedly in favor of the passions, Hayden Ramsay argues that reason
must take the blame when emotions lead a person morally astray. On his read, Aquinas
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says that when the passions are incorrectly inclined, it is because the reason that is
engaged in apprehending the objects toward which they are inclined “has been
inadequately trained.”25 Virtue, on the other hand, is the “proper ordering of the
emotions” such that our emotions incline us toward what is truly good.26 Ramsay argues
that emotional integrity and rightly ordered emotions, which allow the person properly to
enjoy the objects of her natural inclinations, are necessary for good and satisfying living.
He writes that the “objects of natural inclinations are more than mere means to
satisfactions but rather the sources of their real loves and joys, hopes and anxieties.”27 In
other words, the person whose emotions have been well formed will realize that the
objects toward which she is naturally inclined in an appropriate way are also the
particulars through which she experiences universal good. Further, Ramsay argues that,
for Aquinas, “the natural law requires and includes emotional integrity, and is not simply
the passionless willing of intelligible goods; morality is for human beings not
computers.”28 Human beings are created with passions and emotions, and these must be
brought into accord with what is good and right so that the person is able to live with
integrity. Ramsay’s position is that, provided our emotions are in line with the natural
order,29 we will find “genuine emotional satisfaction” in the objects of our natural
inclinations because we will recognize them “as goods” rather than simply as sources for
fulfilling our desires.30 Ramsay’s explanation of Aquinas’s position is focused on the
proper integration of emotions with the person’s reason such that her desires are for what
25

Ramsay, Beyond Virtue, 127.
Ramsay, Beyond Virtue, 129.
27
Ramsay, Beyond Virtue, 128-129.
28
Ramsay, Beyond Virtue, 129.
29
Ramsay, Beyond Virtue, 120.
30
Ramsay, Beyond Virtue, 130.
26

206

is truly good. Other scholars explain this concept using Aquinas’s understanding of
connaturality.

Connaturality
In Aquinas’s thought, connaturality is the condition of a person’s having her
passions and desires in tune with her reason such that she automatically desires that
which she would determine to be good if she reflected on it. Attaining connaturality in
one’s emotions aids the acquisition of virtue, and it is a state toward which children’s
moral education can guide them. Connaturality is one of the topics that Aquinas does not
treat systematically, according to philosopher Taki Suto.31 However, combing through
Aquinas’s work, Suto finds some consistency in Aquinas’s discussion of it. First,
connaturality is acquired, not innate,32 which means it is something that we learn over
time, and that can potentially increase in us over time. Second, to attain connaturality is
to become like that which we understand.33 For example, a person who invests her time
in music will become more musical.34 Finally, there are instances when responding based
on connaturality is preferable to reasoned responses. These are situations that require
quick responses. Suto uses the example of a person who sees a drowning child. Valuable
time will be wasted if the person stops to ponder, reason, or deliberate about whether it is
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a good thing to try to save the child. It is better if the person has the connatural response
of helping another person in need and moves instantly to save the child.35
According to Ryan, connaturality is achieved when “a person is changed such that
the orientation or habitual disposition to what is good becomes connatural or second
nature.”36 Such connaturality leads to virtue. Virtue is not the condition of the reason
continuing to rule the emotions, but rather of the emotions being “‘in tune with’ right
reason…. Feeling, thinking, willing resonate with each other that this particular response
is ‘right.’”37 Martin Rhonheimer goes further and makes the case that integrated, rightly
ordered emotions lead to the person’s having a connaturality with good such that with her
whole being she knows, desires, and seeks the good. Without the passions being part of
that process, her appetite would not be engaged, and she would not seek the good in the
same way.38 Ryan’s and Rhonheimer’s analyses underscore that emotions are at their best
in a relationship with intellect and will such that all three are in agreement with one
another.39 These positions corroborate the case made above that virtue requires the
integration of feeling, thinking, and willing in a fitting, natural, and resonant way.
Distinguishing among them is necessary if a person is to reflect on and cultivate her
emotions, but then thinking, feeling, and willing must come to the point where they are
reintegrated in order to qualify as virtue.
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It seems plausible to say that the unity of the passions with nascent reason in
childhood is something that should perdure in a revised way in adults. Children must be
taught what is good and right, with the hope that their emotions will eventually come into
line with what they are taught. In this way, what their reason understands to be good will
reflect true goodness, and their emotions will be inclined to that good. Achieving
connaturality takes time. Psychologist Frank Moncher states that children must learn by
example from the significant adults in their lives. They must first practice what is right
because it is what they are supposed to do, and then hopefully as they mature, they will
want to do what is right. Moncher argues, “It is the repetition of the interior acts, of
intelligent mastery over one’s self, that will contribute directly to the formation of virtue.
In contrast, the repetition of exterior acts can produce habits, but will not necessarily lead
to virtue.”40 Emotions have tremendous significance for the person’s morality and moral
development. When emotions are not integrated with well-formed reason, they can lead
to vice. But emotions that move the person toward connaturality with goodness make
acquiring virtue possible.

Acquired Virtue
According to Aquinas, the perfect and adequate definition of virtue is as follows:
“Virtue is a good [habit]41 of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one
can make bad use, which God works in us, without us” (ST I-II.55.4). The phrase “which
Frank J. Moncher, “A Psychotherapy of Virtue: Reflections on St. Thomas Aquinas’
Theology of Moral Virtue,” Journal of Psychology and Christianity 20, no. 4 (2001):
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God works in us, without us” refers only to infused virtues, but Aquinas notes that when
that phrase is omitted, the definition encompasses both infused and acquired virtues. In
this dissertation, I am more concerned with acquired than infused virtues because
acquired virtues can be the subject of moral education and a person can work to attain
them, but God bestows infused virtues on human beings.42 Because virtues are habits, I
begin this section by discussing Aquinas’s understanding of habit, and I then move to
how the acquired virtues require and shape emotions.

Habits
The role that Aquinas attributes to habit in virtue formation and in emotion is
central to reflecting on how his thought can be extended to children and their moral
agency. A habit, according to Aquinas, “is a disposition of a subject which is in a state of
potentiality either to form or to operation” (ST I-II.50.1). In terms of moral action and
virtue, a habit is not the action or the state of emotional arousal; it is the potential and
tendency to act a certain way or to feel a certain way, and it is a stable propensity that is
difficult to change (ST I-II.49.2, ad 3). In order for a human tendency to qualify as a habit
for Aquinas, the person with the habit must “be distinct from that to which it is
disposed…as potentiality is to act.” In other words, the habit is not definitive of the
person. Being passional is how human beings are created; habits are learned. This
distinction is underscored by the qualification that a habit’s potentiality must be able to
be actualized in more than one way, and in the course of the actualization, there must be a
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number of things occurring, which are able to be “adjusted” (ST I-II.49.4). Further, a
habit must be able to respond to reason, but being guided by or disposed to reason does
not guarantee that the habits are leading the person toward the good.
Jean Porter demonstrates the importance of habits in Aquinas’s thought. On
Porter’s read of Aquinas, a habit is “a stable disposition of the intellect, will, or passions
inclining the person to act in one kind of way rather than another. Such dispositions are
necessary if we are to be capable of action at all; for example, the child’s innate
capacities for speech must be developed through the habitus of a particular language
before the child can actually talk.”43 In the same way, the child’s innate capacities for
reason and relationships must be developed in order for her whole self to become inclined
toward right action and virtue. Porter argues that for Aquinas, intellect, will, and passions
are “interdependent and can only be analyzed in conjunction with one another.”44
Although the powers are separable for the purposes of discussion, they are integrated in
the person as a whole. Ideally, the passions and the intellect work in collaboration,
moving the person toward true good and her own perfection as a human being,45 but in
practice, passions form before the intellect “has the maturity to bring a comprehensive
conception of the human good to bear on her judgments about particulars.”46 Having an
undeveloped intellect thus leaves a person susceptible to forming bad emotional habits.
Because children have undeveloped intellect, and because human beings lack the
instinctive tendencies in our passions that animals have, we need to be taught the good
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toward which our passions should be directed, both for our own proper development and
for the sake of those with whom we interact.47 Porter proposes that this occurs in children
by way of “very simple precepts, example, and story” which give children the basis for
learning how to act in ways that conform to the moral codes of their society, and that
these early behaviors become the foundations for acquired virtues. The child first learns
what Porter refers to as the “paradigms of virtue,”48 through which she is taught the right
courses of action in particular situations. This formation may occur either by imitation (as
when a child acts out something she has learned from a narrative) or coercion (as when
she is required to behave in a particular way by the adults around her). Either method of
induction involves both intellect and emotion.
By being forced to act in certain ways, and experiencing the responses of
others to her actions, the child comes to think and to feel in ways that
correspond to those actions. In this way, the raw materials of organic
desire and aversion, which are the basic stuff of the psyche, are shaped in
one direction rather than another, in such a way, that is, that the child
gradually comes to want to practice self-restraint, persistence, and
courage, and to see the world and the situations that face her
accordingly.49
Porter explains that from this basis the child learns to apply those good behaviors to other
similar situations.50 The child then needs to learn prudence, the virtue that involves being
able to apply the general concepts of goodness to the particular and unusual situations in
which she might find herself.51 Eventually, the child is able to bring these virtues to bear
on her own goals that she has established based on her own assessment of the good in her
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particular circumstances.52 Thus, the child’s progression toward the acquisition of virtue,
according to Porter’s reading of Aquinas, begins with external forces (such as caregivers)
determining for the child both the goals toward which her behavior should be moving as
well as which behaviors she should perform, and it reaches completion when the person
is able to establish her own goals and choose actions that will foster the achievement of
those goals. According to Porter, a person develops from being told what to do and why,
to making these determinations on her own based on her ability to understand, to exercise
prudence, and to engage her emotions. There is no guarantee that a person will progress
toward virtue, however, because people acquire bad habits as well as good ones.
Aquinas distinguishes good habits and evil habits based on whether they are in
accord with reason and human nature. He thinks a habit is good, if it “disposes to an act
suitable to the agent’s nature,” and “an evil habit is one which disposes to an act
unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are
according to reason, whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they
are against reason” (ST I-II.54.3). The powers of the soul, insofar as they are subject to
reason, are also subject to the formation of habits. Exterior sensitive apprehension is not
subject to reason and so not subject to habit (eyes see without habit because it is their
nature to see); but interior sense apprehensions such as “memory, thought or
imagination” can be subject to habit (ST I-II.50.3, ad 3). The sensitive appetites, because
they have “an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite” (ST I-II.50.3, ad 3),
are also susceptible to habit formation, “by which they are well or ill disposed in regard
to something” (ST I-II.50.3). Finally, the will is also subject to habits. Aquinas explains
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that “every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a habit whereby it is
well disposed to its act. Now since the will is a rational power, it may be variously
directed to act. And therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby it
is well disposed to its act” (ST I-II.50.5). Further, because habits are subject to reason
and are capable of being changed (although altering them is difficult), their operation
depends on the will. The will can act on a given habit, but it can also choose to act
contrary to a habit or not to act on the habit at all (ST I-II.52.3).
Choice with respect to habit extends to the formation of habits and not only to
their execution. A person forms a habit by repeating particular actions. Clearly, whenever
possible, a person should use her reason to judge which kinds of habits are good, and then
work to form those habits. But whether the person has consciously chosen the habit or
not, a habit can be increased either by repeatedly engaging in the habitual action or by
engaging in an act that surpasses the “intensity” of the habit (ST I-II.52.3). Intensity can
be interpreted in a number of ways, and Aquinas does not specify what he means by the
term. It is possible that intensity could refer to duration, such as the habit of reading for a
longer period of time each day; it could refer to level of difficulty, as when an athlete
increases her training; it could refer to quantity, as when a person’s coffee-drinking habit
increases from two to six cups per day. But it also seems plausible to interpret this
concept so that we can speak of emotional intensity. For instance, the habit of responding
with patience is more difficult but also becomes more ingrained when the situation is
stressful. Another example might be a child who is forming the habit of sharing by
repeatedly sharing her own toys with other children and by having other children share
their toys with her. Half-hearted sharing will reinforce the habit over time, but sharing
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when the child finds the situation emotionally intense, perhaps either when it is difficult
to share or when she feels particular love toward the child with whom she is sharing, will
likely increase in her the habit of sharing.
Just as habits can be reinforced and grow, so too can they be diminished. Because
habits are subject to reason, a person’s judgment may influence her habit formation for
good or for ill. Aquinas writes that “a habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted
by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether
through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice” (ST I-II.53.1). Vicious habits can thus
be “corrupted” and diminished, but virtuous habits can as well. Therefore, a person who
has formed virtuous habits is still susceptible to corruption and the loss or decrease of
those habits. A habit may also fade away if a person ceases to perform the acts that
established the habit in the first place (ST I-II.53.3). A simple example of this might be a
child who is in the habit of sucking her thumb and then injures the thumb such that
sucking it is either painful or impossible. If the injury lasts long enough, the child will
often not go back to sucking that thumb; the habit is broken.
Breaking habits is difficult, and Aquinas suggests that one reason for this is that a
person’s dispositions can affect her will such that something seems good or bad even
though it might not really be good or bad. Her dispositions and habits can affect her will
(and thus her choices) in terms of how she perceives her habitual actions, and she can be
inclined to continue a vicious habit because it seems to be good. However, Aquinas does
not think people are inevitably subject to their habits. Rather, “the will is not moved of
necessity because it has the power to remove this disposition so that the thing does not
seem so to him; for example when a man calms his wrath so as not to judge something in
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anger. Passion however is more easily removed than habit.”53 By changing the way one
thinks about something or the way one perceives an object, it is possible to change one’s
habits with regard to that object.
One would hope that the habits a person develops while learning to determine her
own goals are good habits. If a person does develop bad emotional habits because of a
flaw in her apprehension, she can work to change the emotion by altering her perceptions
and thoughts. Just as the habits of virtue form through repetition, bad habits also form
through repetition. A bad emotional habit that is based on irrational interpretations of
reality can be changed by adjusting the person’s habit of thinking, suggests Claudia Eisen
Murphy. By amending the evaluations that are present in the arousal of the emotion, a
person can eventually change the emotional habit. Murphy explains, “by systematically
recasting the situation every time I evaluate it irrationally, I might be able to acquire a
new habit of evaluating the situation properly.”54 Because emotions can be affected by
reason and by reasoned judgments, at least to some extent, the passions can also
sometimes be changed through changing the habit of thinking that corresponds to the
emotional response. As children learn to evaluate the world around them, adults can
attempt to guide them toward habits of thought that foster good emotional habits and lead
to the formation of virtue.
This process is not always successful, and Harak’s research confirms the
difficulty of removing habits, particularly those that are formed in children and that
involve their whole person, body and soul. In his discussion of children who have been
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abused, he traces a connection between experiences that occur early in life and habits that
the person exhibits later. In this account, as in his book on virtue, Harak emphasizes the
physical component of human experience. He argues that “habits of the soul are caused
by our capacity to be moved by another…. The soul is affected through embodiment, and
learns mainly through touch. Habits are in the body, but principally in the soul. These
habits of the soul and body are acquired by repeated acts, through the agency of another,
and mainly through touch.”55 Because we are “vulnerable to being moved by another”56
through our bodies, and because “the human being has a unique ability, in both her body
and her soul, to carry pain through time,”57 abuse can have long-lasting and devastating
effects on a child.58 Harak’s point is salient not only in terms of thinking about the
importance of ensuring that all children have proper care, but also because the child’s
sensitivity to touch and early physical contact can mean that good and loving touch has
lasting positive effects for the child. Caregivers might be able to use touch and habit
formation to nurture a child so that her emotions lead her to want to do what is good and
right, thus helping her to acquire virtues.

Emotions and Virtue
In order for a habit to be constitutive of a virtue in Aquinas’s system, the habit
must refer to an act (not a state of being) (ST I-II.55.2). The habit must also be good; an
evil habit cannot be a virtue (ST I-II.55.4). Stephen Pope summarizes Aquinas’s
G. S. Harak, “Child Abuse and Embodiment from a Thomistic Perspective,” Modern
Theology 11, no. 3 (1995): 327.
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distinction between good and bad habits as follows: “‘Virtues’ are simply stable
dispositions to act in ways that are good; ‘vices’ are stable dispositions to act in ways that
are bad.”59 Aquinas’s theory of virtue is extensive, and to do it justice would take us well
beyond the scope of this project. Therefore, I will pay particular attention to the acquired
moral virtues, and specifically to how the emotions can contribute to acquired virtue.
Before we explore the emotions’ role in acquired virtue, I would like to touch on
the infused virtues briefly for two reasons. First, some scholars argue that the infused
virtues are an equalizer in Aquinas’s system that can allow all people to pursue and attain
the ultimate end of life with God,60 regardless of their abilities, intellectual or otherwise.
Second, the infused virtues are worked in humans by God without any action on the part
of the human being, and this can raise concerns about human agency that we must put to
rest.
The infused virtues are habits that God places in human beings to allow humans
to attain our ultimate end. In Aquinas’s system, humans are natural beings, and human
powers do not allow us to move beyond what is natural to us. However, we are created
for a telos that is supernatural—the vision of God (ST I-II.5.5). In order for us to be able
to attain our supernatural end, God infuses us with supernatural qualities that elevate us
beyond our human nature. These are the infused virtues (ST I-II.51.4), which “God works
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in us, without us” (ST I-II.55.4). Jean Porter argues that the infused virtues allow Aquinas
to maintain the Christian idea of the equality of all people, even in the face of distinctly
divergent capabilities and life circumstances.61 The infused virtues are not directed
toward good living in this world but toward the supernatural telos of the vision of God in
the next. Porter demonstrates that this distinction between the end toward which infused
virtues are directed and the goal of good living in this world allows Aquinas to explain
the presence of infused virtue in people who also exhibit “contrary habits, that is, vices,
which render their [infused cardinal virtues] operation difficult and unpleasant.”62 Thus,
not only do the infused virtues make it possible for those people on whom God bestows
them to attain their supernatural telos, but infused virtues also allow us to explain the
admixture of saintly and sinful tendencies in the same person.
The second issue with infused virtue that it is important to clarify is that defining
infused virtue as a habit that “God works in us, without us” might seem to imply that the
person on whom God bestows these loses the ability to act as an agent. Cates notes that
the infused virtues can affect the exercise of moral agency by causing the person either to
intend a different (proximate) end than they might otherwise have, or to arrive at different
means for achieving their end. Even if the person engages in the same actions that she
would have without the infused virtue, the actions will have different meaning for her
because of the infused virtue.63 However, as I showed in chapter one, the view of moral
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agency that stems from Aquinas’s thought is non-competitive, meaning that even when a
person has received the grace of infused virtue, she maintains her agency. Porter explains,
“the ends of the acquired virtues, namely, the overall well-being of the organism and the
community, is thus transformed by the infused virtue, rather than being obviated or
undermined by it; again, grace perfects, rather than destroys nature.”64 Persons who
receive infused virtues retain the ability to act on their own volition. They are
transformed, not coerced, by this grace.
The passions are cultivated not through infused virtue, but through the habituation
of acquired moral virtues,65 to which we now turn our attention. The human appetite
needs to be formed and shaped by reason and to follow reason’s lead in order for its
moral habits to be virtuous (ST I-II.58.2). Aquinas states, “habits of moral virtue are
caused in the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason” (ST III.51.2). Moral virtue requires prudence and understanding (which are intellectual
virtues) in order to determine the correct and virtuous courses of action in given
situations, to choose those actions, and to incline the appetite toward those actions (ST III.58.4). Prudence and understanding develop over time and involve maturity, reason, and
experience, all of which are still in the early formative stages in children. This is not to
say that children cannot be on the path toward moral virtue, or that their actions, choices,
and early understandings of the world are not part of their morality. Indeed, a child’s
early experiences are the foundation for her later understanding and prudence. At the
same time, the nascent level of reason and experience in the child indicates that the child
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will also have less-than-fully-developed prudence and understanding, and it reinforces
the argument for not holding children accountable as adults.
Another reason for children’s lesser degree of accountability is that, although the
moral virtues shape the passions, Aquinas maintains the primacy of reason and says that
we do not merit by our passions, except indirectly. The passions are subject to habit, and
so to virtue, insofar as they participate in reason. Considered in and of themselves, the
irascible and concupiscible powers cannot be subjects of virtue (ST I-II.56.4). According
to Aquinas, virtue also depends on the will (ST I-II.20.1), and he holds that the will and
the passions are intimately connected. Therefore, in Aquinas’s theory, reason, will, and
sense appetite are all integrated in the person who acquires virtue.
We saw above that the passions, to the degree that they are in accord with reason,
allow the person to take pleasure through her intellectual appetite in sensible goods such
as food (see ST I-II.34.4). The relationship between will and passion works in the
opposite direction as well. Aquinas maintains that “the movement of virtue, which
consists in a perfect act of will, cannot be had without any passion, not because the act of
will depends upon the passion, but because in a nature subject to passion a passion
necessarily follows upon a perfect act of will.”66 This movement seems to refer to the
overflow of the will into the passions. The intellectual appetite is moved such that the
sensitive appetite is also moved because, as Aquinas says, humans are by nature “subject
to passion.”67 Further, passion can be said to be an effect of virtue (ST I-II.60.2), because
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“every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary” (ST I-II.59.4,
ad 1).
For Aquinas, passions are meritorious only indirectly, and their merit is
proportional to how they correspond to the will. This indirect merit can happen in three
ways.68 First, if the will wills a passion, or if the will loves a passion, then that willing or
loving can be meritorious. The passion itself is not meritorious, but the passion is the
object of the will’s loving or willing, and the will’s action is meritorious. Second, if the
passion elicits an act of the will, and if that act of the will is meritorious, then the passion
is indirectly meritorious as the principle of the will. In these cases, the will either
consents to a good passion or resists an evil passion. The passion’s eliciting an act of the
will raises the issue of antecedent passions and passions that lead the will astray. Given
Aquinas’s position on antecedent passions, it is likely that the passions he refers to here
arise as a result of a reasoned perception of something and that the will then consents to
or resists the passions. The third way a passion can be indirectly meritorious is by
overflow from the will (intellectual appetite) into the sensitive appetite. Aquinas’s
example of this is a person whose will hates sin, and so when the person sins, her
sensitive appetite feels shame as a result; the shame is indirectly meritorious.
At the same time, Aquinas’s position is that for an action to be truly virtuous, it is
not enough that the person’s intellect dictate the action; the appetitive powers (that is,
both the will and the passions) must concur with reason such that the person also wants to
perform the good act. “Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only
that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue; but also that his
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appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue” (ST I-II.58.2). That which
perfects a person’s appetite is a moral virtue (ST I-II.58.3). Lombardo’s explanation of
virtue is helpful for emphasizing the ongoing and accretive process of acquiring virtue.
He writes, “the category of virtue is a way to describe what happens when choices
become embedded in our personality, so that we become actively disposed toward future
acts of goodness, that is, toward acts consonant with authentic human flourishing and
psychological health.” This embeddedness is not the exclusive domain of reason; for an
action to be a complete moral action, the appetite must be engaged as well.69
Because acquired virtues are habits, they are formed by repeating the virtuous act
until it becomes habitual (ST I-II.51.3). In order for an action to be virtuous, it must be a
good action (based on understanding), it must be appropriate to the situation (which
prudence will determine), and it must be something that the agent wants to do (meaning
the appetites are in accord with it). If a virtue is acquired through habitual engagement in
the virtuous act, how does a person begin to acquire a virtue she does not already have?
How does she bring her appetites into agreement with her reason such that she wants to
perform the virtuous action if she does not already have the virtue? This question is
particularly important for thinking about children, who begin without any acquired
virtues and must develop all the acquired virtues they are to have. Because virtue is a
habit, it seems that the way a person might work to acquire a virtue is by willing herself
to perform the good action even when her emotions do not want to, and over time, her
repeated action will create a habit. Ideally, as she works to form the habit, her emotions
will come to desire that which her reason and will determine to be good. This method of
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forming a virtuous habit begs the question of whether the performance of actions that are
good but that the agent does not want to do runs the risk of being disingenuous. Herdt
takes up this issue by addressing hypocrisy in terms of acting in a way that gives the
impression that a person has a specific virtue when in fact she does not have that virtue.
On Herdt’s read, Aquinas’s view of these situations falls on the side of generosity.70
Aquinas’s assessment is that it is acceptable to perform actions without the concomitant
appetite (and so virtue) if one is under obligation because of a vow to do so, or if one is
attempting to acquire the virtue in question through repetition of action that results in
habit (ST II-II.111).
This generosity in terms of good actions that are not fully virtuous makes sense
when we think about how people need to behave for a moral community to function.
Waiting until people possess genuine virtue before we ask them to comport themselves in
line with the virtues would be detrimental to the group as a whole and to its members. We
sometimes need people to act in ways that are not natural for them as they acquire
virtues. For instance, moderating one’s behavior when angry is often beneficial to others,
and one should learn to do this even before one’s anger itself is moderated (if it is
immoderate). Through repeatedly performing good actions, we hope to move toward
virtue by eventually wanting to perform them. At the same time, if all our actions are
only done from a sense of duty or because our reason requires it without the cooperation
and support of the emotions, then we will be functioning more like robots than humans.
We will be obeying commands rather than acting as persons who strive for integration.
The same holds true for children, and a child who is being taught to behave in ways that
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assist her in becoming virtuous will be encouraged to perform good actions even when
she does not want to. Eventually, she will become accustomed to the moral codes she is
being taught and, if all goes well, her appetites will follow suit, and she will want to
engage in virtuous actions. The habit she has acquired will be a virtue.
Theologian Lee Yearley raises the question of whether all habits of virtue require
the same level of emotional involvement. His assessment is that some virtues depend
more on the action that results from them than on the emotional component. He names
justice as one such virtue, and he argues that a person who performs a just action is still
acting with justice even though her emotions might not be properly engaged. He
acknowledges that for Aquinas, the just act is diminished without the passional
involvement, but Yearley holds that the act is the most important component of the
virtue.71 Other virtues depend entirely on whether the emotion is present or not, and one
example is courage. It is not possible to have the virtue of courage without the
concomitant emotions.72 Yearley makes a valid point that the level of emotional
involvement might vary from one virtue to another, but Aquinas’s account seems to
require passions or emotions to be at least amenable to, if not overtly motivating, an
action in order for the action to be virtuous. However, Yearley’s argument does address
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the question of how we would prefer that people act prior to their acquiring a given
virtue. In the case of justice, it seems beneficial to society that people act with justice
even when they do not want to, although the ideal would be that they both desire and act
with justice.
In addition to being an integral part of virtue, emotions can foster the practice of
virtue through motivating a person’s returning to virtuous behavior when she has lapsed
from the habit of virtuous action. Peter Sedgwick makes the case that fear73 can diminish
voluntariness, but he also argues that it can serve a positive function. He writes,
Aquinas sees two ways in which human beings are led to practise virtue
once they have begun to stray off the straight and narrow. First, they are
restrained from doing evil by fear, but only after they have failed to be
moved easily by words; second, they are led ‘by force of custom to do
voluntarily what once they did only from fear and thus to practise virtue’.
Fear comes close to making an action involuntary, because the will is free
when it can direct itself without compulsion from outside itself…. but
action through fear does not remove the causality of the will.74
In this way, a passion comes close to coercing a person to act in ways that their will
might still resist. And as the person acts in the ways they are supposed to, they come to
want to act in those ways and to increase their virtuous behavior. They choose to develop
emotions that will foster virtue.

Choosing Emotions
Emotions and passions sometimes arise unbidden, but their connection to the
intellect in Aquinas’s system suggests that they are subject to a level of choice and
control on the part of the person experiencing them. This amenability to the influence of
73
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reason and thought is, as we have seen, one of the reasons emotions are moral. Peter King
summarizes the significance of the passions for morality as follows: The passions “can be
affected by reasons and beliefs. Their cognitive penetrability will turn out to be
fundamental to Aquinas’s moral and theological psychology, since this allows people to
perfect themselves through the virtues.”75 As we saw above, the passions are (indirectly)
meritorious in relation to the will, which is the power of choosing in the human soul.
When emotions are properly in accord with reason, they do provide the necessary
integration of the person’s thinking, feeling, and willing that is needed for virtue.
Aquinas’s account of prudence provides one example of the way this internal
integration fosters virtue. Prudence is necessary for a person to live a good life, and it is
required for virtue. In other words, prudence helps the person to desire that which is good
and to act in ways that accomplish good, and it incorporates both reason and appetite.
Prudence is the intellectual habit (virtue) that involves reason in making good choices
and decisions, and it is necessary in order for a person to choose well consistently (ST III.57.5). The virtue of prudence, “which is right reason about things to be done,” also
requires an appetite that is directed toward good ends (ST I-II.57.4). Traina explains that
“prudence properly understood not merely makes wise decisions about the pursuit of
goods but also—by engaging the appetite, especially the will—harnesses desire and
yields action.”76 Both the intellectual and sensitive appetites can be involved in prudence.
A rightly directed will takes pleasure in reasonable engagements with sensible goods that
the sensitive appetite enjoys. When prudence is present, the person’s decisions and
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choices of action follow reason’s determination of what is best in a given situation, and
they take pleasure in the good. Further, the passions can arise as a result of the will, and
can take pleasure in that which the will finds good through overflow. Lombardo offers a
summary of the integration of thinking, feeling, and willing in a virtuous person. He
writes, “virtuous passions may well respond to abstract ideals, either by being shaped by
rational considerations or by sharing by overflow in the affections of the will. Similarly,
the affections of the will may rejoice or sorrow virtuously in sense objects.”77 The will
and the passions do not contribute to a given virtue by separating themselves from each
other, but by being in tune with one another and with reason.
The intimate connection between the will and the passions extends beyond their
desiring the same objects. Because the will is the power involved in choosing, a person
can engage it to make decisions regarding whether and how to act when she experiences
an emotion. Aquinas makes the case that it is also possible to make choices about one’s
emotions themselves. This is part of what it is to be responsible for one’s emotions and
one’s emotional life,78 and to be responsible for the actions that follow on the emotions,
or that the emotions motivate. Both Mattison and Yearley79 draw on Aquinas as they
discuss the methods people can use to alter their emotions. Using the example of anger,
Mattison outlines how a person can reshape an immoderate emotion. First the person
works toward continence, or recognizing that the passion is inordinate and checking
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herself from acting on it.80 Next, the person makes the effort to shape the passion itself,
which involves more than stopping herself from acting on the passion. It involves trying
not to feel the inordinate passion when it does start to arise.81 Finally, the person attempts
to prevent the inordinate version of the passion from being aroused at all.82 Yearley
describes the relationship between reason and passion at each of the three stages. He calls
the first stage self-cultivation, when a person’s reason and emotions are in conflict.
Second, the person begins acting virtuously, but she is not yet truly virtuous because
“errant emotions still are evident and powerful, even though they are under control.”
Finally, the person reaches the stage of true virtue in which there is no longer any conflict
between her reason and her emotions.83
Cates also argues that people have the power to observe and to a degree determine
their emotions. This happens in several ways. Prior to the onset of a given emotion, the
intellect and the sensory powers mutually influence one another through the involvement
of reason in sensory powers, and through the sensory powers’ contributions to reason that
were discussed in chapter three. The intellect is also capable of persuading the emotions,
and it is ethically important for people to see this and allow the intellect to work on their
less virtuous emotions. As an emotion arises, our wills may choose to consent to the
emotion or not. In consenting to an emotion, we apprehend it as suitable, and this is a
form of intellectual love.84 We can also use our wills to distract us from emotions that are
not good for us by focusing on something else. Thus, the intellect and will can influence
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emotions before they arise, as they arise, and after they have arisen by attempting to
reform them.85 Reflecting on emotions is, therefore, not an exact science, but it is
important for moral growth and integrity. Cates cautions, “once we feel a particular
passion, it is likely to skew (for better or for worse) our reflections about whether or not
the passion itself is appropriate.”86 Taking this insight seriously allows us to see how the
moral community can serve a critical function at this point. When our own emotions
skew our assessment, other people, who are not embroiled in the same emotion, can
provide us with a perspective that helps to check our emotion-based assessment against
reality. Giving children this kind of feedback can help them learn that their emotional
responses to reality are not the only ways of perceiving and interpreting the situations and
circumstances in which they find themselves. Doing so teaches them that reflecting on
their emotions is necessary for achieving emotional integration.
Our ability to control our emotions means that we can (to some extent) determine
what emotions we experience at a given time, as well as which emotions will influence
our formation over time. To a degree, we choose the emotions that we consistently
experience, and these become part of who we are and how we interact with our
surroundings. For this reason, Cates encourages conscious deliberation about “what sorts
of things we ought to look for and focus on as significant in situations of moral import.
We can choose over time to become persons whose passions are partly composed of
realistic beliefs and perceptions that are informed by well-deliberated desires for the
humanly good.”87 As adults, we can sometimes deliberate about what sorts of things we
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believe and into what sorts of formative experiences we choose to place ourselves. What
does this advice mean with respect to children? Children do not have this level of control
over their lives, and their emotional makeup is formed in situations they do not choose,
situations that are to a large degree regulated by others. Their emotional development,
particularly prior to the onset of the ability to engage in rational deliberation, will likely
tend to follow the pattern of the dawning experiences Arpaly posits (see chapter one). For
everyone, but especially for children, experience guides what we think and what we
believe in ways that are sometimes not yet conscious or chosen. Ideally, by being
exposed to good examples and by others’ responses to their actions, children learn to see
situations in ways that are realistic and that lead them to be people who want to be
virtuous.
In summary, according to Aquinas, a truly virtuous person will have integrated
reason and emotion so that they are not at odds with one another, and so her emotion is
guided by reason. Virtue requires that a person knows what she is doing, that the action is
good, and that she chooses to do it. The basis in reason is what makes the emotion and
the resulting action something for which the person is responsible. Emotion’s relationship
to reason also makes a person responsible, to some extent, for how and whether she
acquires the virtues. For this reason, discussions of virtue involve the person being
accountable for her actions and, at least in part, for her acquisition of the virtues. The
virtuous person is able to incorporate her emotions and reason into choosing the right
course of action. By these standards, children are often not exercising a Thomistic
conception of virtue. They are, however, working and living and learning toward it. And
as they move toward virtue, they will engage in actions that are moral, even if not yet
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fully virtuous. Although Aquinas denies that children have reason, he would not deny
that they have passion since even animals experience passion.88 Further, appetite drives
us to engage with the world and to come to know our surroundings and determine not
only what the objects we encounter are, but also what they mean for us. Because the
emotions play a role in the moral life, they are part of what it means to be a moral agent.
In the next section, I argue that children should be understood to be moral agents
because their actions have moral import, and because their emotions are engaged in and
being formed by the actions they perform. Their emotions and actions respond to the
good as they perceive it in their stage of life, but their worldview is not yet shaped by
reason to the degree that it will be when they are older, and so their actions are not yet
something for which they are or should be held to an adult level of accountability.

Children’s Moral Agency
My argument for considering children to be moral agents is based on their
emotions, through which they engage and respond to the people, objects, and situations
they experience. Aquinas’s distinction between emotion and cognition provides a system
within which to think about the human experience of emotion that maintains its
relationship to cognition. As we have seen, emotion attunes people’s awareness to the
morality of different situations and motivates their behavior. This is true of children as
well as adults. At the same time, children are largely dependent on others, which raises
the question of how their agency functions within this dependency. In the first part of this
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section, I make the case that desire for goods is a moral motivator, and that the goods
infants and children desire are in fact sometimes moral goods. In the final part of this
section, I attempt to articulate the ways moral communities, action, and interaction foster
and constitute moral agency in a child.

Desire and Dependency
The goods that people desire often serve as reasons and motivations for their
actions. This is the argument advanced by Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder in their
book of moral psychology, In Praise of Desire.89 In some ways, their theory concurs with
Aquinas’s system, notably in that both require thought and emotion for virtue. Arpaly and
Schroeder name their theory “Spare Conativism,” which is the notion that people act for
desires, where desires are understood to be intrinsic desires for the right things based on
right concepts.90 Arpaly and Schroeder contend that a person has virtue when she has
good will,91 and they understand good will to be “desiring the right or good (via the right
concepts).”92 What the right or good actually is, Arpaly and Schroeder leave to normative
moral ethics to determine, and they do not define the right or the good themselves.93
Rather, they focus on the desires people experience and discuss different types of
desiring. There are instrumental desires that are desires for something because of how it
benefits me. These, they argue, can become intrinsic desires, which are desires for what
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the object is itself.94 An example of this might be a child who desires the praise she
receives for being kind to a playmate, but later comes to enjoy the friend’s company and
to want to be kind because she likes the friend. Arpaly and Schroeder argue that a
“reward system” functions within intrinsic desire: “to have an intrinsic desire regarding it
being the case that P is to constitute P as a reward or punishment.”95 Arpaly and
Schroeder give an example of children learning to cooperate. When children get positive
attention (reward) when everyone is cooperative, they come to constitute cooperation
itself as reward.96
Arpaly’s and Schroeder’s theory of desire and action is somewhat compatible
with Aquinas’s theory of emotion. Arpaly and Schroeder make the case that people desire
that which they consider to be a reward, and this corresponds to the middle portion of the
appetitive movement described by Aquinas—from love to desire to joy in possession (or
from hate to aversion to sorrow). In both theories, desiring the object is based on an
apprehension of the object as good, or as something that will benefit the person, or as
something that will be pleasant.
Another striking point of connection between Aquinas and Arpaly’s and
Schroeder’s theory is the central role of the intellectual powers in motivation. Arpaly and
Schroeder contend that people are motivated by intrinsic desires, which they define as
being based on the right concepts, and right concepts are formed by the intellect. That is,
Arpaly and Schroeder are not arguing that human moral behavior should be motivated by
whims and base-level passions. Rather, the desires should be for objects that are good. A
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person’s reason plays a role in determining what is good, and it helps to shape desires and
so actions. However, this reason need not be either conscious or deliberate.97 Recall
Arpaly’s consideration of Huck Finn that I discussed in chapter one. Huck’s desires to
protect Jim from the slave catchers motivated his action not to disclose Jim’s location. At
the same time, his desires were not based on conscious deliberation. Rather, they were
the result of a “dawning” experience that emerged from the time he had spent with Jim
and his as-yet unarticulated understanding of Jim as a human being who deserved
freedom. This example further corroborates the view of the role of emotion in moral
agency. Huck’s moral action when faced with the decision of whether to turn Jim into the
slave catchers stemmed from his emotions that had been shaped by his experience, but
his reason was also involved even though it was not conscious. Just as Aquinas’s account
demonstrates that people come to learn universal concepts (“chair”) from experiences
with concrete instances (seeing many chairs) through their intellectual apprehension
abstracting the concept from the concrete (ST I.79.3), it is possible that the same process
can occur in a person who has repeated experiences of another person. As Huck came to
know Jim, Huck’s intellectual apprehension abstracted characteristics of Jim and
correlated them with concepts of human beings that were already present in Huck’s
intellect. It is possible that Huck’s intellect knew that Jim fit the concept of human being
equal to other humans, although his consciousness retained the category of “slave” for
Jim. It seems plausible, then, that Huck’s reason was involved, although not in a
conscious or deliberate way. And this unconscious “dawning” experience shaped his
desires and emotions such that he was motivated to act as he did.
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Jean Porter offers a description of the way a virtuous person’s thoughts and
desires are integrated in Aquinas’s theory that corresponds to what Arpaly and Schroeder
propose. Porter maintains that the person who is virtuous not only has a desire to perform
good actions, but she also has a desire for the good itself, “both in general terms, and in
terms of her admiration and desire for the fitting, the noble, the decent, the praiseworthy,
as these ideals have been inculcated in her by her upbringing. These desires, in turn, set
the orientation of the whole person, her mind as well as her passions and her will.”98
Desires for the good allow the virtuous person to see the good,99 to notice moral
situations, and they influence how she reasons about the good and the moral,100 and how
she chooses to engage in moral actions.
Desire is a powerful motivator, and the objects of desires are goods that we can
evaluate ethically. In his book, Dependent Rational Animals, Alasdair MacIntyre makes a
case (partly building on Thomas Aquinas) for virtue within human dependency, which
applies not only to children, but to people at all stages of life who find themselves
vulnerable and dependent on others.101 His argument can be extended to considerations of
what it means to be a moral agent who desires the good within a community of mutually
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dependent human beings. Specifically, I find his thoughts useful for advancing the notion
of children as moral agents based on their desire for and seeking of the good within the
social relationships in which they find themselves.
MacIntyre’s argument contains three main points that relate to our consideration
of children’s moral agency. First, he makes a case for the importance of acknowledging
and addressing the physical nature of what it means to be human.102 In the text, he treats
in some detail the characteristics humans and intelligent non-human animals share, in
large part because of our common physicality.103 Second, that humans are bodily beings
means that we are vulnerable to ailments and afflictions, and MacIntyre argues that it is
morally important to acknowledge this vulnerability and dependence on others and to
develop “virtues of acknowledged dependence” (8). Virtues of acknowledged
dependence are those qualities that foster our participation in relationships of giving and
receiving with other (also dependent) people (120), such that we share in those “goods
that can only be mine insofar as they are also those of others, that are genuinely common
goods” (119). Finally, we must also work to overcome our reliance on others for
determining what is good such that we become independent practical reasoners (105).
Both sets of virtues are attained within the context of social relationships. Indeed, without
the relationships, we will not acquire the virtues either of dependence or of independence
(9). Thus, human beings—including children—are interdependent and interrelational, and
we develop our virtues within the context of and through our relationships.
MacIntyre distinguishes four categories of “good” that contribute to human
flourishing and development. The first goods are “the pleasures attained in the
102
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satisfaction of…felt wants” (68); second are goods that serve as a means to other ends;
third are goods that are worth pursuing for their own sake within a given social role (for
example the skills of fishing for members of a fishing crew) (66); and finally are those
goods that are universally beneficial to humans as human beings for their flourishing
(67). We all begin as infants with desires for those things we need to survive, for comfort,
and for things that will allow us to flourish and develop our potential. Our desires at this
stage center around our bodily needs, “for milk and the breast, for warmth and security,
for freedom from this or that discomfort or pain, for sleep” (68). Although we continue to
experience desires related to physical wants throughout our lives, MacIntyre argues that
children learn that there are goods beyond their immediate needs, and that there are
different sorts of goods than bodily wants (68). Children learn that sometimes another
course of action rather than the one that immediately satisfies our desire is best or good in
a given set of circumstances (69). At this stage they still depend on adults to tell them
what is good. Being able to evaluate which good is best to pursue in a given instance
involves learning to separate ourselves from our desires so that we can determine whether
what we want right now is really the best course of action, or even a good one (70).104
Then, eventually, human beings learn to move beyond what the authoritative voices from
our childhood say is good for us, to ourselves determining what that good is (71).
This progression that MacIntyre outlines is similar to that presented by Porter
above.105 The person moves from being told what to do and why, to being an independent
practical reasoner who herself determines the good and the course of action that will best
104
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achieve that good. All of this, on MacIntyre’s read, occurs in the context of relationships,
without which we could not become independent practical reasoners (82). A person gains
the skills, knowledge, and tools for independent reasoning from the relationships of
dependence she experiences in her childhood (84).106 Further, no one can continue
functioning as an independent practical reasoner without the support of community. This
kind of independence is something we depend on others to help us maintain (96).
Once a person learns to reason independently, she must still bring her desires into
agreement with her judgments. The goal is to desire something because it is good and not
only because it satisfies her wants (87).107 MacIntyre argues that the virtues are crucial to
this development: “What are the qualities that a child must develop, first to redirect and
transform her or his desires, and subsequently to direct them consistently towards the
goods of the different stages of her or his life? They are the intellectual and moral
virtues” (87). The ability to detach ourselves from our desires and assess them in terms of
the good is “in key part an extended initiation into those habits that are the virtues” (88).
A person has acquired a given virtue when she desires that which she also evaluates as
good.

Mary Doyle Roche argues that children’s vulnerability and interdependence shows
that virtue is acquired through relationships (Mary M. Doyle Roche, “Children, Virtue
Ethics, and Consumer Culture,” in Virtue and the Moral Life: Theological and
Philosophical Perspectives,” ed. William Werpehowski and Kathryn Getek Soltis
[Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014], 77). She extends relationality into the
fundamental questions of virtue ethics, which ask: “who am I” (both in terms of
weakness and imago dei); “who do I want to become”; and “how and with whom will I
get there” (83)?
107
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MacIntyre’s argument follows Aquinas’s system of thought with respect to
separating evaluative and appetitive functions.108 MacIntyre also offers a clear
explication of why it is important to think about virtues in terms of what he calls desire
for good. As is true in Aquinas’s analysis, virtue for MacIntyre involves bringing the
desires into agreement with the person’s best understanding of the good. Both systems
also contain a broad-spectrum vision of good that encompasses physical goods (food) and
more abstract goods (love). Aquinas’s system focuses on whether the emotion is rightly
directed toward good and away from evil. His understanding of emotional involvement in
the virtues extends beyond desire to include emotions that are not desires, such as love
and joy, which acknowledge and take pleasure in the goodness that is present. However,
as we saw in Arpaly’s and Schroeder’s argument above, it is plausible that desire is the
driving force behind a lot of action. Thus, even emotions—such as love—that are not
desires can motivate desires.109 For example, if I love someone, that love will likely lead
to desires to do things that are beneficial for that person. MacIntyre shifts the emphasis
away from the desire to the good itself, and he argues that our evaluations must center on
the good that is desired and whether it is best in a given instance, not on the desire per
se.110 While desire may motivate action and serve as a resource for claiming that children
have moral agency, it is important to cultivate in children desires for what is truly good or
best in a given instance if they are to grow in virtue. Simply desiring that which appeals
at a particular moment might be a way that very young children and infants seek the
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good, but they must learn to assess the goods they are desiring and bring their desires into
accord with their best perceptions of the good.
MacIntyre’s position demonstrates that mutual dependence is a thread that
interrelates human beings in community with one another. But who are the agents within
this community? Are the independent practical reasoners the primary agents who act on
behalf of those who are dependent on them within the network of interdependence? It
makes sense that those people who have achieved the ability to engage in independent
practical reasoning have a greater responsibility than those who are more dependent, but
it is possible that those who are dependent are also agents. MacIntyre’s assessment that
infants and young children are motivated by the desire to satisfy physical wants111 helps
advance the case that children are acting in moral ways, although they may not yet be
able to judge the best good in a given instance. Because of this, it is plausible to claim
that children are acting on their desire for the good as they perceive it (including sensitive
appetitive desires based on sensible objects), and as a result, their actions are moral and
stem from their own agency. Children—as well as those who are temporarily or
permanently disabled—are agents to the extent that they are able to engage in actions that
are of moral import and that are somewhat formative of them, and these are chiefly
motivated by the desire for good, as they understand it at their stage of life.
Children’s desires for the good are part of their passional and emotional makeup.
Just as Aquinas does not believe that passions must be overcome, neither does MacIntyre.
MacIntyre thinks emotions must be shaped so that they are not self-centered and focused
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only on the present, but this takes time and is what it means to become virtuous.112
Emotions and desires at all levels of maturity can serve as moral motivators. It is arguable
that children are already acting as moral agents in the world through their desires for the
good. If children did not act on their physical needs and wants, those wants and needs
might go unfulfilled, and the children might not develop as they should. This is
particularly true of wants such as hunger and the desire to be held. Children who lack
adequate nutrition and affection can succumb to failure to thrive,113 and some of them do
not survive. These goods are real and are necessary to their life and well-being, and
without them, children will not be able to develop their potential.114 Children are not
machines that need to be recharged occasionally, but fully human beings who call on
other human beings to interact with them in meeting their needs. Through these
interactions, a child learns about how human relationships function, and she makes a
moral call to those around her to meet her needs.115 For this reason it is arguable that a
child’s desires for her physical needs to be met are in fact desires for goods that are
unqualifiedly necessary at that stage of her development, and that her expression of those
desires is an exercise of her moral agency.
In the next section, I strive to highlight the ways in which experience and
community function to shape children’s emotions, and so their agency. The interactions
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between the child and her community are mutually formative, and the child’s emotions
will contribute to her interpretation of what she is being taught morally. In addition, the
mutual, gradually-building influence of appetite and apprehension on one another means
that the child’s experiences will accrue to help form her perceptions of and evaluations of
the goods that she encounters. At the end of the section, I draw on a fictional narrative
about a child developing compassion to illustrate the ways emotions and experiences
compound in moral formation.

Interaction, Action, and Moral Agency
As I discussed in chapter one, the interactive theory in sociology maintains that
human beings, as part of a community, both influence and are influenced by the other
members of the community, and in contributing to the community, an individual is an
agent. The formation occurs in both directions simultaneously. If we think about children
in a moral community in terms of interaction, it seems evident that the community forms
the children, but we also see that children elicit moral responses from others. Their needs
make a claim on the caregivers in their midst to respond to and fulfill those physical
needs. I would argue that the caregiver’s response is moral because it contributes to the
survival and flourishing of the infant or child and is also reflective and formative of the
kind of person the caregiver is. The interactive theory, taken in conjunction with the
importance of experience in moral formation, leads to the possibility that the responses of
caregivers to children’s needs and wants will result in “dawning” experiences for the
children regarding their own value as well as how other people should be treated.
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Recall that children are not considered moral agents or capable of acquired virtue
by Thomistic standards because they have undeveloped rational powers. Ironically, this is
also where I think that Aquinas’s theory can provide resources for claiming that children
are already engaged in moral activity as agents. The appetitive and apprehensive powers
are mutually influential, as we have seen. Because of this, it is plausible to claim that
some of the actions children engage in qualify as moral actions, and that children should
be considered moral agents even with inchoate rational powers.
The cumulative effect of apprehension on appetite, and of appetite on the person’s
perception of the objects she apprehends, arguably begins long before the human being
has developed the ability to reason consciously. Acting for reasons and being able to
reason are not synonymous. People act for reasons, even for moral reasons, without
conscious knowledge or deliberation as to why they are doing so. The desire for physical
goods is one example of this; children act on their desires for food (a vital good) without
reasoning about it. Further, Arpaly’s work that I discussed in chapter one points to this
distinction between conscious reasoning and acting for reasons that have become part of
one’s thinking as a result of “dawning” experiences. A dawning experience can change
the way a person responds to situations, although the person might not yet be aware of
what caused the change. The experiences also change the person’s emotions such that she
notices moral situations differently and responds to them in ways that correspond to her
new experience and her emotions surrounding it.
In teaching children morality, it is important to guide them such that their
emotions come to cooperate with and foster their good behavior. It is possible that the
responses of the community surrounding them can incline children toward good actions.
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It is also possible that children can be guided in a way that is akin to the despotic rule of
reason over emotions that Aquinas cautions against. For instance, a parent can rule a
child by force, coercing her to do what the parent thinks she should, and sometimes, this
is necessary (this is particularly evident in cases involving safety).116 But if this is the
way that the child is always treated, her agency will be undermined, and she will not
learn to bring her own desires into line with the moral codes and norms of her community
and to notice, discern, and act in accord with the good in moral situations.
A child needs a functioning moral community if she is to learn to negotiate
relationships with other people and to understand and follow the moral codes of that
community. Instances where the moral codes are lacking or where they are regularly
broken present children with difficulties for understanding that these norms exist or
should be followed, argues theologian Perry Downs.117 In the context of considering how
to reintegrate street children into communities, Downs argues that the presence of adult
guidance and nurturing and the experience of having ethical norms modeled for them are
necessary components of children’s moral development.118 Community can also serve to
strengthen a person’s resolve and ability to perform a morally right action when that

Williams makes the point that in Aquinas’s theory, the will cannot be subject to
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action is difficult to do. Particularly in situations where people around them are
counteracting the moral codes, children can experience difficulty doing what they know
and feel to be right. Downs contends, “the strength to act on convictions independently
will be very weak in abused and victimized people. Strength to act on what they know is
right comes more easily in a group than in individuals.”119 His insight emphasizes the
importance of community not only for the inculcation of moral norms and for teaching
the child to do what is right, but also for giving the child the support and moral strength
to act on those budding convictions.
To illustrate the ways in which experiences, communities, and emotions influence
moral growth, I draw on the story surrounding Julie Trelling’s relationship with Aggie
Kiplin in Irene Hunt’s Newbery-Award winning young adult novel Up a Road Slowly.120
The narrative is told in first person as a reminiscence by the main character, Julie. In the
story, Julie lives with her strict and morally conscientious Aunt Cordelia, who is also the
school teacher at the local one-room country school that Julie attends. Aggie is a mentally
delayed child whose family lives in poverty, and whom Julie finds “repulsive” due to
Aggie’s unpleasant odor resulting from lack of cleanliness, as well as to Aggie’s
tendency to say inappropriate things (24). Julie and the other children do not wish to
include Aggie in their lunchtime activities; however, Aunt Cordelia requires that Aggie
be included (25). Julie is not yet ready to include Aggie, and Julie contrives a plan
whereby Aggie is told she (Aggie) is the queen and that everyone else is her subject.
Aggie must sit alone in the center of a circle of children who all have their backs to her.
That way, no one has to sit with or look at Aggie (25-26).
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When Julie’s twelfth birthday is approaching, Aunt Cordelia agrees that she may
have a party to celebrate (50). Julie insists that she will invite all the girls in school with
the exception of Aggie, which Aunt Cordelia refuses to accept. Julie is allowed to decide
for herself whether she will have a party that includes Aggie, or cancel the celebration
(51). She cancels the party (52). Her aunt bakes and brings cakes to school for all the
students on Julie’s birthday, but Julie the narrator remembers, “compassion was not yet
aroused within me” (53), and when Aggie insists that she will sit with Julie to eat the
cake, Julie tells her, “‘Don’t you dare follow me, Aggie; don’t you dare come near me’”
(54).
A few months later, towards the end of a very hot summer, the community learns
that Aggie has fallen ill with a fever. She had cut her foot and received no medical
treatment or sanitation for it, and the infection made her very ill (54). On a particularly
hot day, Julie’s school friend Carlotta invites her to go for a buggy ride (56). Aunt
Cordelia permits Julie to go but requests that she stop at the Kiplins’ house to visit Aggie
and to bring some flowers Cordelia has cut from the garden (57). When Julie and Carlotta
reluctantly reach the Kiplin residence, Carlotta refuses to go inside, so Julie enters alone
(59). She is appalled by the deplorable condition of Aggie’s home and by the lack of care
Aggie has received. She sees that Aggie is delirious with fever (59), and Julie finds
herself experiencing a new set of emotions regarding Aggie. She feels awe and
uncertainty in the face of Aggie’s serious illness, and she longs to return Aggie to her
healthy, if repulsive, self (60). Because Aggie is not conscious, Julie apologizes to Mrs.
Kiplin for her unkindness toward Aggie over the years, but Mrs. Kiplin looks at her with
hatred and does not accept the apology (60).
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When Julie leaves the Kiplin house and returns to Carlotta and the waiting buggy,
Carlotta is ready to continue their pleasant ride, but Julie’s experience leaves her wanting
to go home (61). Carlotta refuses to take her home, so Julie leaves the buggy and starts
walking the two miles back to Aunt Cordelia’s house. A friend sees her and gives her a
ride on the handlebars of his bicycle when she explains what happened. Aunt Cordelia
seems to understand that Julie was moved by the experience, although she does not say
so. The next morning they hear the news that Aggie has died (62).
Two themes stand out in this vignette that have relevance for the current project.
The first is the prominence of emotion as a motivator for the children in the story. Julie’s
emotions are pronounced throughout this selection, and because the novel is written from
her perspective, we are made privy to Julie’s emotions. It is interesting to speculate on
the emotions of some of the other characters, but Julie’s are the only ones that are
articulated, and that from the perspective of an adult remembering her childhood.
Nevertheless, the emotional shift Julie experiences in her dealings with Aggie is also a
moral journey. The second theme is the impact the relationships of community have on
the children’s emotions and behavior.
Three moments in this story particularly illustrate the distinctive experience of
children acting as moral agents and of the influence their emotions and other people can
have on them. The first is Julie’s initial response of revulsion to Aggie. Aggie’s lack of
hygiene results in an unpleasant smell.121 To use Aquinas’s language, Julie’s sensitive
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apprehension detects the odor, and her sensitive appetite is moved toward being repelled
by the odor, and so by Aggie. I do not mean to suggest that olfactory experience is the
exclusive reason for the children’s consistent rejection,122 but it does play a role in how
Julie and the other children feel about Aggie. Their emotions are shaped in part by their
sensitive apprehensions of the child. In some ways, the object of their emotions—
Aggie—is reduced to their sensitive apprehension of her, which moves their sensitive
appetites. However, the sensitive parts of their souls are not operating in isolation from
their intellects, and the children have in their intellects an idea of what a child should be
based on their experiences of children who are well cared for. Aggie does not fit their
abstraction of what an acceptable child is, and this also helps to shape their emotional
response. Julie’s actions at this point in the story are shaped by emotional impulses that
have not yet been integrated with and informed by reason. She justifies her rejection of
Aggie to herself, although it means that she loses her birthday party. Hearing that Aggie
is ill does not seem to alter Julie’s feelings toward Aggie. Julie does not wish Aggie evil,
but Julie does not yet have the emotional maturity that would allow her to want to do
anything kind for Aggie.
The second moment that is fruitful to consider is Aunt Cordelia’s insistence that
Julie bring flowers to Aggie. This is an adult’s attempt to alter a child’s emotional
response through experience. Aunt Cordelia knows that talking with Julie and trying to
reason with Julie about the plight of a child like Aggie will prove useless; Julie has been
unresponsive to Cordelia’s attempts to explain Aggie’s situation to Julie (51) and to her

122

Other factors contribute to the rejection, including the children determining who
warrants membership in their group and Aggie’s vulnerability evidenced by her openness
to and obvious desire to befriend Julie.
249

insistence that Julie include Aggie. Julie needs to see and experience for herself why
Aggie is the way she is. In the story, Aunt Cordelia is able to treat Aggie with patience
and compassion. Cordelia demonstrates what appears to be virtue because her emotions
are moved by Aggie’s predicament, even as she sees and smells the same things that
repulse Julie.
Aunt Cordelia is an authoritative voice in the story, and Julie does not resist her
instruction to Julie to bring the flowers to Aggie. However, Carlotta does not feel
compelled to follow the suggestion. In a way, Aunt Cordelia functions as reason in the
story, and Julie represents the emotion that is amenable to reason’s command. Carlotta’s
response can be seen as the “something of their own” of the passions that makes them
able to resist reason’s command. The emotional conditions of Julie and Carlotta
following Julie’s visit to the Kiplins’ home reflect and result from their willingness to
cooperate with the instructions that would lead them away from cruelty and rejection of
another human being and incline them toward compassion. Julie encounters Aggie’s
sickness and poverty and experiences hatred from Aggie’s mother. Following these
experiences, her emotional state is so altered that she cannot continue to enjoy a buggy
ride in the country. Carlotta refuses to visit Aggie, and so she is unmoved and remains in
the same emotional state that both she and Julie were in prior to stopping at the Kiplins’.
Lest we think that Julie’s transformation is immediate, the third salient moment in
the story involves an exchange with her Uncle Haskell that points to the gradual
alteration that entrenched but misguided emotions undergo on their path to aiding virtue.
Following Aggie’s funeral, Julie is feeling guilty about how she treated Aggie and seeks
out her uncle. Julie knows that he is right when he tells her, “‘You know very well that if
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this Kiplin girl could approach you again, as moronic and distasteful as she was a month
ago, that you’d feel the same revulsion for her. You couldn’t help it’” (65). Although her
understanding and judgment of the situation and of Aggie have changed, her emotional
response has not yet caught up. Aquinas’s distinction between emotion and cognition is
useful in explaining this phenomenon. Julie needs to continue growing in virtue before
she will reach the maturity that allows her to express compassion even in the face of
distasteful, unpleasant people, and in the midst of the pressure from the group of children
to reject Aggie. Uncle Haskell knows this, and the following day, he tells Julie, “‘Guilt
feelings will do nothing for either you or the Kiplin child. But your compassion as you
grow into womanhood may well become immortality for the girl you call “Aggie”’” (67).
Julie’s experience, her emotions of guilt, and her budding sympathy are the beginnings of
the virtue of compassion developing in her.
As Julie experiences these events and feelings, she is a moral agent. Her rejection
of Aggie involves a series of moral actions that hurt Aggie. Her decision to obey Aunt
Cordelia and enter the Kiplin house is a moral action that changes her, although it brings
no comfort to Mrs. Kiplin, and Aggie is unaware of Julie’s presence. Julie’s decision to
end her buggy ride, to allow the emotions of the experience to become part of her rather
than pushing them aside, is a moral action, and one in which Carlotta is not willing to
participate.
The events in the story are also replete with the interaction that is part of being in
a moral community. The children in the school are a small community that makes the
decision to reject a child who does not fit in. The buggy ride with Carlotta is an
interaction that pressures Julie not to visit Aggie and that does not adapt to accommodate
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how she feels after the visit. Mrs. Kiplin’s overt rejection of Julie and Aggie’s inability to
interact both make an impression on Julie and affect her emotions and how she thinks
about herself and her past actions. Upon her return home, Aunt Cordelia provides a place
of quiet support in which Julie can begin to process the experience (62). Julie’s
interaction with Uncle Haskell gives her an idea of how she can grow from her
experience rather than be consumed by unproductive guilt.123 The people she encounters
in this story all have an impact on her emotions, for better or worse, and her response to
them involves her moral agency.
Julie’s story exemplifies the way in which emotion is involved in the moral life.
Her desires for what she perceives to be good motivate her actions. But her willingness to
learn that there are goods that might take precedence over the immediate goods on which
she has been focused (Aggie’s well-being is of greater significance than an enjoyable
buggy ride) makes it possible for her to develop emotionally in a way that will foster
virtue. Her emotions guide her actions when she is younger, and she has some control
over how they continue to exert influence and to be formed by her reason and her
evaluations of what is good as she grows.
Children are able to engage in moral actions of which they are the agents, and
Aquinas’s understanding of emotion and virtue provides tools for reflecting on this.
Children’s emotions and their desires for what they perceive to be good motivate their
actions, even at a basic level such as the desire to satisfy their physical wants. As children
mature and their reason develops, their discernment of the best good in a given instance
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Recall that Ryan maintains the possibility of growing morally by reflecting on the
“negative” emotions, which could include guilt (Ryan, “Positive and Negative
Emotions,” 151).
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will also mature. Accordingly, children’s responsibility for their judgment of what is
good, for the actions they choose, and for the consequences of those actions increases
because they are able to reason and understand the moral import of what they choose to
do. Aquinas’s distinction between appetite and apprehension, which also maintains their
mutual and cumulative influence, is a constructive resource for thinking about how
children already possess agency even as they develop in virtue. Children will begin to
acquire virtue as they learn to discern the good, and as their emotions come to concur
with that which they understand to be good, and this growth stems from their early
appetitive inclinations and responses.
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CONCLUSION

This dissertation has operated on the premise of a Christian theological
anthropology that holds children to be fully human and in the image of God. Because of
their full humanity, children are already in relationship with God and with other people;
they encounter and must learn to contend with the good and the evil in the world. As they
engage in relationships and navigate situations, and as they express their desires for what
they perceive to be the good, they are acting as moral agents. Children’s agency occurs
within the context of their vulnerability and dependence, and they live their agency by
interacting with the people with whom they are in relationships and the circumstances in
which they find themselves. Much of their engagement with and understanding of the
world occurs through emotions that they experience as a result of their relationships and
circumstances. These emotions reflect the values the children have and can serve as
moral motivation in their actions and responses to the people and situations they
encounter.
Many contemporary theological and philosophical considerations of emotions
recognize emotions as central to moral formation in children. This is due to the cognitive
dimension of emotion that allows it to be something on which people can reflect and that
they control, at least to some extent. However, strictly cognitive theories of emotion
define emotion as constituted by propositional thought in a way that excludes children’s
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having emotions. This exclusion extends to considerations of children as moral agents in
ethics more generally, and when children do appear in theological ethical discourse, it is
usually as objects of ethical responses by adults. Taking seriously the full humanity and
engagement with reality that theological anthropology claims for children suggests that
children should be considered ethically in ways that go beyond their being the objects of
other people’s ethical actions and that places them in the position of being moral agents
as well.
Aquinas’s theory of emotions provides a system in which to consider children as
moral agents whose emotions impact their actions and morality without requiring a level
of cognitive development that young children have not yet achieved. He relates intellect
and passion in a way that maintains their distinction and at the same time emphasizes
their mutual influence. The cumulative effect of reason and passion on one anther results
in the rich and complex emotions of more mature human beings. However, Aquinas’s
placement of the passions within the sensitive appetite and the relationship he draws
between the sensitive and intellective parts of the soul implies that even some of the
passions that infants experience can be considered emotions because they reflect the
child’s perception of and desire for the good, and because they inform the child’s intellect
both in the moment during which the child experiences them and over time as resources
on which the child will draw in her decision making and interactions.
Through these interactions, emotions function in the child’s moral agency as
reasons for actions and as moral motivators. Aquinas’s insistence that a good action
requires an emotional engagement in order to be virtuous supports the idea that emotions
are central to moral motivation and action. The emotional experience of desiring the good
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drives much of people’s action. Even early desires for physical comfort and for care can
be forms of emotional motivation, and acting on those desires can be considered
engaging with the world as an agent. This is because acting on desires for goods qualifies
as acting for reasons, and those reasons do not need to be either conscious or articulated
to function as reasons and motivation for moral action. At the same time, because
emotion plays a central role in the moral life, it will be important for further research to
investigate the implications for moral agency and accountability that follow when a
person’s emotions do not develop in a way that we would recognize as normal.
Whether the reasons for one’s actions are conscious and articulated or not,
helping children develop good reasons for actions and good moral awareness is vital to
their moral formation. Because human beings have rational potential, children must be
taught to think about and reflect on their emotions and the actions that stem from those
emotions. They should also be taught how to discern the best good from among
competing goods, as well as the best course of action in a given situation. Because human
beings are relational and interdependent, children must learn to understand the
consequences of their actions both for themselves and for others, and to seek the best
good for all concerned. Further, as we think about children and the role emotions play in
their motivation to act and in their moral formation, it is important to remember that their
needs and wants must be addressed in ways that guide them toward wanting that which is
good. Adults can help to foster this kind of emotional resonance with the good by
attending to the needs of children through nurture and care for their needs, and through
cultivating a sense of empathy for others. Learning to distinguish between what the child
really does need and what she wants might constitute part of this education. So too can
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learning that others have legitimate needs and wants that must be taken into account
when fulfilling one’s own needs and wants. Still, the child is her own person, and as
influential as education, examples, and experiences may be, the child herself plays a part
in deciding whether and how to incorporate and act on the lessons she has been taught.
The hope is that children will take to heart the morally good lessons and examples
to which they are exposed. However, if they do not, that does not preclude them from
agency. Making bad choices and acting for selfish reasons does not mean that a person is
not being an agent. Adults also perform morally bad actions. The difference between a
child’s bad action and an adult’s is that the adult is morally and legally culpable for what
she does, while the child is not held accountable in the same ways. It seems appropriate
when dealing with children to give less attention to punishing and more attention to
teaching and redirecting the child’s thinking and emotions in order to encourage moral
emotions (and thinking) that motivate morally good actions. When a person has reached a
level of cognitive maturity, has been exposed to the moral codes of her community, and
has experienced situations of moral import, she is likely to be expected to know what is
good and to act accordingly. Teaching children and helping them to develop good
emotional and moral habits will aid them in reaching the maturity to be accountable.
Because children are still learning and being shaped and guided by their
experiences, how they respond to the circumstances and relationships they encounter will
form who they are in those moments and who they become as they grow into adulthood.
But they usually do not control their own circumstances, and this dependence and
vulnerability that is the context for their moral formation has implications for thinking
about adults such as Mrs. Kiplin in the narrative I recounted in chapter four. Mrs. Kiplin
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is presented as a mean, unforgiving woman who does not take good care of her child. But
if we take seriously the formative influences of childhood, we must look at such a person
with an eye to what her life has been up to that point. How was she raised? Under what
circumstances did her character form? This is not meant to excuse or exonerate her from
her neglect of Aggie. Aggie experiences the sin of rejection, some of it from her own
mother, and Aggie dies in filth and discomfort as a result. But our view of Mrs. Kiplin
might be nuanced if we knew the story of her own childhood. If it is true that each
person’s childhood perdures in her life, then this includes the childhoods replete with
neglect, abuse, and violence. These children might grow into adults who have been
deprived of the formative experiences that would have guided them towards virtue and a
moral life. More research needs to be done to investigate how to respond ethically to
adults whose childhoods lacked the positive formation of a good moral community, and
whose actions as adults are contrary to the good.
It is important to remember that children are not a static demographic. Each
person spends only a limited amount of time in childhood and then takes on the
responsibility of being an adult. Each adult was once a child, and the experiences of the
early years—both the good and the bad—remain with the person throughout her life.
Children are already fully part of the human family, and adults all retain aspects of their
lives as children. When thinking about children in moral theological terms, then, we must
remember that they are already experiencing the world around them in terms of emotions,
and that these emotions impact their actions and responses. The person each child is
today—appetitive, intellectual, interrelational, vulnerable, dependent, developing, and so
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on—influences the world around her and is part of who she (and that world) will be in the
future, a future in which Christians dare to hope.
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